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This dissertation considers the music and technical practice of composers affiliated with 
French spectralism, including Hugues Dufourt, Gérard Grisey, Tristan Murail, Jean-Claude 
Risset, and Kaija Saariaho. They regularly described their work, which was attuned to the 
transformative experiences that technologies of electronic sound production and reproduction 
could inspire in listeners, using metaphoric appeals to construction: to designing new sounds or 
exploring new illusory aural phenomena. To navigate a nascent but fast-expanding world of 
electronic and computer music, the spectralists appealed to physical musical attributes 
including gesture, space, and source-cause identification. Fascinated by gradual timbral 
transformations, they structured some of their pieces to invite speculative causal listening even 
while seeking to push it to expressive extremes. 
I hypothesize that, much as the immersive technology of the cinema can create the 
illusory feeling of flight in viewers, electronic music can inspire listeners to have experiences in 
excess of their physical capabilities. Those feelings are possible because listening can be 
understood as empathetic and embodied, drawing on a listener’s embodied and ecological 
sensorimotor knowledge and musical imagery alongside referential, semiotic, and cultural 
aspects of music. One way that listeners can engage with sounds is by imagining how they 
would create them: what objects would be used, what kind of gestures would they perform, 
how much exertion would be required, what space would they inhabit. I cite recent research in 
psychoacoustics to argue that timbre indexes material, gesture, and affect in music listening. 
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Technologies of sound production and reproduction allow for the manipulation of these 
tendencies by enabling composers to craft timbres that mimic, stretch, or subvert the timbres of 
real objects. Those electronic technologies also suggest manipulations to composers, by virtue of 
their design affordances, and perform an epistemological broadening by providing insight into 
the malleability of human perceptual modes. I illustrate these claims with analytic examples 
from Murail’s Ethers (1978), Saariaho’s Verblendungen (1984), and Grisey’s Les Chants de l’Amour 
(1984), relating an embodied and corporeal account of my hearing and linking it to 
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Introduction: Imagination Beyond The Body 
1.1 Three illusions
While watching a movie at the Mugar Omni Theater, a large IMAX movie theater at the 
Boston Museum of Science, I suddenly had the feeling that my body was flying through the air. 
The camera, adopting a literal bird’s eye view, soared above a landscape and darted about, and 
in my chair I darted with it. When the camera-as-bird took a sudden dive, I literally fell out of 
my chair as if it was my body that had plummeted – and several of my fellow moviegoers did 
the same. 
The Museum of Modern Art in New York devotes an entire room to a triptych of Claude 
Monet’s Water Lilies (1914-26). Having seen the paintings only in textbooks, I was unprepared 
for their massive size when I viewed them in person: each panel is 6’6” tall and nearly 14’ wide. 
The immersive scale coupled with the serene aquatic subject matter led me to see movement 
where there was none, a soft undulation in the stationary painting. I felt, at least for a moment, 
that I had entered Monet’s garden in Giverny. It felt more than merely metaphorical—not “like I 
was there,” so much as “I was there.” But where is “there”? The garden—its space and its depth 
and its movement—was conjured by my imagination but experienced by my whole body.
In her song “Fade” from her 2012 album Movement, Holly Herndon sings the line “Reach 
out your hand” (2:02). The vocal signal is rearticulated every 16th note so that it creates a 
chopped, stuttering effect in time with the drums. She is singing quietly but, through reverb and 
mixing, sounds louder than the rest of the instruments. Her voice fills up a large space but 
sounds as if it does so easily, without strain. In listening to this moment of this song, I imagine 
that I have that voice, that I fill up that cavernous space with that dense rhythm. I feel 
effortlessly powerful.
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All three of these experiences have several commonalities.
First, they are illusions: an experience of inhabiting the fictive world of the movie, the 
painting, or the song rather than (or within, and touched by) the actual world that my body was 
inhabiting. They constituted an imagined sensorimotor engagement with the world of the 
artwork. 
Second, they are technologically mediated and technologically enabled. Following from 
scholarship on the cinema by Sobchak (2004), Agamben (2009), and Richmond (2015), the 
components of the IMAX theater—its scale, the positioning of the projector at the back of the 
silent and darkened theater—form an apparatus, which structures and guides the attention and 
behavior of a viewer. In my experience, the apparatus of the theater coaxed me into 
empathizing with the perspective of the camera. I assigned false and impossible sensations to 
correlate with the perceptual information I was being presented, to produce the illusory 
experience of flight. The arrangement of Monet’s paintings in the room at MoMA coupled with 
aspects of his color palette and technique constitutes a similar kind of apparatus; as does the 
technological assemblage of, on the one hand, the techniques of the recording studio, and, on 
the other hand, my headphones and .mp3 compression rate and even room layout when I listen 
to Herndon’s song. 
Third, these experiences are bodily sensations that draw on my bodily knowledge, but 
they imply experiences outside of the physical nature and design of my body, in spaces that do 
not or cannot exist. I cannot actually fly; I cannot actually produce the same sounds as Herndon 
in “Fade.”  1
 And, strictly speaking, Herndon’s voice sounds as it does in “Fade” only when her voice merges with 1
the technical apparatus of the recording studio. But she can admit those tools into her sense of her own 
voice when she performs with them, just as I can assimilate the sound of her processed voice into my 
embodied sensorimotor schema. 
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Fourth and finally, these experiences both rely on and cultivate an experience of 
immersion: of being in a position to deploy empathetic and imaginative capacities, often 
without conscious awareness, in a virtual world within the actual world. 
1.2 Technologies of sound creation and production
This dissertation has two interconnected objectives, aimed at better understanding some 
of the phenomena I just described. First, I consider the emergence of the idea that computers 
and digital audio techniques could be used to construct virtual and surreal sounds: sounds that 
evoke materials, gestures, and spaces that were at or past the limits of what could happen in the 
real world, but which were nevertheless measured in relation to real-world phenomena (rather 
than something “alien”). Second, I construct a psychological and perceptual framework for 
considering how listeners might engage with these novel sounds. What might need to be in 
place for a listener to hear, in all its corporeal fullness, an electronic sound as being a 40-foot 
piano? Both of these goals are in service of the analysis of electronic musical practices, including 
but not limited to fixed works produced using the tools of the studio.
Music theory has struggled to account for electronic music with the same nuance that it 
has for acoustic music. I believe this is largely because electronic music is not score-centered, but 
also because the technical knowledge used to make electronic music has been siloed away from 
the skills considered necessary to be a music theorist. But by attending to corporeal signifiers in 
music that are, I will argue, always operating at least on a background level, any listener can 
articulate aspects of the listening experience that lead to relevant pathways through a piece and 
which are intersubjectively communicable.
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Concerning my first thesis that computers emerged as a tool for the construction of 
virtual sonic worlds, consider a hypothetical example: It is possible for the sound of an acoustic 
guitar to exist in a recording alongside the synthesized sound of a hybrid piano with strings 
made out of a mixture of rubber and wood.  The coexistence of these two sounds is the product 2
of two subsets of the electronic revolution in music (and across the arts), which László Moholy-
Nagy termed, in his prescient discussion of the phonograph, “production” and 
“reproduction” (1922). The two are intertwined in the context of the recording studio, and it is 
tempting to refer to aspects of recording as “reproduction” and aspects of synthesis as 
“production.”  But the demarcation is not so clear. In fact, the techniques of recording do not 3
merely represent space: they create it, by using microphones to place instruments at various 
distances from the imagined position of the listener (e.g., drum set back and to the left, singer 
directly next to my left ear, guitar three feet away and in the center). Or recording engineers can 
use signal processing techniques like reverb and equalization to suggest a distance between 
object and listener, and thus to create an aural space with depth of field. Even in the 
stereophonic world of most audio recordings, these constructions take on a kind of three-
dimensionality, similar to the way that depth can be achieved in a flat painting.  Imaginary 4
aural spaces are not all that studios construct: for listening purposes, new instruments can be 
invented in these aural environments. Some early synthesizers seemed to defy description, and 
 These are some of the parameters that Logic Pro X’s physical modeling synthesizer “Sculpture” gives 2
users, for example. 
 The clash between Pierre Schaeffer’s work with musique concrète at the Groupe de Recherches Musicales 3
(GRM) and Stockhausen’s synthesis experiments at Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) during the early 1950s 
is commonly held up as an example of this conceptual schism. See, for example, Demers (2010).
 Echo and reverb’s capacity to create a sense of space are addressed in Doyle (2005). Numerous other 4
authors have written about recording and space but most instructive for my study is the account in 
Lennox (2017), whose embodied cognition framework is similar to mine without making reference 
specifically to mimesis.
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these sounds came to stand in for an alien or uncanny aesthetic. But there was also an effort at 
using synthesizers to recreate acoustic instruments, which proved more difficult than engineers 
initially anticipated.  Indeed, it ultimately required—and elicited—new knowledge of the 5
acoustics of sound production, and a set of computer synthesis algorithms aimed at 
reproducing those production methods. The effort to study sound for means of making better 
synthesizers was not merely a means to an end of solving a practical problem. Rather, it 
illustrates the way that different technological needs altered ways of thinking about sound. 
Using computers to synthesize sound often required parametric thinking: atomizing a sound 
gestalt into aspects like fundamental frequency, overtone spectra, amplitude, attack envelope, 
formant frequencies. But it also invited consideration of the way that those variables are 
interdependent, for instance in learning that playing an instrument louder does not uniformly 
increase the amplitude of all of its partials.
This study considers how the idea of fabricating surreal or non-real musical objects and 
spaces evolved within the historical and aesthetic context of French spectral music in the 1980s, 
particularly in light of emergent computer music technology. Appearing in the wake of mid-
twentieth century continental European high modernism, French spectral composers—
including Gérard Grisey, Tristan Murail, Hugues Dufourt, and Kaija Saariaho—developed a 
complicated and at times contradictory set of aesthetic aims surrounding perceptual immediacy 
and timbral transformations. Their music is fundamentally mediated by technologies of sound 
synthesis and analysis, even when that mediation is masked or oblique. These synthesis 
technologies had an epistemic function for spectral music: the tools of the recording studio 
revealed aspects of sound (especially timbre) which became metaphorical and structural 
 Critical accounts of the early schism between Schaeffer and Stockhausen appear in DeSouza (2018), 5
Kane (2014), and Taylor (2001).
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resources for their compositions (whether acoustic or electroacoustic). Recounting the early 
work of Saariaho, Jean-Baptiste Barrière cites the microphone as an important part of her 
compositional development. Saariaho “was first ‘orchestrating through amplification,’ using 
microphones like microscopes, observing and revealing modes of playing, timbres that could 
not be heard in purely acoustical music. Amplifying these sonic worlds actually provided a 
natural bridge to her work with computers, which started by detailed analysis of vocal and 
instrumental sounds with spectral analysis” (Campion, Barrière, Saariaho 2015, 11). Grisey 
makes a similar point, writing that “spectral music offered a formal organization and sonic 
material that came directly from the physics of sound, as discovered through science and 
microphonic access” (2000, 1). Conceptually, spectralism oscillates between two poles that might 
seem contradictory. Many landmark acoustic pieces from the 1970s—Grisey’s Partiels (1975), 
Murail’s Ethers (1978)—focus on large perceptual gestalts. Technologically mediated acoustic 
knowledge is applied metaphorically and sometimes with fairly broad leeway. In the 1980s, 
many works using the computer necessitated a return to the kinds of parametric thinking 
associated with total serialism, which the spectralists had spent the past decade critiquing on 
perceptual grounds. Spectralism has always evinced an interest in the atoms of sound—partials 
of harmonic and inharmonic sound spectra, attack and decay envelopes, etc.—and in large-scale 
perceptual gestalts often expressed by way of clear and repeating gestural content.
1.3 Perceiving aural worlds
My other objective in this dissertation is to establish a framework for considering some 
perceptual and cognitive mechanisms behind these illusory experiences in music. How am I 
able to feel what it is like to have a voice that isn’t mine, to play an instrument that can’t exist, to 
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inhabit an impossible space? The answers I wish to consider here are psychological and 
technological, but also social: on the one hand, the human (and mammalian, and possibly even 
broader) capacity for imagination, empathy, and mimesis shapes not just our learning but our 
perception of the world. Upon seeing something, I might imagine an interactive relationship 
with it: how would I hold that object? How would I act to produce that sound? Recent evidence 
from psychology and neuroscience has given some experimental evidence to support two 
claims: First, that perception and action are inextricably linked; and second, that aesthetic 
perception is less a difference in kind than in degree in relation to everyday or utilitarian 
perception.  Mimetic perception is “hacked” by constructed aesthetic objects. Part of what those 6
objects communicate, in addition to any semantic or referential content, is an affective 
experience made legible by imagining what it would be like to make an object or do a 
performance. 
An early theorist of embodied perception’s role in the imaginative experience of art is 
Gombrich (1962). He observes that “the context of action creates conditions of illusion. When 
the hobbyhorse leans in the corner, it is just a stick; as soon as it is ridden, it becomes the focus 
of the child’s imagination and turns into a horse” (206). More recently, Starr (2013) has 
undertaken work in what has come to be called neuroaesthetics, an attempt to find explanations 
for different varieties of aesthetic experience within the workings of the brain. Such a discipline 
risks both brain reductionism and value-laden causal linkages between works of art and the 
effects they elicit (i.e., “this painting is better because it activated the motor cortex more strongly 
in study participants”). Brain reductionism is particularly tempting if such research adopts a 
work-centric approach. But Starr’s account highlights how neuroscience can be used to combat 
 I take aesthetic perception to encompass looking at art objects, but also engaging with aspects of the 6
natural and recast world.
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a much older and often invisible reductionism rooted in the work concept. “The complex 
thoughts, sensations, actions, and feelings that make up aesthetic experience are best 
understood first as events,” she writes. “That is, we encounter an urn, and walk around it; a 
landscape, and we seek to dwell in it, a piper’s melody, and we savor its movements; a poem, 
and we read and reread it; a dance, and we watch and the reimagine it. When we approach 
aesthetics thus in terms of events—and not primarily in terms of objects—we foreground 
dynamism and temporality” (17-18). It is possible to deploy findings from neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology to further nuance our understanding of what constitutes a musical work: 
from a classical, Western understanding of works transmitted and reified through scores toward 
a view that incorporates an assemblage of social contexts and actions and actors (from 
performers to listeners) in what Small (1998) calls acts of “musicking.”
In electronic music there is a sometimes yawning gap between how a sound was 
designed and produced and how it is perceived by a listener; what is heard as a massive kick 
drum sample could be comprised of a low sine wave and triggered by the lazy flick of a 
computer key. The first objective I outlined in section 1.2 is largely focused on historical analysis 
of compositional process, and my second objective outlined in 1.3 is concerned with aspects of 
reception (which are equally subject to historicization). But I want to suggest that these two 
strands are not always so separate, and indeed that considering both together has great 
explanatory value for considering the interpenetration of humans and technology within a 
particular historical moment. After all, many aspects of computer music have collapsed the 
distinction between composer, performer, and listener: sitting in front of a synthesizer, one is all 
three at once. (Indeed, the way in which electronic music lays bare this fuzzy distinction makes 
it possible to retrospectively see that these subject positions have always been blurry—yet 
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another way in which technology performs an epistemic broadening.) Iverson (2017) notes that 
for composers in the 1950s “the studio held incredible potential for investigating and even 
overturning acoustic realities” (363), and that even when Stockhausen’s electronic music 
experiments were failures “the electronic studio immediately began to revolutionize his 
perspectives on what was possible” (ibid.). 
However, I wish to avoid the trap of technological determinism: that a new gadget 
emerged which yielded a particular shift in practice. From what did the gadget emerge? Our 
relationship with our tools and techniques is co-constitutive and constantly co-evolving. Clark 
(2004) writes that “human thought and reason is born out of looping interactions between 
material brains, material bodies, and complex cultural and technological environments. We 
create these supportive environments, but they create us too. We exist, as the thinking things we 
are, only thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, and cultural and technological 
scaffolding” (11). Computers occupy a dual position in this formula: on the one hand, computer 
technology is an environment: we do things within the world of the computer. On the other 
hand, the computer alters other environments through epistemic revelations. 
In a fascinating and wide-ranging book on software design, Harrell (2012) puts forth the 
concept of a technological phantasm: “Phantasms are a combination of imagery (mental or 
sensory) and ideas” (4). He poses a question: “How can one better understand and design 
computing systems that effectively prompt human imagination in the forms of narrative 
imagining and poetic thought (e.g., metaphor, theme, emotional tone. narrative, social 
categories, and imaginative worlds)?” (21) This is one question that computer music software 
designers were beginning to grapple with in the 1970s. Faced with perceptual and aesthetic 
impasses in extant modes of synthesis, composer/programmers including Jean-Claude Risset, 
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Barrière, Max Matthews, and John Chowning sought to design methods of sound creation and 
organization that better reflected certain causal tendencies in listening. Once the architecture of 
these synthesis tools was established, their potential to push past the bounds of the material 
world became clear, opening new expressive possibilities for engaged and empathetic listeners. 
It is impossible for technological design to exist outside of or transcend culture and identity: 
that race and gender and class and sexuality are all inscribed in software, because software is a 
form of discourse. But Harrell’s book argues that it is possible for software to use this identity 
embeddedness to shape the world for the better: to have software’s text-like constructedness be 
actively in service of shaping the world rather than to have that shaping be an unconscious 
byproduct. “A computational system prompts humans to conceptualize and interact with world 
events, emotional experiences, and/or social exchanges,” Harrell writes. “The process of 
designing such a system involves having a concept one wishes to express and finding a 
computational means of expression” (115). The concepts expressed by software like the CHANT 
physical modeling synthesis software (discussed in chapters 4 and 5) leave their traces in the 
works created using CHANT. When a CHANT user can manipulate the attack and resonance of 
a signal to sound like a human voice, what kinds of manipulations seemed attractive? If musical 
timbre indexes musical expressivity, and instrumental design has historically both preceded and 
causally determined the kinds of timbres a musician can produce, what happens from the 
listening standpoint when timbre is produced first? Does the arrow travel backward to an 
imagined source?
While I will suggest in chapter 5 that Gérard Grisey was concerned with expressions of 
gender and sexuality in his music, the subjects of race and gender are generally left out of the 
spectralist’s discursive work. There is a long legacy of considering whiteness (not to mention 
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maleness and heterosexuality) as normative and thus invisible, which critical race theorists have 
called “exnomination.” Fiske (1994) writes that “exnomination is the means by which whiteness 
avoids being named and thus keeps itself out of the field of interrogation and therefore off the 
agenda for change” (quoted in Lewis 2002, 224). It seems fair to observe that mindset in the 
relative absence of discussions of race and gender in the writings of the spectral school. I expect 
it is also due to then-contemporary stylistic norms for academic writing (inseparable from the 
aforementioned exnomination) meant to conceal the author: avoiding first-person pronouns and 
biographical information in favor of linguistic constructions and topics that seemed “impartial.” 
Many musicians since the 1960s have used the recording studio in a way reminiscent of 
Harrell’s account of software: as a tool for constructing visions of alternate worlds, alternate 
social configurations, alternate identities.  That this is not considered a part of the spectral 7
project in light of their work with synthesis software and the recording studio is significant. 
Such an approach presents openings for analytic paths through their output. In particular, it 
allows for a way around the problem of score-centered analysis. By analyzing the capabilities of 
various software and hardware, an analyst could start to draw correlations between equipment 
and creative result that have high explanatory value but which are invisible in the score alone. 
1.4 Virtuality and Illusions
There has been much written about virtuality and illusions in the realm of explicitly 
interactive, virtual reality spaces (musical and otherwise). For instance, entries in the Oxford 
Handbook of Music and Virtuality (Whiteley and Rambarran 2016) cover topics like the immersive 
online world “Second Life” (Gagen and Cook 2016) and the YouTube symphony orchestra (Tan 
 For example scholarly accounts, consider Weheliye (2002), Chapman (2008), and Auner (2013).7
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2016). Or in Grimshaw and Garner (2015), the focus is largely on video games and similar 
virtual reality environments that feature sound and music. But these experiences also inhere in 
less explicitly interactive musical environments, such as sitting in a concert hall or listening to 
music at home. Interactivity is a fact of existence; we do not sit and passively observe an 
aesthetic object, but rather constitute our aesthetic experience through the active application of 
embodied physiological and cultural know-how. When I am engaged watching a movie, I am 
not merely observing a two-dimensional image: I am (to varying extents) inhabiting it, 
empathizing with various characters or even with technological artifacts like the camera (as in 
my iMax example). Similarly, when I listen to music with attentive engagement, I am not a 
passive listener but am actively considering various subject positions: of performing a given 
part, of imagining someone else performing it, and incorporating various instruments and 
spaces and gestures into my imagining. This experience may be amplified or attenuated 
depending on listener biography. My background as a performer (principally on percussion and 
electronics) and composer likely predisposes me to consciously attend to questions of 
performance more than some other listeners, though I will argue that it is impossible to listen 
completely detached from questions of causality (including the nuances of performing). And, as 
I discuss in more detail in chapter 3, different performance backgrounds can attenuate 
perceptions of exertion: a pianist and a bassoonist will have different responses to the bassoon 
passage that famously opens Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring (1913)—the bassoonist will likely have a 
better conception of the strain and difficulty required to play that melody in such a high 
register. But everyone is capable of some kind of active, imagined first-person engagement with 
music. This imagined engagement may happen unconsciously and involuntarily, and what 
might be construed as detached or rational cognitive “understanding” or knowledge of music is 
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in fact predicated on some kind of first-person relationship with sound production. (Even 
putatively “neutral” approaches to music analysis embed the subject position of the author and 
the pretense of neutrality is, itself, an articulation of a particular historical and social subject 
position.) Aesthetic experience is relational, and as such it becomes important to consider not 
just technical features of a work of art but the sensory mechanisms that allow us to register 
those features — and that may have enabled us to conceive of and produce those features in the 
first place. The tools we use for creation are not passive: as Clark (2004) observes, we think with 
our tools, and they condition both the range of our thought and enable ideas that were beyond 
our conception. 
I also hasten to note that the illusions I refer to are different from what are 
conventionally thought of as being auditory illusions, such as the Shepard-Risset glissando (a 
tone that seems to ascend or descend infinitely without actually moving, like a barber shop 
pole).  Such trompe l’oreille effects can inspire thinking about the illusory nature of media, but 8
they are ultimately a more specific instance of the broader capacity for art to inspire illusory 
sensations. If anything, aural illusions like the Shepard-Risset glissando can have the effect of 
reducing an experience of immersion by making a viewer more aware of the medium’s role in 
facilitating the illusion. As Grau (2003) writes of optical illusions, such media “stage 
symbolically the aspect of difference. They leave the observer outside and are thus unsuitable 
for communicating virtual realities in a way that overwhelms the senses” (14). Grau notes that 
there is aesthetic pleasure to be had in knowing that one is being tricked, but that this is 
different from “the concept of the virtual and its historic precursors, which are geared to 
unconscious deception” (16). 
 One online example of a Shepard-Risset glissando can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?8
v=MShclPy4Kvc
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Grau’s analysis suggests a response to authors who have discussed experiences of the 
virtual as a fundamental revolution brought about by digital techniques of virtual reality. 
Calleja (2013) writes that “virtual worlds are enabling experiences that were not previously 
available through other media” (1). He is working with a more narrow definition of virtuality 
than some other writers. In contrast to his definition, I am interested in identifying ways in 
which broader definitions of virtuality have inhered in pre-digital media, and thus been 
accentuated (rather than created anew) in digital art. Whiteley (2016) observes that “as a 
concept, ‘virtuality’ can initially be understood in relation to its very opposite: the, as it were, 
un-virtual (i.e. the real, the actual)…The pivotal question, then is not ‘what is real/actual” and 
“what is virtual,’ but rather the extent to which the experience or degree of mediation is virtual” 
(1). Virtuality insofar as we are aware of it is constructed, and that constructedness can be 
historicized. Grimshaw (2013) echoes this point, suggesting that virtuality is nothing new but 
that “digital technology simply provides new ways to conceptualize, to use, and to experience 
that virtuality” (quoted in Whiteley 2016, 3). The use of computer technology to synthesize and 
structure sound marks a new shift in perspectives of the virtuality of musical experience, and a 
proper analysis of musical works using digital techniques of sound synthesis would need to 
account for capabilities of the new technologies and for the ways their users conceived of those 
capabilities.
1.5 Immersion
Grau (2003) writes that an experience of immersion in visual art is built on “seal(ing) off 
the observer hermetically from external visual impressions,” so as to “appeal to him or her with 
plastic objects, expand perspective of real space into illusion space…The intention to install an 
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artificial world that renders the image space a totality, or at least fills the observer’s entire field 
of vision” (13). I posit aural immersion to be the product of an analogous enfolding of the 
observer by sound; for me, the most familiar means of this experience is wearing over-ear 
headphones in an environment where my attention is devoted exclusively to listening. This 
experience is acousmatic: it entails listening to music where the source of the sounds are unclear 
or underdetermined or altogether unknowable. There are pre-electronic means of inducing this 
immersive effect, too: assuming one can habituate to the mannerisms of the concert hall, the 
expectation of total silence from the audience coupled with the acoustic refinements of the space 
seem meant to facilitate an experience of immersion and envelopment. 
Grau (2003) defines virtual reality as “a space of possibility or impossibility formed by 
illusionary addresses to the senses. In contrast to simulation, which does not have to be 
immersive and refers primarily to the factual or what is possible under the laws of nature, using 
the strategy of immersion virtual reality formulates what is ‘given in essence,’ a plausible ‘as if’ 
that can open up utopian or fantasy spaces” (15). This definition does not implicate any kind of 
technological component: it does not make recourse to electricity or the cinema or any other 
technologies thought to imply the virtual. Instead, immersion would seem to be something that 
we do as perceivers as much as something that is done to us by media. Immersion is evident in 
the experience of musical trancing, for instance, which Becker (2004) discusses in her book Deep 
Listeners. In Becker’s account, trancing elicits heightened and extreme emotional experiences: 
deep listeners are “persons who are profoundly moved, perhaps even to tears, by simply 
listening to a piece of music…These folks, I believe, experience a nearness to trance” (2). 
I would suggest that this trance state is not dissimilar from the imaginative and illusory 
experiences that recorded music can conjure, in that “deep listening” experiences can entail a 
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kind of engrossed immersive engagement, which in turn implicates the imagination. Becker’s 
study nods in both title and methodology to the work of composer, performer, and philosopher 
Pauline Oliveros. Among her many endeavors, Oliveros was an electronic music pioneer, 
producing pieces like “Bye Bye Butterfly” (1967) that used synthetic means to similar ends as 
her probing acoustic works.
In an essay titled “What would disembodied music even be?” Noë (2012) offers one 
answer to his titular question that is illustrative of the importance of immersion for certain 
varieties of active and empathetic musical experience. Noë describes a portable record player 
from his childhood that produced tinny, low-fidelity sound. “In some sense that is an example 
of disembodied sound. It is sound coming out of a cheap speaker; there is nobody making the 
sound there. It is disembodied sound as compared to what it would be like to be sitting in front 
of Mick Jagger and the Rolling Stones, having them sing to you: that would be embodied 
sound” (2012, 73). Noë is subscribing to an object-oriented ontology of sound here that has been 
critiqued in numerous sources including Kane (2015), one that is at odds with the broader aims 
of embodied understanding that he is considering. Sound itself is not embodied; our perception 
of it is. (Later in the essay Noë seems to acknowledge this, writing: “our musical sensitivity to 
movement is really a sensitivity to intelligibility; it is really a form of understanding” (79), 
which I take to be a reference towards the relational nature of music perception rather than its 
object-centeredness.) What Noë calls disembodiment in this example is in fact the destruction of 
an experience of imaginative immersion. The technical apparatus for reproducing the recording 
(including not just the quality of its speakers but its very portability) was insufficient for 
fostering the kind of immersive engagement with music that allows for a more fully imaginative 
engagement with the virtual world of sound. It may have enabled other kinds of experiences: 
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social uses of music, for example, such as signifying group membership or marking public 
spaces. But it did not allow Noë to have the imaginative experience with the recorded 
performance that he associates with embodiment. Grau’s “space of possibility or impossibility” 
that he describes as a condition of immersion became uninhabitable.
Noë concludes provocatively, writing “electronic music doesn’t take the body away. It 
gives us a new body” (79). That is to say, electronic music broadens our sense of what our body 
is and what it can be. That this is possible owes to twin factors: on the one hand, our embodied 
and embedded perceptual faculties rooted in mimesis and imagination. On the other hand, the 
tools and techniques of sound creation, inscription, distribution, and consumption, which guide 
and direct perception even while they are shaped by what we can perceive. If electronic music 
can give us a new body, that ultimately suggests that the body has always been more contingent 
and malleable than humanistic notions of bounded individuality would have suggested. The 
tools of music analysis and media archaeology can deepen a listener’s aesthetic appreciation of 
(which is, perhaps, their imaginative engagement with) particular musical works and practices, 
and it can suggest explanations for certain compositional maneuvers within a historical and 
cultural context. But this can also be a way to think about the nature of perception, of techniques 
and technologies. It is a way of thinking about the boundaries of humanity with music and 
through music.
1.6 Chapter summary
Chapter 2 situates French spectral music in the context of musical modernism, 
particularly in continental Europe. Grisey, Murail, and other spectral composers continued 
some aspects of the high modernist project while rejecting others, and their rejections usually 
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were described as being on perceptual and psychological grounds. For instance, Murail writes 
that spectralism was “a reaction against [mid-century modernist composers’] refusal to make 
even the slightest concessions to the phenomena of auditory perception” (Murail 2000, 6). I 
suggest that this reproach is rooted in part in an over-reliance on discursive statements and 
political posturing by composers ranging from Schoenberg to Babbitt to Boulez, and also on a 
corresponding preoccupation with technical method (and with the idea that a technical 
method’s audibility corresponds to its aesthetic desirability). All of this downplays gestural and 
rhetorical elements of mid-century modernist music whose perceptual meaning might be quite 
clear and graspable, especially in terms of mimetic imagination of effort and exertion.
Dolan (2012) suggests that philosophical accounts of music’s immateriality and 
transcendence (of the sort associated with Romantic-era thinkers like Hanslick) were correlated 
with the reification, beginning in the late eighteenth century, of the instruments of the orchestra. 
The twin technologies of recording and synthesis may perform the opposite function: by virtue 
of their immateriality, they forced a careful reckoning with the materiality not just of musical 
activity but of perception. If listening practices within the community of nineteenth century 
orchestral listeners coevolved with instrumental developments, listening practices in the 
twentieth century have been unsettled by the rapid advent of digital sonic worlds. These 
listening practices are also bound up in the separation of the senses under modernism, so that 
optical or aural perception may be refined in their isolation. The isolation of hearing is what 
Sterne (2003) calls audile technique, as when “over the long nineteenth century, listening becomes 
a site of skill and potential virtuosity” (93). Audile technique “is oriented toward a faculty of 
hearing that is separated from the other senses. Once so separated, it can be intensified, focused, 
and reconstructed” (93). The spectralist’s use of computers for sound analysis is an extension of 
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this history, an interest in the molecularization of sound through the visual mediation of the 
spectrograph. Ironically, to deepen their ears they relied on their eyes.
Chapter 3 suggests that this molecularization of sound and its separation from other 
senses is controverted by an embodied understanding of musical experience. I consider how 
music perception is constituted by bodily knowledge, which is in turn representative of the 
interpenetration of bodies, tools, and ecologies across a perceiving organism’s existence. In the 
context of acousmatic music, timbre is the catch-all musical variable that conveys aspects of 
object size and material, space, and modes of gestural/physical excitation. Timbre is generally 
defined as the way that a listener can judge two sounds of equal pitch and volume as being 
dissimilar, a definition by negation which leads Bregman (1994) to call timbre “an ill-defined 
wastebasket category” (92). As an example, the timbral differences between a bowed or plucked 
C#4 on a violin are touted as the way that we can infer how that sound was made. Those 
differences are proxies for the action of bowing and plucking as well as for the material (string, 
but also bow hair versus fingertips). In general, when listening to music acousmatically, it 
doesn’t matter if our causal inference is right or wrong in as much as it matches the “correct” 
origin of the sound, but it does matter for our imaginative and empathetic experience of the 
piece. Our ability to infer cause is premised in past knowledge of specific instruments and 
modes of playing as well as deeper-level knowledge of what kinds of actions tend to yield what 
kinds of sounds. A listener might hear a lawnmower and describe it as “angry” because the act 
of making a lawnmower sound with one’s voice would typically, for that listener, accompany 
feelings and statements of anger.  Though we don’t think of it this way, this is an experience of 9
empathetic engagement with an inanimate object. The lawnmower is not angry but has a 
 It also depends on their experiences with lawnmower sounds (object identification) or the ways in 9
which they are used to expressing anger (which can also be expressed by silence, for instance). 
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metaphoric relationship to the sounds that represent anger in us, which in turn informs 
perceptions of anger toward us. I would underscore that a listener might hear this way or might 
not — the analytic claims that the framework of embodied perception allow are by no means 
meant to be definitive or universal. Embodiment has been deployed in service of elucidating 
and even celebrating the contingent, provisional, and subjective (as well as intersubjective) 
experiences that music can inspire in a listener, a line of thinking best associated with feminist 
musicological scholarship including Cusick (1994) and McClary (1991).
To illustrate my point about imagination and perception in music listening, I discuss a 
wide range of work in music cognition. I focus especially on the account of mimesis and 
embodied music perception posited in Cox (2011, 2016), especially his discussion of mimetic 
motor imagery. Motor imagery is defined by Cox as “imagery related to the exertions and 
movements of our skeletal-motor system, and in the case of music this involves the various 
exertions enacted in musical performance” (2011, paragraph 2). Looking at a violin and 
imagining how I might play it is an example of motor imagery. Mimetic motor imagery is 
imitative motor imagery, which Cox says is similar to mental simulation. Looking at a violinist, 
or hearing a violin performed, I might imagine what it would be like to do those sound-
producing actions: this is the distinction between motor imagery and mimetic motor imagery. I 
argue that Pierre Schaeffer’s four modes of listening are at times in opposition to aspects of 
aural perception that are rooted in deeply embedded facets of worldly observation and mimesis 
—facets that are so deeply embedded that they precede the existence of homo sapiens. I 
consider these oppositions to be productive both as a strategy for analyzing acousmatic music 
and as a means of better understanding human perception (within music and without). 
Ultimately, I argue, practices of reduced listening or attention “solely” to timbral or 
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spectromorphological features of sound are unable to fully transcend aspects of perception that 
are preoccupied with causality and intention, which I view as proxies for embodiment writ 
large. 
Chapter 4 delves into the idea of music listening as illusory in light of the embodied 
cognition work discussed in chapter 3. I focus on the technique of physical modeling synthesis 
as discussed in the work of Jean-Claude Risset and Hugues Dufourt. Physical modeling is a 
significant departure from previous synthesis methods because it focuses on constructing 
algorithms that govern physical parameters like excitation, resonance, and physical materials, 
rather than sculpting resultant waveforms (as in additive and subtractive synthesis). The results 
of physical modeling synthesis achieved better verisimilitude for acoustic musical sounds, but 
the interface and the parameters it made editable also inspired, I argue, an attitude toward 
sound rooted not just in realism but in surrealism: of stretching recognizability without 
breaking it. I pay special attention to Risset’s writings, who, as a keen reader of ecological 
psychologist James Gibson, grasped the cognitive implications of the software he was building. 
Reflecting on his work with then-nascent computer synthesis techniques, Risset wrote: “The 
first syntheses, made by trying very diverse sound structures, and even by doing “anything," 
did not open at once the vast, new and surprising world of sound that was hoped for. Thus the 
psychoacoustic problem was revealed in all its magnitude” (2014, 170).  Sitting at the computer 10
attempting the synthesis of sounds, Risset was learning about his own hearing as much as about 
the tools for synthesis. This was perceptual knowledge brought about by the synthesizer and by 
the local-level musical and aesthetic purposes to which it was being put. Synthesizers expressed 
 Les premières synthèses, faites en essayant des structures sonores trè diverses, et même en faisant 10
“n’importe quoi”, n’ont pas ouvert d’emblée le monde sonore vaste, nouveau et surprenant qu’on 
espérait. Ainsi s’est révélé dans toute son ampleur le problème psychoacoustique.
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sound via parameters like amplitude and frequency, but what the ear needed was physical 
materials and size and structure. Writing of the algorithms he and others developed for sound 
synthesis, Risset observes: “Digital synthesis produces sounds from the specification of their 
physical structure. To listen to them, one thus has the psychoacoustic experience of the relation 
between this physical structure and the audible sound effect” (2014 170).  11
Chapter 5 examines Gérard Grisey’s 1984 composition Les Chants de l’Amour. I consider 
Grisey’s extensive writings about the piece in light of the capabilities of the CHANT physical 
modeling synthesis software, designed at IRCAM. Using sketch materials held at the Paul 
Sacher archive, I argue that working with CHANT contributed to a conceptual shift for Grisey. 
At a narrative level, the piece features shifting relations between a 12-voice SATB choir and a 
tape voice synthesized using CHANT. The voice is often monstrous and alien, clearly “othered” 
against the choir; but at times it takes on more realistic human qualities. The piece is divided 
into 28 sections (plus an introduction), each based on one phoneme found in a recording, made 
at IRCAM, of the sentence “I love you.” Grisey further scrutinized the recording of “I love you” 
using spectral analysis to glean the content of its formants, the distinctive frequency 
components produced by complex sounds, which render recognizable the various vowel 
sounds in speech (as well as all manner of other sounds). His working method thus shows the 
influence of CHANT’s parametric interface and inadvertently aligns Grisey with some of the 
technical practices of total serialism, which the spectralists roundly critiqued in their early 
writings. 
 La synthèse numérique produit les sons à partir de la spécification de leur structure physique. À leur 11
écoute, on fait donc l’expérience “psychoacoustique” de la relation entre cette structure physique et l’effet 
sonore audible. 
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I conclude by addressing the risk of ahistorical universality implicit in an embodied 
cognition framework. Does embodied cognition reinscribe the problematic notion of “man as 
the measure of all in light  things” that feminist and post-humanist writers like Braidotti (2013) 
and Haraway (1985) have deconstructed? Is an analytic approach rooted in applying bodily 
knowledge implicitly reconstructing problematic boundaries between “human” and 
“nonhuman”? I suggest that it does not, for two reasons. First, its emphasis is on the porousness 
of perception insofar as perceiving entails a constantly coevolving relationship between an 
organism, its world, and the objects that populate that world. Our subjectivity is not bounded 
but in fact extends past the traditional boundaries of the human including to objects and 
artifacts, which we use for a variety of functional and expressive ends. Second, embodiment 
destabilizes passive, object-centered approaches to art in favor of the idea that we actively create 
aesthetic experience via an empathetic and imaginative capacity rooted in sensorimotor action. 
We are thus not passively perceiving the world as though in the Cartesian theater of the mind, 
but actively constructing and evaluating our perceptions.
Gombrich (1960) opined that his book Art and Illusion was necessitated by a kind of 
perceptual numbness to images brought about by mass production. “That the discoveries and 
effects of representation which were the pride of earlier artists have become trivial today I 
would not deny for a moment,” he writes. “Yet I believe that we are in real danger of losing 
contact with the great masters of the past if we accept the fashionable doctrine that such matters 
never had anything to do with art. The very reason why the representation of nature can now be 
looked upon as something commonplace should be of the greatest interest to the historian. 
Never before has there been an age like ours when the visual image was so cheap in every sense 
of the word” (6). Without wanting to make recourse to a connection between mass production 
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and value, I do wonder if a similar problem is present in music today. In the age of the portable 
music player, and of recorded music (or muzak) in public spaces, music has become an 
indispensable part of everyday life, and the music that we hear constantly but attend to only 
casually is full of sounds whose considerable strangeness has been overtaken by the loss of 
novelty. Whiteley writes, “all music has an element of virtuality…some artists specifically 
incorporate techniques that encourage listeners to understand and engage with their music in a 
virtual space”(2016, 2). The mundanity of certain techniques today should not mask their 
radicalness at their point of origin, a radicalness that may render their potential perceptual 
impact on a given listener more clearly. Considering the ubiquity of synthesized sounds and 
techniques of space in music recording, I would posit that a similar risk as the one Gombrich 
identified exists in music consumption: we are now at a remove from the origin of certain kinds 
of experiences whose novelty is critical to understanding their musical use and significance. 
These experiences of inhabiting a virtual world inhere in old art, and they inhere in new art, but 
their manifestations change over time. By paying attention to the kinds of experiences fostered 
by immersive deep listening to these sounds, as well as to the historical and technological 
contexts in which they emerged, we can uncover aspects of music listening that have been 
concealed and neglected even as they hide in plain sight.
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Chapter 2: Spectralism and Modernism: Contexts and Disruptions
2.1 Overview
This chapter aims to situate spectral music in a lineage of musical modernism and 
discuss several problems in the historiography of modernist music, especially surrounding 
issues of abstraction and of corporeality. I suggest, following Metzer (2009), that musical 
modernists are united by an interest in the outer reaches of expression, characterized not just as 
novel means of musical expression but as a pushing of expressive musical resources near to, but 
not necessarily past, the point of recognizability. I introduce several core concepts in French 
spectralism via the composition Partiels (1975) by Gérard Grisey, which evinces some of the 
problematic qualities ascribed to musical modernism that I consider in my first section. I 
analyze the piece’s introduction, drawing attention to pitch, timbral, and gestural aspects of the 
work that illustrate its corporeal residue for listeners. Despite being an acoustic piece, Partiels 
exhibits a decidedly electronic mentality: Grisey uses the instruments of his ensemble as though 
they were sine waves in an additive synthesizer, sculpting new and surprising sounds from his 
basic materials and finding new ways for those sounds to behave in time. I conclude by 
considering how a listener-oriented account of this music still benefits from a consideration of 
the writings and stated aims of composers, albeit a skeptical one.
2.2 Modernist Historiography and an Account of Musical Modernism
It can feel strange to start a discussion about “new music” by pointing out the ways in 
which it is not so new after all. The twentieth century is saturated with vanguardist rhetoric 
across all the arts, so much so that points of continuity—which are also, in a way, points of 
comprehensibility—can seem hard to grasp. The spectral school of composition, which emerged 
!25
in Paris in the 1970s, has been just as caught up in this rhetoric as any other, laying claim to all 
manner of rupture with their immediate compositional forbears, Pierre Boulez especially. 
Consider Gérard Grisey claiming that spectral music “is in radical opposition to all sorts of 
formalism which refuse to include time and entropy as the actual foundation of all musical 
dimensions” (2000, 2). Or Tristan Murail writing a retrospective of spectralism: “At a certain 
point the ‘spectral movement’ was seen as a reaction against the ‘avant-garde’. And clearly it 
was a reaction against certain composers who believed that they were the avant-garde. But, in 
reality, it was a reaction against their refusal to make even the slightest concessions to the 
phenomena of auditory perception” (2000, 6). Adorno cautions against comparing modern art to 
its forebears. “Nothing is more damaging to theoretical knowledge of modern art than its 
reduction to what it has in common with older periods. What is specific to it slips through the 
methodological net of ‘nothing new under the sun’; it is reduced to the undialectical, gapless 
continuum of tranquil development that it in fact explodes” (1973, 36; quoted in Grau 2002, 7). 
As with Grisey, Murail, and Adorno, this dissertation considers claims about newness: I 
believe that many composers associated with spectralism were among the first composers of 
Western art music to see the potential for digital technology to confront listeners not just with 
new sounds but with new sounds that simultaneously draw on, challenge, and extend our 
perceptual faculties and our body’s kinesthetic sense of itself. That this could be manifest in 
their music speaks as much to the historical situation of the spectral school (working at a time 
when the computer was becoming a more powerful and viable tool for music-making) as it does 
to the inheritance of various strains of musical modernism and their position in that network. 
At the same time, I wish to be clear that this is a continuation of older attitudes toward 
immersion, illusion, and extension in music, sound, and art, which Gombrich (1961) has 
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suggested may go back to the age of the cave painting. In engaging with the sensual and felt 
qualities of musical experience while also exhibiting an interest in the far reaches of expression 
(and with certain familiar modernist tropes like alienation, abstraction, and so on) the music of 
the spectralists suggests that certain attributes (or even pejoratives) applied wholesale to 
musical modernism—that it is dry, sterile, rooted in an aesthetic rejection and negation of the 
past, overly cerebral, disembodied —are, at least for this listener, controverted by the 1
compositions themselves, which exemplify a distinctive but firmly entrenched fascination with 
the embodied, corporeal, and somatic nature of musical experience. That scholarly reception has 
emphasized certain of these traits may in part owe to the rhetoric of the composers themselves, 
which often seems disinterested in issues surrounding reception or social contexts. 
The locus classicus for such critiques of musical modernism can be found in McClary 
(1989), who argues that “the prestige value of this music, in other words, is inversely correlated 
with public response and comprehension” (60). Despite its regular association with attacks on 
musical modernism (or, at least, musical modernists), I find in McClary’s essay a route for 
rehabilitation of the reception of modernist music to which I am deeply sympathetic, and which 
motivates my present project. “The orthodox, self-contained analyses that appear in Perspectives 
of New Music…require little more than a specialist’s grasp of combinatorial techniques; by 
contrast, explication of this music as historical human artifact would involve not only 
knowledge of serial principles, but also grounding in critical theory and extensive knowledge of 
twentieth-century political and cultural history. We would gain from such discussions of avant-
garde music a greater sense of human connectedness…But at the same time, we would lose the 
mystique of difficulty, which might well be replaced by the acknowledgment of human 
 These particular attributes are discussed and critiqued in Born (1995), which I turn to at the end of this 1
chapter
!27
vulnerability” (65). Mid-century musical modernists like Babbitt and Boulez defined a set of 
concerns around their music through a series of discursive claims that in turn influenced the 
reception of their music; without discounting those claims, we might do well to 
compartmentalize the assertions of the composers and to consider other ways in which this 
music is meaningful and other levels on which it operates. Critical perspectives on spectral 
music have been overshadowed by copious literature devoted to compositional process, much 
of it written by the composers themselves. This does a disservice to the reception of the music 
both by omitting discussion of attributes that may not interest (or may not even occur to) its 
composers, and thus by suggesting that those attributes are not salient aspects of the music 
when, in fact, they are.
To highlight some of the distinctive attributes of the work of the spectral school, it is first 
necessary to explore the many ways in which their work is a continuation of certain 
predispositions found in the music and thought of their immediate predecessors like Boulez, 
Messiaen, Ligeti, and Stockhausen. The spectralists harbored a set of peculiar and paradoxical 
aesthetic ideals. They cultivated an aesthetic of expressive immediacy while employing a highly 
mediated compositional practice. They decried the perceptual opacity of their serial forbears 
despite employing perceptually opaque methods themselves—and despite occasionally using 
serial-inspired methods of organization in their compositions. The math and logic-driven 
scientism that characterizes the discursive and aesthetic practice of mid-century modernists was 
exchanged for one rooted in the physical and biological sciences, including acoustics, 
psychology, biology, physics, and physiology. This refigured scientism was accompanied by a 
much more time-honored correlation of naturalism to aesthetic value, with the spectralists 
!28
asserting a privileged closeness to concepts of consonance and dissonance as given by nature 
and of an attentiveness to universal principles of perception.
The issue of newness and the narrative of rupture that suffuses discussions of musical 
modernism in the twentieth century merits some scrutiny. Perhaps no one has done more to 
date the origins of musical modernism in the twentieth century to Arnold Schoenberg’s famed 
1908 “break with tonality” than Schoenberg himself. “From the very beginning,” he writes of his 
early atonal works, “such compositions differed from all preceding music, not only 
harmonically but also melodically, thematically, and motivically” (Schoenberg 1975, 105). 
Schoenberg’s rejection of tradition, this account might hold, subsequently ushered in a radically 
new era of musical works and indeed musical thought, one which fetishized novelty and 
espoused avant-garde ideals about forward progress and the art of the future while being 
aesthetically challenging to the point of incomprehensibility for some lay listeners. In a similar 
vein, Babbitt’s essay “Who Cares If You Listen?” suggests that those who cannot attend to the 
many intricacies of pitch, register, duration, dynamic, and timbre in a serial work will be numb 
to its core meanings: “Inability to perceive and remember precisely the values of any of these 
components results in a dislocation of the event in the work's musical space, an alternation of its 
relation to a other events in the work, and—thus—a falsification of the composition's total 
structure” (Babbitt 1958, 39). Further: “Deviation from this tradition is bound to dismiss the 
contemporary music of which I have been talking into ‘isolation.’ Nor do I see how or why the 
situation should be otherwise. Why should the layman be other than bored and puzzled by 
what he is unable to understand, music or anything else?” (ibid.., 40). For Babbitt, 
understanding a work means understanding its structure, a statement that implies relatively 
constrained definitions both of “structure” and of what it means to “understand,” and which 
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suggests that anyone failing to grasp a piece on these terms will be met only with 
befuddlement.  It is also a statement that can be said to reflect a set of priorities specific to the 2
act of composition. One irony that inheres in several critiques of modernist music is that the 
pejorative charges levied by critics tend to emerge from discursive claims made and embraced 
by the composers, such that the pipeline from composer to composition to critique seems to 
leave out the variegated experience of a range of listeners. A number of scholars in recent years 
have nuanced this claim enormously by considering the music in gestural and sonic terms that 
may overlap with certain pre-compositional concerns but may also be wholly independent of 
them; the introduction to spectral music I will provide in this chapter aspires toward a similar 
aim.  3
Much is lost by glossing over the continuities between the music of the twentieth 
century and that of the preceding three hundred years. Babbitt himself acknowledges this in 
“Who Cares If You Listen?” writing, “Although in many fundamental respects this music is 
"new," it often also represents a vast extension of the methods of other musics, derived from a 
considered and extensive knowledge of their dynamic principles” (ibid.., 40). Recent 
scholarship on music and modernism by Johnson (2015a, 2015b), Albright (2000), Pierson (2015), 
and Cohen (2012), as well as on the relationship between modernism and modernity, has 
pushed back on this narrative of rupture, while also complicating the idea of modernist 
composers as a single unified community of like-minded artists. There are myriad strands of 
aesthetic and discursive modernism, from the scientistic writings of Babbitt to the 
cosmopolitanism of Wolpe to the craggy and contrarian eclecticism of Ives. Further, the 
 Seizing on these claims, McClary (1989) twists the title of Babbitt’s famous essay “Who Cares If You 2
Listen?” into the rejoinder “Who cares if you compose?” (63)
 For examples of listener-oriented analyses of works by Babbitt, see Straus (1986) and Dubiel (1990).3
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proclivities that both unite and divide these strands within modernism represent a continuation 
of a set of ideas about music (as transcendent, as reflecting a composer’s subjectivity, as 
emotionally expressive works) that have become inextricable from modernity as a whole — 
ideas whose origins have been variously dated as far back as Beethoven, Mozart, or 
Monteverdi.  Rather than insist upon a certain set of aesthetic ideals or discursive tropes to 4
which modernist music must intractably hew, there is much we can learn about modernism by 
considering music as something that people do: as a form of discourse in the broadest sense, and 
as reflecting the experience and history and corporeality of the network of subjects who do it 
while simultaneously constituting a body of expressive texts suitable for analyses and 
interpretations by a diverse group of listeners.  The notion of musicking advanced in Small 5
(1998) provides a similarly useful perspective shift away from a musical work and toward a 
musical performance, implicating not only composers but musicians, dancers, listeners, and any 
other actor who makes a contribution to the sum total performance. This connects works to a 
particular but always-subtly-shifting historical and social context that becomes inseparable from 
the meanings of that work. 
Understood this way, modernist music mirrors any number of the hopes and anxieties 
surrounding shifting realities that characterized the modern world at large. These could include 
the development of urban centers, the industrial revolution and the concomitant suffusion of 
daily life with technology, the rise of a middle class, the gradual and often tumultuous process 
of enfranchisement of women and people of color in civic life, the invention of the computer, the 
 Beethoven is cited by Taruskin (2005), Mozart by Berger (2007), and Monteverdi by Chua (1999) and 4
Johnson (2015a).
 This formulation is the one made by David Lewin (1986) in his article “Music Theory, Phenomenology, 5
and Modes of Perception,” and it is approaching orthodoxy in music theory today. 
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way the internet exponentially enhanced access to information while also destabilizing a 
number of businesses (including the music industry), and many more. These social and material 
developments impacted a wide range of people in widely varying ways, and so impacted their 
art. And in the same way that the advent of train travel profits from being contextualized in 
relation to the technology of the horse and carriage (and certainly not as a rupture in the way 
we consider travel), the music commonly held under the rubric of “modernist” benefits from 
being considered as contiguous with the music that came before as part of the larger social 
history of modernity. To quote Julian Johnson’s formulation, “music history might be better 
understood as a kind of variation form rather than solely in terms of linear 
development” (2015a, 4).
Marshall Berman (1982) writes that those who find themselves living and writing about 
the modern world “are apt to feel that they are the first ones, and maybe the only ones, to be 
going through it…However, great and ever-increasing numbers of people have been going 
through it for close to five hundred years” (15-16). Read against Frank Kermode’s 1966 book The 
Sense of an Ending, which asserts that a sense of apocalyptic finality has been an inextricable part 
of modernity as a whole, a mindset is revealed: it is part of the modern condition to consider 
this historical moment as both first and last, beginning and ending. This is the impulse that 
nurtures some generalizations about modern music in the last 100 years: that a novel technical 
practice like serialism or the use of computer algorithms to generate pitch material heralds a 
wholly new aesthetic while at the same time signing its own death warrant—because of its 
eschewal of the past, or its perceived foreignness in the face of “tradition,” or because it is soon 
seen to be supplanted by some other novel method, or any number of reasons. These 
vanguardist claims may owe in part (though certainly not chiefly) to economic pressures on 
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composers in the twentieth century (some external, some self-imposed and self-perpetuating 
within the community) which incentivized newness—or at least incentivized talk of newness as 
a manner of brandishing prestige and gaining financial support through institutionalization in 
the university and through commissions and grants.  They have been compounded by some 6
critics and musicologists who were willing to wade into those waters on terms set by those 
same composers, sometimes by extolling the newness of an aesthetic or by evincing hostility 
towards its merits. 
Berman (1983) delineates three phases of modernity; the first phase stretches from the 
start of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, an inchoate modern experience that 
nurtured the work of Galileo even while allowing him to languish under house arrest for the 
last chapter of his life. At least one development of this time that also finds some resonance with 
the twentieth century and with the spectral school is the rise of body imaging in art: the attempt 
by artist/physiologists to draw maps of human anatomy that are now familiar to any student of 
biology but were at the time largely mysterious — in effect, to image the invisible around us.  7
The second phase extends from the “great revolutionary wave” of the 1790s through to 
the start of the twentieth century. Berman discusses Rousseau’s account, in his novel The New 
Eloise, of the protagonist Saint-Preux’s move from the country to the city. “Everything is absurd, 
but nothing is shocking, because everyone is accustomed to everything,” says Saint-Preux. After 
 Issues of grants and institutional patronage are discussed as they pertain to serial composers in America 6
in Straus (1999), who maintains that the notion of serial hegemony in the realm of grants and patronage is 
overblown. Shreffler (2000) responds by questioning the separation of atonal and serial styles in Straus’ 
methodology, given that much atonal music after 1950 is, in a meaningful sense, post-serial. More 
recently, Robin (2016) explores issues surrounding novelty and patronage in the “indie classical” scene 
surrounding the label New Amsterdam Records. 
 A comprehensive account of these early artistic efforts can be found in Stafford (1993). I will argue in 7
chapter 3 that the spectralist’s use of computers for spectral analysis is a new side of the same effort: to 
image the invisible.
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a few months in this urban reality, Rousseau’s Saint-Preux feels “drunken” amidst the “agitated, 
tumultous” life of the city. Berman summarizes: “This atmosphere—of agitation and turbulence, 
psychic dizziness and drunkenness, expansion of experiential possibilities, destruction of moral 
boundaries and personal bonds, self-enlargement self-derangement, phantoms in the street and 
in the soul—is the atmosphere in which modern sensibility is born” (18). Berman’s mention of 
the expansion of experiential possibilities will be especially important for the account of 
modernist art that I will advance shortly, and for the account of the spectralist’s music in 
particular that I will proffer throughout this dissertation. The third phase brings us to the 
present day—still immersed in modernity, still feeling as though that immersion is both the start 
and the end of something momentous, but gradually saturated with the emergence of mass 
media as well as the social and aesthetic implications of the rise of globalization. 
Berman is not the only writer on modernity to suggest that historical and aesthetic 
periods which have been pitted against each other might in fact be different facets of the same 
structure. Calinescu (1987) describes “five faces of modernity”: modernism, the avant-garde, 
decadence, kitsch, and postmodernism. Calinescu defines modernity as “reflected in the 
irreconcilable opposition between the sets of values corresponding to (1) the objectified, socially 
measurable time of capitalist civilization (time as a more or less precious commodity, bought 
and sold on the market), and (2) the personal, subjective, imaginative durée, the private time 
created by the unfolding of the ‘self’” (5). This definition establishes an opposition that 
Calinescu suggests is acted out in the art and aesthetics of modernity. “Modernity has opened 
the path to the rebellious avant-gardes. At the same time, modernity turns against itself and, by 
regarding itself as decadence, dramatizes its own deep sense of crisis.” (5) For Calinescu, 
aesthetic movements that would seem to be diametrically opposed in the twentieth century are 
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in fact communities within the umbrella of political modernity. Even within Calinescu’s “five 
faces” there are factions: to pick one example from recent music history, the famous “uptown/
downtown” split in New York City art music reflected two different factions of composers 
whose music still is best subsumed within the category of “avant-garde.” 
Julian Johnson (2015a) approaches musical modernism in the twentieth century in a 
manner that is influential for my own approach to the music of the spectral school of 
composition. Johnson cites Michel de Certeau’s suggestion that Western history is shaped by 
three binaries: that of the present and the past (time); that of human labor and the idea of nature 
(space); and that of discourse and the body (material). Johnson’s own account of music in the 
period of modernity uses those binaries to frame “a sensible history of musical modernity, a 
history of the feeling and experience of being modern” (10). A sensible history of twentieth 
century modernism pushes against a number of highly durable aesthetic critiques of certain 
strands of Western art music in the last 100 years — for being antiseptic, sterile, inert, gray, 
obtuse, impenetrable, forbidding, cognitively opaque. These charges, too, have a longer history
—Schubert, for instance, was derided by a contemporary for writing music with “no sense, no 
order, no meaning. The composer…resembles a big waggoner…who…turns now to the right, 
now to the left, getting at one time out of the road without making any honest way” (quoted in 
Cohn 1999 213-214). In the case of this quotation, it is not that Schubert’s music has no order but 
rather that it has (for that listener) the wrong kind of order. Modernist music’s critics similarly 
see it lacking expression when in fact it lacks the wrong kind of expression. David Metzer has 
argued that modernist compositions in the twentieth century are a “mode of inquiry” (2011, 7) 
into the nature and limits of expression. 
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An important influence on the music and thought of the spectral school has been Institut 
de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM), the Parisian music research laboratory 
founded by Boulez in 1977 with unprecedented support from the French government. IRCAM 
and its relationship to musical modernism is one of several topics explored in Georgina Born’s 
1995 ethnography of IRCAM, Rationalizing Culture. The preceding brief historiography of 
modernism has in part been set up in order to respond to several aspects of Born’s critique of 
IRCAM. To be clear, there is much to admire in Born’s account, particularly her portrayal of the 
power structures at play at IRCAM, the economic position of the avant-garde in France (and in 
Western culture at large) in the 1970s and 1980s, and the pernicious presence of both sexism and 
racism bound up in IRCAM’s power structures. But while I find her ethnographic account of the 
people laboring at IRCAM to be insightful, I question some of her claims about the aesthetics of 
musical modernism, as well as some of the values implicitly reinforced by those claims.
Born establishes a set of dualities or binary relationships between “Modernism/
Serialism, Postserialism” on the one hand and “Postmodernism/Experimental Music” on the 
other. Here are some of Born’s pairings:




Cerebral, complex Physical, performative, simple
Text-centered Practice-centered
Linear, cumulative, teleological Cyclical, repetitive, static
(Born 1995, 63)
Taxonomies are useful, and any taxonomy risks reducing the forms of activity that it 
wishes to categorize. Categories are always porous. In this instance, indeterminism of the sort 
practiced by Cage in his “Music of Changes” was a formative part of Darmstadt’s early years, 
and as Iddon (2013) and Piekut (2013) have both discussed, Cage occupies a complicated 
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position in the modernist-postmodernist division. Mysticism, too, suffuses the work of many 
modernist composers. Schoenberg, for one, was deeply interested in mysticism in relation to the 
unconscious, and Bartók’s interest in numerology must certainly register as well. I invoke 
Born’s list not as a definitive account of musical modernism and postmodernism but rather as a 
reflection of some attitudes about those aesthetic and ideological movements in the 1980s in and 
around IRCAM that implicate bodily knowledge.
The contrast between music that is “cerebral and complex” (modernism) and “physical 
and performative” (postmodernism) is the tension that I wish to explore. First, there are 
definitional concerns: what constitutes complexity in music is far from clear: is densely notated 
music complex? Music that is difficult to perform? Music that sounds complex, or that sounds 
unfamiliar? Are non-Western musics that don’t rely on notation or on aesthetic criteria rooted in 
novelty necessarily less complex? Complexity, in short, is a social issue, not an inherently 
musical one. Physicality is another descriptor that is more complex than it seems, and the fact 
that Born seizes on it in context of an ethnographic study of an electronic music institution is no 
accident. IRCAM was fundamentally enmeshed with rapid developments in high tech, and 
Born links an interest on the part of those laboring at IRCAM between a drive toward 
universalism and naturalism through scientism (which she argues is one fundamental aesthetic 
goal of modernism) and the extension of that scientism into high tech.  
Chapter 3 presents evidence that some form of physicality inheres in all music-listening 
because all perception is embodied. This does not mean that a concept like “abstraction,” 
understood perhaps as abstraction away from obvious signifiers of musical physicality, no 
longer exists. But it necessitates an examination of what musical abstraction might look like, 
and what work it is made to do, in particular musical communities in light of the physicality 
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that inheres in empathetic music-listening. My case study from this point forward is French 
spectral music, specifically by composers Grisey, Saariaho, Dufourt, and Murail. 
Goldman (2010) characterizes the spectralists as “interested in microscopic fluctuations 
of sound, observable through its graphic three-dimensional representation in the form of a 
spectrogram” (210). The spectrogram is a manifestation of the visualist culture of the natural 
sciences, translating aural phenomena into a fixed visual object. As Don Ihde writes about the 
privileging of vision in the epistemology of science, “It is as if the entire sensorium, for science 
purposes, is reduced to and transformed into visual form.” (2009, 64) We can observe a more 
stringent critique of this strand of musical modernism in Born’s anthropological account of 
IRCAM: 
It is striking that the response to the deep musical and philosophical impasses that arose 
around early and midcentury serialist modernism has been to amend and improve the 
rationalism and scientism through increasingly sophisticated scientific and technological 
mediation. Far from rejecting the deeper epistemological character of modernism, 
postserialism has refined and complexified it, for example in the elision of computerized 
music analysis with compositional genesis…The discourse within which IRCAM is 
situated is a scientistic refinement of the classic concerns of modernism (Born 1995, 198). 
Ihde writes that “Just as perception, phenomenologically, is active, not passive, the postmodern 
technologies used by science are active in the sense that they are more and more constructive 
rather than passive.” (2009, 62, my emphasis) (By “postmodern” Ihde is referring to the present 
historical period, as one coming after the historical period of modernism.) Spectralism, like the 
natural sciences, is translating, via its technologies, imperceptible natural phenomena into the 
realm of perceptibility, of readability, of phenomenological accessibility. In so doing, these 
IRCAM-affiliated spectral composers are not necessarily extending the legacy of universalism 
and positivism that Born decries. Technological tools, software in particular, become texts that 
are read and interpreted, and which exert agency over their interpreters. 
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2.3 Grisey’s Partiels (1975) and Techniques of Spectral Composition
One of the first mature and surely one of the most influential compositions by Gérard 
Grisey, Partiels (1975) served as a cogent and prescient thesis statement for the then-nascent 
French spectral school. It introduced, almost didactically, concepts that would orient future 
spectral works: a renewed interest in consonance and dissonance, characterized as harmonicity 
and inharmonicity; the use of the harmonic series to generate pitch material; an emphasis on 
processes of gradual transformation applied to all musical parameters, especially harmony, 
resonance, and timbre; the translation of computer-generated acoustic data into complex 
orchestral textures.  It does all of this using clear, repetitive, massive musical gestures in its 8
introduction. Perhaps the most audacious element of Partiels is the sheer repetitiveness of its 
introductory four minutes. The listener is hammered by its forceful, insistent opening gesture 
(reproduced in example 1): a loud, sustained low E2 in the trombone, the open E1 string of the 
contrabass attacked sforzando and sul ponticello three times, played with such weight that the 
woody sound of the string slapping against the fingerboard is audible; together they form a call, 
mysterious and ominous. That call is met by the staggered entry of the cello, violins, flutes, 
clarinets, sounding a microtonal harmony with an otherworldly sheen, uncanny and mystical. 
And then it happens again, that great and yawning low E rippling into the brightest upper 
reaches of the ensemble. It happens no fewer than 14 times, each repetition revealing a bit more 
of the fictive world around (or, perhaps, inside) that low E, and each repetition shifting the 
 Of course, Partiels did not appear out of nowhere with regard to Grisey’s oeuvre. Féron (2010) has traced 8
many of Partiels’ organizing principles to work begun by Grisey in his composition Dérives; and Cagney 
(2016) traces certain elements all the way back to one of Grisey’s first student compositions, Vagues, 
Chemins, le Souffle (1970–72) 
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rhythmic and harmonic ground on which the structure is built: a theme and variations based on 
the acoustic imitation of a computer analysis of a time-stretched recording of one note on one 
instrument. 
The spectral hallmarks on display in Partiels are worth exploring as a way in to the 
generic tropes used by the spectral school in general and by Murail and Grisey in particular. I 
will begin by explaining some of the concepts of musical acoustics that undergird spectral 
attitudes toward pitch material, and then I will return to the introduction of Partiels to explore 
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order of entries. In most brass sounds, the upper partials emerge slightly later
than the lower ones, a phenomenon which Grisey imitates (on a greatly
expanded time scale) with the staggered entries in his synthesised replica of the
t ombone.The goal of instrumental sy thesis is not a precise reproduction of the
trombone sound – which would in any case be impossible given the complex
spectra of acoustic instruments – but rather a hybrid sonority permitting us to
hear both the individual instruments and their fusion into a unified timbre.
The physical properties of sound are brought into focus by these techniques
of analysis and re-synthesis; this is an appeal to nature in the objective sense of
the term. For music theorists, Grisey’s technique will have strong echoes of
Rameau’s corps sonore.The essential difference, however, is that Grisey is dealing
with real sounds, not with an idealised source of overtones. Recall that Rameau’s
corps sonore, as formulated in the Génération harmonique, conveniently stopped
vibrating after the sixth partial to avoid the ‘out-of-tune’ natural seventh.3 In
contrast, Grisey carries into his music the complexities of real sounds, including
their often distorted and imperfect spectra.
Ex. 1b Instrumental synthesis at the opening of Grisey, Partiels (1975)
GE´RARD GRISEY AND THE ‘NATURE’ OF HARMONY 351
Music Analysis, 28/ii-iii (2009) © 2011 The Author.
Music Analysis © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Example 2.1: Opening gesture of Partiels, reproduced from Hasegawa (2011)
Grisey’s fascination with gradual processes (across multiple musical parameters), his use of 
rhythm and repetition, and his choice of organic, bodily, and zoological metaphors to describe 
his music. 
Western musical practice has cultivated two complementary methods for measuring 
interval: as the ratio between two frequencies, or as the distance in pitch space (today, 12-tone 
equal tempered pitch space) between two pitches.  A perfect fifth can be thought of as the ratio 9
3:2, or as the distance of seven semitones in 12-tone equal temperament. Hasegawa (2008) 
writes: “In broad terms, the ratio model tells us about the sonic quality (the degree of 
concordance and stability) and the root implications of an interval, while the distance model 
offers an easy way to measure and compare intervals, but ignores the way that the constituent 
pitches combine acoustically” (2).  When we hear the dyad {C4-Bb4} we might hear it as being 10
a dominant 7th, and/or 10 semitones, and/or that its sound is qualitatively tense, rough, or 
dissonant. Hasegawa (following the work of James Tenney and others) observes that the first 
two claims constitute a measure of distance, the latter a measure of frequency ratio. Rather than 
constituting an abstract artifact of ancient music theory, ratios remain an essential—Hasegawa 
uses the word “visceral,” a felicitous descriptor—component of musical experience. 
Furthermore, Hasegawa shows how some pieces (in both tonal and post-tonal repertoires) may 
 Neither of these methods make explicit recourse to tonal hearing of intervals in relation to a tonic pitch 9
(i.e., hearing the major third of scale degrees 1-3 as different from scale degrees 5-7), and this could 
certainly be considered a third method of interval measure.
 Hasegawa traces the lineage of these models through their roots in antiquity through to the work of 10
Helmholtz, James Tenney, and the spectralists themselves. Chapter 1 of Hasegawa 2008 also provides a 
good account of the history of equal temperament and its relationship to just intonation; a discussion of 
tuning theory is outside the scope of the current chapter. 
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draw more on either the interval or ratio-based measures of pitch relationships, and that these 
varying modes of attending to a piece’s pitch structure can shape our experience of the piece. 
Speaking physically, sound is vibration, a wave of measurable frequency passing 
through a state of matter (air, water, et cetera). Speaking psychologically, sound is something we 
sense when those frequency waves stimulate our hearing organs. The physical 
conceptualization of sound considers it in terms of frequency and amplitude, the psychological 
considers sound in terms of pitch and volume. The tension between these two ontologies of 
sound—of acoustics and psychoacoustics—was of particular fascination for composers in the 
twentieth century, the spectralists foremost among them. One reason for this accelerated interest 
likely owes to technological advancements made during the twentieth century—particularly 
digital audio recording and scientific technologies for studying and measuring sound, both of 
which built on and expanded our understanding of acoustics. As an object resonates (a musical 
instrument like a violin string or marimba bar for example, but the principal applies to all 
physical objects), it vibrates at certain frequencies that are related to the physical nature (size, 
density, material) of the object as well as the manner in which it has been excited (with a bow or 
a stick, loud or soft, et cetera). The fundamental frequency is what we typically perceive as the 
pitch of a sound; the arrangement and amplitude of its overtones (or partials) is a significant 
part of what we hear as a sound’s timbre, though our perception of timbre is just as influenced 
by aspects of its attack, decay, sustain, and release (ADSR).
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Figure 1 shows a table of the first 15 partials of the harmonic series rooted on a 
low E1 in hertz:
Figure 2.1: Partial rank and frequency
Example 2 notates the first 24 partials (including those 15 frequencies) on the five-line 
Western musical staff. I will here represent microtonal pitches using quarter and sixth tones, 
which follows Grisey’s practice.
Mathematically, the harmonic series is represented simply by y = n(f) where f is the 
fundamental frequency in hertz, n is an integer defining partial number in the harmonic series, 





















E1 of the bass in Partiels, are 2*41.2hz = 82.4 hz; 3*41.2hz = 123.6 hz; and so on. We can map 
these frequencies as notes on a staff, just as we can consider notes as frequencies, but the 
recognition that notes are often approximations or translations of frequencies into the written 
medium, rather than precise representations of those frequencies, is one of the most important 
tenets of the spectral school’s approach to pitch. At least in their early compositions, the spectral 
school’s use of microtonal pitches is not rooted in a system of temperament but rather in the use 
of frequencies.  Following from this, the spectralist’s use of microtones was best conceptualized 11
as an approximation into the domain of pitch notation of frequencies gleaned through computer 
analysis of real sounds. Depending on what sound or set of sounds is subjected to computer 
analysis, the result could be virtually indistinguishable from pitches of the harmonic series or it 
could be noticeably different. 
A sine wave contains only a fundamental frequency and no overtones. Most Western 
instruments have been cultivated to have relatively “clean” timbres so as to emphasize their 
 As Murail proclaimed: “We nevertheless need tools that can handle the continuous expanses we have 11
discovered. Pitches, therefore, will be measured by frequency (hertz), not by chromatic degree, and the 
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Example 2.2: First 24 partials of E1
fundamental pitch more clearly.  A more complex sound (like a bell) contains a fundamental 12
frequency and a number of overtones of varying volume or frequency. But any sound is in 
theory reducible to a number of sine waves of various frequencies, amplitudes, and durations, 
and so any sound can be recreated by assembling sine waves to the proper specifications. This 
process is known as additive synthesis and many familiar (and familiarly unbearable) MIDI 
sounds are produced in this way.  
For Partiels, Grisey analyzed the low E2 of the trombone using a spectrogram. Consider 
the following two spectrograms of a trombone E2. (See figures 2.3 and 2.4.) The first thing to 
note is how much information this doesn’t tell us. We might like to imagine a composer sitting in 
front of her computer screen the way that the character Cypher in the science-fiction film The 
Matrix interpreted binary code, staring at pure frequencies and deciphering the exact content of 
the spectrogram. In fact, the above spectrograms do not tell us with specificity what instrument 
is playing; if the instrument is a solo instrument or part of a larger ensemble; if the sound is a 
single note, a chord, or a multiphonic; and so on. This is one of the more radical shifts in the 
musical epistemology of the spectral school: the written, visual representation of music on the 
five-line staff, pivotal in the history of Western music for the last 1,000 years, represents some 
information (pitch, relative duration, instrumentation/orchestration) better than other 
information (timbre, absolute duration, certain non-equal tempered systems of pitch). The 
spectrogram more or less inverts this, telling us some important information about the timbral 
makeup of a sound and displaying it in clock time, but omitting instrumentation, orchestration, 
and (in most cases) notated pitch. 
 Consider the Indonesian gamelan as a familiar example of instruments cultivated with the opposite 12
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Figure 2.4: Spectrogram of a trombone low E from Fineberg 1999
synthesis, but replaces pure sine tones with the complex sounds of real instru-
ments. An iconic example is the opening of Grisey’s Partiels for chamber orches-
tra (1975), based on a fortissimo trombone E2.2 The trombone sound can be
analysed into a set of partials of varying frequencies and amplitudes; this can be
expressed either as a numerical table or graphically as a spectrogram (Ex. 1a). In
a spectrogram of a sound, the sound’s evolution in time is represented on the x
axis from left to right, and frequency is shown on the y axis, with low frequencies
at the bottom and high ones at the top.The intensity of vibrational energy at any
frequency is indicated by shades of grey from light (weak) to dark (strong).
Ex. 1b reproduces the opening page of the score. We first hear the trombone
itself, accompanied by sforzandi in the double bass an octave below; as the
trombone fades out, instruments from the ensemble enter gradually from low to
high, playing pitches which match selected partials of the analysed trombone
sound. For example, the third partial (played by the clarinet) is a perfect twelfth
above the trombone’s fundamental, with a frequency three times that of the
fundamental; the cello’s G♯ approximates the trombone’s fifth partial, and so on.
Grisey uses the strength of each partial in the trombone analysis to assign
dynamics to the instruments participating in the synthesis, and also to shape the
Ex. 1a Spectral analysis of a trombone sound
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Figure 2.3: Spectrogram of a trombone low E from Hasegawa 2009
What do the two spectrograms from figure 2.3 and 2.4 reveal? Each line corresponds to a 
frequency, indicated on the Y-axis – lower lines are lower frequencies. The duration of each 
frequency is represented along the X-axis. The darkness of each line corresponds to relative 
amplitude of the partial. The spectrogram reveals that the trombone sound’s upper partials 
emerge slightly later than the lower frequencies, and that certain partials—in the case of 
Grisey’s spectrogram, the fifth and the ninth—are louder than others. The choice of a time scale 
becomes important here: the second sonogram (figure 4) has a much smaller unit of time for its 
x-axis and thus shows in greater relief the behavior of the partials of the low E. By contrast, 
Hasegawa’s spectrogram (figure 3) shows the sound unfold over a longer span of time, which 
also allows for fluctuations in the volume of various partials to be visible. One of the most 
important steps in writing a piece of spectral music becomes choosing a sound and recording it 
to tape; the use of a spectrogram to analyze that sound becomes an interpretive act in itself. All 
this work finds its ultimate instantiation on the five-line staff. From recording to spectrogram to 
sheet music, we have had a translation of a translation of a translation.  This is a 13
technologically-mediated production of knowledge that has been the subject of research by Ihde 
(2001) and McLuhan (1995), the latter of whom wrote that “Translation is thus a “spelling-out” 
of forms of knowing. What we call “mechanization” is a translation of nature, and of our own 
natures, into amplified and specialized forms” (56). 
Recall that additive synthesis is the stacking of sine tones on top of each other to imitate 
the more complex timbre of real sounds; compare that with the orchestration evidenced in the 
opening of Partiels, reproduced in example 1. Here, Grisey is employing a technique he calls 
“instrumental synthesis”: the stacking of instrumental tones on top of each other to suggest the 
 For more on spectralism as translation, see Lara (2013).13
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harmonic series of a particular tone. The ensemble sounds the odd-numbered partials of the 
trombone E1 (the low E0 in the contrabass serves as a low doubling of the trombone; it cannot 
be the fundamental because it does not correspond to the registral position of the rest of the 
ensemble’s pitches.) Odd numbered partials are the characteristic tones of a harmonic series. 
Each odd numbered partial becomes an even numbered one upon its repetition: the third partial 
is doubled in a higher register as the 6th, the 12th, and so on. This is why the fundamental pitch 
is so important: we not only hear it as partial rank 1, but as 2, 4, 8, 16, and so forth. Its statistical 
prominence in a harmonic series is what makes, for example, a violin’s low G sound stable or 
pure. Filtering out the odd-numbered partials leaves us with the same pitch content transposed 
an octave higher (the 5th partial of E1, G#3, becomes the 10th partial G#4; see figure 6). This 
filtering has the effect of weakening some of the pungency of the sound, because the more 
“dissonant” tones emerge at the upper end of our auditory perception and thus take on a 
different character. Filtering out the even-numbered partials, as Grisey does, weakens the 
presence of the fundamental pitch. Example 3 shows the pitches found in the introductory 
phrase of Partiels .14
 Strictly speaking, partial 21 should be A5 -1/6 tone; above the 13th partial Grisey seems to only use 14
equal tempered accidentals, likely a concession to performance and to the very fine-grained nature of 
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Example 2.3: Pitch collection from first phrase in Partiels
Recall the two timescales of the spectrograms in figure 3 and 4: the closer we zoom in to 
the sound (the smaller units of time in the x-axis of figure 4), the easier it is to see the staggered 
entry of the different partials of the trombone recording. The opening gesture of Partiels is based 
on a recording of a trombone roughly one second in length, and in the piece it takes 
approximately 12 seconds to perform. This is an instance of time stretching, a recording 
technique in which recordings are slowed down without affecting their pitch (as opposed to 
slowing down an LP, which transposes the pitch up or down as the speed increases or 
decreases). It is also a didactic move: the entry of the partials is slow enough for us to consider 
each pitch as a distinct entity and as part of a fused whole. The goal of instrumental synthesis 
here is not verisimilitude; it is precisely the point that the music exists in a murky and liminal 
space between an orchestrated harmony and a fused timbre.
 From rehearsal 1 to 3 Grisey adds more and more upper partials of the low E1, 
thickening the texture. Because the different timbral profiles of the instruments are interacting 
with the cumulative timbre of the passage, a development that we might expect to become more 
consonant—given the increased number of appearances of low-rank even-number partials—in 
fact begins to grow more dissonant and unsteady. By rehearsal 4, almost every harmonic partial 
from 1 to 25 is sounding (example 4).  
This marks the turning point in this introduction from a sound mass assigned the 
function of stability (the introductory phrase) to a sound mass that grows increasingly unstable. 
This is achieved by altering the pitches of the harmonic series into an inharmonic mass, and by 
adding extended techniques in individual instruments to divert attention to particular corners 
of that sound mass. I experience the first four gestures as a relatively stable group, and with 
!49
each repetition I find that I toggle (either deliberately or not) between hearing the individual 
instruments of the ensemble or hearing the sound as a fused sonority. This fusion, and the 
liminal boundary between fused timbres and distinct harmonies, is undercut as the sonority 
grows more stridently dissonant and the instrumental texture moves away from its blend. At 
rehearsal 4, the cello sounds a sharp and unstable molto sul ponticello trill; at rehearsal 6, the 
trombone uses a plunger mute; at rehearsal 7, the bass clarinet uses flutter tongue; at rehearsal 
10, the cello and viola perform harmonics glissandi on their D and G strings. All of these are like 
little cracks in the resonance of the ensemble harmony, timbral fissures that draw attention to a 
particular voice in the ensemble and away from the overarching sonority. The original chord, 
meanwhile, has deviated significantly from the harmonic partials of the overtone series; while 
the low E and the 3, 4, 5, and 7th partials of the overtone series remain, Grisey also inserts 
pitches that cloud the sonority, adding low end murk via a Bb2, C3, and a loud accordion cluster 
(example 5). Tampering with the low end of this chord is significant as a way of diminishing the 
fusion of the ensemble. At higher registers the distinction between pitches that are or are not in 
the harmonic series is relatively small; there is, for example, only an equal-tempered semitone 
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Example 2.4: Pitches in Partiels rehearsal 4, with partial rank labeled
space separating partials becomes very small. But there is no easy way to reconcile the low Bb2 
at rehearsal 11 with anything related to the E1 overtone series.
As the pitch content morphs from stable to instable, the rhythmic content of the upright 
bass becomes irregular as well. Example 6 shows the bass attacks for each section of the opening 
of Partiels. From the initial three even quarter notes, Grisey begins to add and subtract 16th note 
values to render the spacing slightly more unpredictable: a slightly truncated second attack in 
rehearsal 2, a slightly truncated third attack in rehearsal 3, and so on. The number of attacks 
expands as well, from 3 up to 7 in the final instance.
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Example 2.5: Reduction of pitches at rehearsal 7
“Spectral music,” writes Grisey, “offered a formal organization and sonic material that 
came directly from the physics of sound, as discovered through science and microphonic 
access” (2000, 1). I believe my short discussion of Partiels shows that this is somewhat fanciful — 
there is nothing direct about the process of orchestrating the data of a spectrogram into an 
instrumental texture, but rather the entire process is mediated by, among other things, Grisey 
himself. The spectrogram is one actor of many in the assemblage of tools and techniques that 
yield the piece Partiels. 
Partiels does demonstrate a number of musical features that Grisey has described in rich 
metaphorical language. In his essay “Tempus Ex Machina: A Composer’s Reflections on Musical 
Time,” Grisey outlines three levels of thinking about the time of music: the skeleton of time 
(duration, measured in terms of chronometric time), the flesh of time (time as felt; in particular, 
the way that periodicity can impact our perception of time passing), and the skin of time (time 
as impacted by a listener’s subjectivity, including their memory, mood, and so on; in general, 
Grisey considers “flesh” to be something the composer can control and “skin” to be something 
the composer cannot control). Grisey’s metaphorical language has extended past human 
characteristics: In his program notes to his piece Le Temps et l’Écume (1988/1989), Grisey claims 
to have been inspired by considerations of the phenomenal time experiences of insects, humans, 
and whales. In Partiels, the constant destabilization of the rhythmic ground, coupled with the 
increasing dissonance of the harmonic content (manifest both in the compression of the 
harmonic series and the addition of extended string techniques like sul ponticello bowing) 
creates a sense of goal directed motion without suggesting what the goal might actually be; 
rhythmic and harmonic density suggest the quality of an acceleration, of a departure from 
something static (the initial harmonic/timbral sonority in rehearsal 1 reprinted in example 1) to 
!52
something full of motion. This, too, finds a physiological metaphor in Grisey’s writings: he 
conceives of the form of Partiels at both a large- and small-scale level as tripartite, following a 
pattern of inhalation - exhalation - stasis.
My analysis of this opening gesture has focused on what I attend to when I listen: sound 
source/causality (which instruments might be sounding), segmentation (where a gesture starts 
and ends), schematic models of pitch (a sound conforms to my extant knowledge of the 
harmonic series). Partiels challenges my ability to determine causality even while acts of 
segmentation and pitch identification remain relatively easy. This seems to be part of its appeal: 
the clarity of its repeating gesture allows me to focus more intently on the foregrounded 
variable of timbre — the line between timbre and harmony, the timbres of individual 
instruments, and the chimerical timbre those instruments form. When I first heard this piece it 
was as part of a mixtape someone gave me; I lacked knowledge of the stylistic aims of spectral 
music or even the ensemble make-up in Partiels. That lack, and the awestruck experience it 
precipitated, left an indelible mark on my hearing of this piece. What struck me then, and what I 
have tried to hold on to in subsequent years, was the impenetrability of the sound mass. There 
is joy in the remystification of instrumental music, in the strange sensation of time slowing 
down during the build-up of overtones following the upright bass’s low E, and in the feeling of 
hugeness that accompanied hearing a massive gesture that grew more massive, more bright, 
with each repetition. It was the enjoyment of that introductory hearing that led me to 
investigate spectral music, and explanations of the music that made recourse (as in the writings 
of the composers) to the harmonic series and to acoustical knowledge felt incomplete. In that 
first, naive hearing, I was trying to parse the sound of that gesture by imagining how it was 
made, and that imaginative act was in part one of empathetic decoding: of trying to invent the 
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means by which I might match this strange aural percept. Though not a part of the received 
discursive tradition of spectral music, I do think that such experiences of a listener—of 
remystification, of inexorable movement toward an unknowable goal, of heightened challenges 
trying to make sense of something multifaceted, new, nameless—are in line with musical 
modernism’s exploration of the outer reaches of expression. Such a view is not anti-listener, but 
rather is one in which great trust is placed in the listener to listen deeply and engage with 
something new. This, too, springs from empathy: composing entails an imaginative listening, 
the creation of a field of experiences that include but are not limited to the ones experienced by 
the composer. Considering the psychological mechanisms of engagement with music, 
particularly electronic music that might challenge conventional expressive markers, will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Body, Tool, and World in Acousmatic Musical Experience
3.1 Introduction
The twenty-first century listener is confronted with an overwhelming variety (and 
quantity) of music involves sounds that have either been synthesized electronically or processed 
using electronics. Examples of the former might include a digital software synthesizer in Garage 
Band or a Moog analog synthesizer; examples of the latter might include a distorted electric 
guitar, or a saxophone recorded and processed with compression. One might talk about 
synthesized sounds as being “like” a more familiar instrument (a warm synth pad might sound 
like the string section of an orchestra, for instance); or else for being strange and unrecognizable 
(as in some of the sounds in Stockhausen’s Studie I); or for summoning surprising extra-musical 
associations (as when a field recording of waves crashing on a beach is piped in to a piece of 
chamber music).
Furthermore, music is routinely experienced acousmatically — that is, without visual 
confirmation of a sound’s source. People might listen to music on the radio while driving, in 
iPod earbuds while walking to work, or on a high quality sound system while sitting at home, 
rather than at a concert or in a ceremonial setting. In the case of some instruments, such as an 
electronic synthesizer, there may be no visually obvious causal source for the sound. In the case 
of others, like the electric guitar, the instrument itself makes almost no sound but relies on 
amplification and, often, processing via pedals in order to sound like “itself”—what Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch (2004) would call a “machine ensemble,” each component of which participates in 
the holistic electric guitar sound.
My aim in this chapter is to consider ways listeners use embodied knowledge to make 
sense of these so-called strange sounds produced by both synthesis and sampling, and to 
!55
suggest that these sense-making strategies are productive focal points for music analysis. 
Listeners rely on a wide range of perceptual information about actions, sound sources, and 
sound spaces, even if they don’t always consciously attend to them. These learned and natural 
tendencies are manipulated in the illusory sound worlds of electronic music. This manipulation 
is manifest at both the level of creation and of reception, and composers faced with the real-time 
feedback of electronic music toggle between the subject position of listener and creator. It is 
analytically productive to consider how any one group of composers, producers, and sound 
designers thought about the relationship between sounds and objects, and how they cultivated 
listener’s attention to those details. But such a consideration needs to take into account how the 
machine ensemble at their disposal asserts agency in those decision-making processes. Finally, 
turning to poietic experience, what inheres in a listener’s perceptual faculties that might enable 
someone to have an illusory aural experience? What sort of compositional devices or narrative/
conceptual priming, if any, might need to be in place to allow a listener to hear these aural 
environments as such?
These questions are motivated by my experiences as a composer and performer of 
electronic music, and I will offer an example from my own practice that demonstrates the kinds 
of analytic problems I want to delve into. I often search for ideas by choosing software 
instruments and improvising. In one such session in Ableton Live, I begin by selecting a basic 
analog modeling synthesizer with a default preset (figure 1).  I start recording while I test a few 
sounds.  I find that I like the beating that results from the semitone F4-E4, which I play on my 1
laptop keyboard by pressing “F” and “D”. But the brightness of the default setting is a bit harsh 
and grating: it sounds very “machinic,” and if I were to make those sounds with my voice, it 
 The recording can be streamed at soundcloud.com/will-mason/dissertation-synthesizer-example.1
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would involve tight and constricted vocalizing. To mitigate this, at 0:15 I turn on a reverb plug-
in to cut the high frequencies (figure 3.2).
Reverb typically creates a perception of a widening aural space, and I find that happens 
here: I’ve not just cut off high frequencies and added reverb but I’ve pushed the sound source 
(the synthesizer) back from the listener (which, right now, is me). I want to minimize this 
distance, so I increase the reflections gain and turn the dry/wet ratio down slightly from 
0:35-0:40. I find that moving the synth closer has made it feel ominous, like a fast-approaching 
fog cloud. I didn’t plan for the sound to become ominous, but I now want to capitalize on it, so I 
increase the decay time to start minimizing the attacks of the minor second dyad E4-F4. The 
reverb patch’s reflections mean that aspects of the timbre of the E4 and F4 are getting amplified, 
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Figure 3.1: Analog modeling synthesizer with default settings in Ableton Live 10
Figure 3.2: Reverb plug-in in Ableton Live 10
creating a wider frequency range than those two pitch labels would suggest. At 0:54 I freeze the 
reverb, which makes it sound either like a sustaining chord or, to my ears, like an ambient 
environment. Particularly, it sounds like something that had been an object has gradually 
become an environment: the synth moved from small and distant to engulfing and omnipresent. 
Lastly, at 0:58 I turn on and increase the reverb’s in-built “chorus” effect, which furthers the 
atmospheric feel of the frozen reverb patch by obliterating any sense of discrete pitch: there’s 
nothing that I could imagine emulating with my voice or with an instrument, and so I am left 
imagining myself within the sound rather than creating the sound.
This example shows several things. Despite being the composer of this example I did not 
set out with a plan but rather improvised in response to the sounds I was making. I had a rough 
sense of what the parameters I controlled would sound like, but it was rarely matched by the 
result. I would like to suggest that a listener's experience with the piece may parallel my 
experience in shaping this piece. I conceptualized the timbre of the synthesizer as rough, which 
I evaluated by comparison to other objects (loud machines, like a weed whacker or a motor) 
and, ultimately, by comparison to my own voice. I heard the sounds undergo a transformation 
that would be almost impossible in the real world, from an object (the clearly pitched 
synthesizer instrument) to an atmosphere or an environment (the frozen and chorused reverb, 
like a massive gust of wind or rush of water). Were I to try and convey salient aspects of this 
composition, pitch labels and a transcription of what I played on a Western 5-line staff would be 
woefully inadequate to describe the sounds that resulted. 
This example also demonstrates how the human body-in-the-world acts as the frame for 
sense-making when we listen both to the strange and the familiar sounds found in electronic 
and electroacoustic music. Listeners can ascribe intentional physical actions to the cause of 
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sounds; or imagine the actions that we would make to produce certain sounds using certain 
materials in a certain space; or can toggle between several distinct modes of listening and even 
try to inhabit several simultaneously. Exploring different modes of listening can be something 
that we do unconsciously, or it can be something we develop as a kind of narrative experience 
with prior priming, and it can be something that certain pieces invite more than others. 
Furthermore, technological developments (in both the production and reproduction of 
sound) in the twentieth century revealed and re-focused these aspects of listening, which 
cultural practices of listening cultivated in Western art music’s common practice era had de-
emphasized. Electronic sounds, the techniques of the recording studio, and the music that has 
been made with those tools have forced us to confront seemingly basic or inviolable premises 
underlying musical experience which turn out to be neither basic nor inviolable. Just as abstract 
painting draws a viewer’s attention to questions of material and gesture and color by 
eschewing obviously figurative subjects, novel types and arrangements of sounds lacking 
obvious tonal or formal frameworks can draw our attention to basic constituents of sound like 
material, space, gesture, and affect.
In asserting these claims I am drawing from scholarship in three different areas: 
acousmatic listening in electronic and electroacoustic music; the imbrication of human 
perception with technologies and technics; and the embodied and corporeal (or gestural) nature 
of perception and cognition, in both musical and everyday experience. In exploring the 
intersection of these fields, my work joins De Souza (2017), Tomlinson (2015), Krueger (2014), 
Godøy (2006), and Cox (2016). There is much more work to be done considering the particular 
ways in which technology can both create and function within the sonic worlds created by 
music. For example, Krueger (2014) takes music as itself a technology—of affect regulation, of 
!59
altered-state induction, etc.—and thus presents a theoretical framework that is musically 
undifferentiated, ambivalent about the particular musical content or genre of a song because 
such a context is not necessary to support his claims about how people use music to regulate 
affect. I am interested in the experience of reasonably enculturated composers and listeners 
coming into contact with specific musical works: an audience for whom the difference between 
the sound of a violin and a piano, or the difference between the interval of a perfect fifth and a 
minor ninth, are laden with culturally accrued meanings.
These concerns are relevant to French spectralism (particularly their electroacoustic 
works), but they neither start or end with those composers. An important early thinker of these 
issues was Pierre Schaeffer, whose work in musique concréte and writings on what he called 
reduced listening will be discussed later. Schaeffer’s influence on the spectralists is oblique: on 
the one hand, but in their stated aim to consider properties of sound itself (as manifest in, for 
instance, the spectrogram) they reveal an affinity with Schaeffer’s ideas about the object of 
reduced listening, which he called the sonorous object. Murail wrote of the “very essential idea 
that the musical ‘atom’ is not the notehead written on staff paper. The musical atom is the 
perceptual atom, tantamount, perhaps, to Pierre Schaeffer’s ‘sonic object.’” (Murail 2005, 123). 
At the same time, the spectralists were interested in the nature of human perception, of acts of 
listening and musicking which are causal and ecological in nature: in the creation of real and 
surreal musical objects using physical modeling synthesis, in the imitation of technological 
sonic phenomena using acoustic instruments, and so on. This suggests affinities with the 
writings of a composer often placed in opposition to Schaeffer, R. Murray Schafer. Schafer 
opposed the idea that composers should disregard the real, material dimensions of sounds: 
sounds used in acousmatic music can and should refer to the real world. Rather than adhere 
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strictly to one aesthetic dogma or another, composers of electroacoustic music (including the 
spectralists) have embraced the malleability of listening, veering between causal, ecological, and 
reduced listening.
These preoccupations were not limited to composers in the art music tradition: the 
Beatles were exploring manipulations of aural representations of space in their famously 
adventurous 1967 album Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, a decade before Grisey and 
Murail began tinkering with imaginary aural objects. Indeed, the spectralists were more attuned 
to pop and rock music than their modernist leanings might suggest. “The spectacular 
development of synthesizers, of electronic sound, owes considerably more to Pink Floyd than to 
Stockhausen,” wrote Murail (2005a, 123). Illusory and manipulative electronic sounds are so 
common today as to be unremarkable—indeed, the construction of a fictional acoustic space 
may be an a priori feature of recorded sound—and this nondescript experience is why it’s 
interesting to consider a historical moment when this phenomenon was emergent, as well as the 
tools and techniques that allowed it to emerge. In the case of the spectralists, it also entails a 
consideration of some extreme cases to which these techniques were put. For the spectralists, 
I’ve argued in chapter 1 that these “extreme cases” were in service of what Metzer (2009) calls 
late modernism’s interest in the nature and limits of expression. From an analytic perspective, 
considering extreme musical cases (which, it should be noted, are today as likely to occur in in 
Timbaland’s studio as they are the lab at IRCAM) can help shed light on the more subtle ways 
that these aural practices have infiltrated a wide range of musics.2
In using words like “illusory” or “manipulative” I do not mean to suggest that the sonic 
phenomena or sound-producing objects under consideration exist in some absolute, knowable, 
 Timothy Taylor’s aptly titled book on music technology, Strange Sounds, makes a similar point; see 2
Taylor 2001, 9.
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noumenal state. As authors ranging from Jacques Derrida (1967) to Naomi Cumming (2001) 
have argued, as soon as something is perceived it is interpreted. I suspect that for many 
listeners, the “enhanced” sound of a voice singing (often softly, or more softly than an 
unamplified vocalist would typically sing) into a microphone and processed with compression 
and reverb (a standard recording technique) is the primary way that they come into contact 
with a sung voice. That augmented sound becomes normative for those listeners, even though it 
is a result of a dense assemblage of tools and social/historical practices. This helps demystify a 
common fiction of recorded sound, which is the notion that certain recording techniques might 
convey a more “true” or “accurate” sense of a performance. The idea of verisimilitude or fidelity 
is itself a construction, a positional stance within a particular auditory culture.3
There is an analytic tension between on the one hand describing a set of technologies 
and techniques that are used to create or modify sounds on a recording (suggesting a default or 
standard sound that has been modified) and on the other hand describing the way those sounds 
might be experienced (which need not rely on any kind of knowledge about what a thing is or 
how it was altered). My analytic method for the latter is built on the idea that people relate 
sounds to the skilled actions and action potentials available to their bodies-in-the-world, but 
also that they can learn to re-map those available actions or to learn new ones. For music 
theorists interested in changing how people listen to music, the intersubjective sharing of these 
experiences of source-cause identification should be as much a part of music theory as the 
intersubjective relating of pitch-class sets or formal boundaries. I find the tensions and 
resonances between the material affordances of musical instruments and artifacts, the kinds of 
knowledge demonstrated in production, and the kinds of knowledge demonstrated in reception 
 In-depth explorations of the concept of hi-fi can be found in Dolan (2010) and Newton (2016)3
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to be extremely productive for considering a culturally and historically situated relationship to 
sounds, tools, others, and ourselves.
3.2. Embodied Music Cognition
If, as I argued in my second chapter, modernism in the twentieth century ought not to be 
understood merely as a negation of romanticism and classicism, what attributes might 
positively define modernist music? I find in spectralism, as in early twentieth century 
modernism, a development of musical attitudes analogous to the gradual move away from the 
criterion of verisimilitude in figurative visual art and towards a more explicit emphasis on 
method and on material (and on a self-conscious consideration of what musical material might 
even be). There are certainly more points of worthwhile divergence between twentieth century 
modernism and its precursors in the larger history of modernity; the political upheavals of the 
twentieth century and the gradual enfranchisement of traditionally marginalized 
demographics, for example.  This scholarly work into the pluralism of twentieth-century 4
musical modernism opens the door for further analytic work into the diversity and variation of 
musical expression employed by these communities. This means not only examining differences 
in technical practice and aesthetic orientation on the part of different composers of abstract 
modernist music, but in considering some of the ways that listeners might respond to these 
differing practices. I want to construct a framework that helps elucidate how the historically 
malleable and ambiguous notion of “musical abstraction” is contextual and contingent. It 
 Eric Drott has written several compelling accounts of music, politics, and modernist music; see, for 4
instance, Drott 2011. Brigid Cohen’s account of modernism and migration in the music of Stefan Wolpe 
offers another point of departure for considering the political and identity concerns surrounding certain 
modernist communities in the twentieth century; see Cohen (2012). And Ellie Hisama (2001) explores the 
work of three women modernist composers, exploring intersections between gender, institutional 
structures, and modernist music in the early and mid-twentieth century. 
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correlates with musical activity which approaches or exceeds individual listeners’ readily 
available conceptual knowledge, a knowledge that is premised in part on the nature of their 
physical selves and their movements in space. My aim is to oppose the idea that abstraction 
entails an absence or erasure of humanity—that the stretching of extant conceptual knowledge 
is not tantamount to total perceptual incomprehensibility, and that in foregrounding the various 
material constituents of music, composers are also drawing attention to physical, material, and 
psychological aspects of performance and listening. In music listening, our body remains the 
frame through which aesthetic objects are felt and evaluated.5
An example may help show how this embodied knowledge can be brought to bear on 
music analysis. Many music theoretic articles about spectralism are content exclusively tracing 
pre-compositional procedures; a smaller number suggest an interpretive hermeneutics oriented 
around perception and identification of those compositional processes. For instance, Julian 
Anderson’s discussion of Tristan Murail’s Ethers (1978) describes the opening as follows: “The 
flute proposes a series of ‘acoustic models’ which the quintet attempts to simulate; in so doing, 
the models are progressively deformed into a new texture which provides the pretext for a new 
acoustic model from the flute, and so the process continues” (1993, 321). Murail’s own 
performance notes for the opening of Ethers, scored for flute, trombone, violin, viola, cello, and 
contrabass, plus a steady churn of maracas, show as much (Figure 3.3). How these models, and 
their deformations and transitions, are experienced is dependent on compositional maneuvers 
Murail makes but could stand more explication. 
 The idea of our body as a frame is a recurring theme in this dissertation and I will take great pains not to 5
adopt a monolithic account of the body as some naturally-given “fact.” When I refer to the body I 
consider it a product of culture as well as of biology, a complex assemblage of objects and forces in 
regular flux. If the account in this chapter seems insufficiently sensitive to this observation, it is by way of 
introduction only and will be complicated later on. 
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The strings sound a dense cluster of high harmonics; gradually, a fundamental 
corresponding to those harmonics is introduced (usually by the cello or the bass). The flutist 
sings the fundamental (in the first instance, a C#4) and plays a Bb(5) (example 3.1). The 
intended effect is sum and difference tones, which have traditionally been understood as 
psychoacoustic phenomena arising from nonlinear distortion in the inner ear. (They can also 
arise physically, as the result of ring modulation in an audio circuit.) Following the flute 
sonority, the strings sound new harmonics comprised of pitches that include the four pitches of 
the flute, as well as other pitches, yielding the deformation Anderson references. Example 2 
gives a reduction of the four sounding pitches in the first flute sonority of Ethers, with their 





















































































Figure 2: Reduction of “A”; Strings (not just violin I; no notational distinction is made between 
harmonics and regular pitches) and Flute (lowest note sung, higher note played, bracketed 
notes result). The pitches notated in the strings are the ones which immediately precede the 
accompanying flute sonority; immediately after each flute sonority, the strings double the 
pitches of the flute.
Figure 1: Map of A, from “Ethers” performance notes
Figure 3: Measure A-63; D natural in bass and D# in cello
Will Mason
Ethers figures
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Figure 2: Reduction of “A”; Strings (not just violin I; no notational distinction is made between 
harmonics and regular pitches) and Flute (lowest note sung, higher note played, bracketed 
notes result). The pitches notated in the strings are the ones which immediately precede the 
accompanying flute sonority; immediately after each flute sonority, the strings double the 
pitches of the flute.
Figure 1: Map of A, from “Ethers” performance notes
Figure 3: Measure A-63; D natural in bass and D# in cello
Will Mason
Ethers figures
Example 3.2: All six flute combination tone sonorities in Ethers opening
I find the flute’s Bb5 a bit odd at first glance. The score allows for microtonal notation, so 
if Murail were trying to have the two performed pitches correspond to the characteristic natural 
7th (the 7th partial of the overtone series), he could have asked as much. More likely, the Bb was 
chosen precisely because it creates a more complex sound. At 960 hertz, the natural 7th of C# 
would result in a sum tone of 1237 hertz (D#, the 9th partial) and a difference tone of 683, the 
natural 3rd (or the 5th partial of the overtone series, 14 cents lower than the equal tempered third, 
F natural at 697 hertz). Because the resulting tones would align with the harmonic series, they 
would be less identifiable as pitches and easier to understand as timbre. Indeed, all of the 
sonorities of the first section of Ethers feature equal tempered sung and played pitches; the 
played pitch never comes close to a triadic relationship (that is, partials 2-6) with the sung 
fundamental. Note too that when the fundamental shifts to Bb in the fifth chord it is a Tp-3 
transposition of the fourth chord, and the sixth chord is a Tp-3 transposition of the first. Thinking 
in terms of frequency rather than pitch offers a theoretically limitless number of combination 
tones, but Murail only uses four intervallically distinct sonorities. The complex sound of the 
flute draws our awareness to the combination tone process itself: it is easier to hear the sum and 
difference tones when they are not subsumed by the harmonic series of the fundamental pitch; 
they do not fuse as easily and the timbre/pitch line is blurrier. The distinction (or lack thereof) 
between pitch and timbre has been a hallmark of spectral thought since the beginning. As 
Murail writes: “There is a harmony – timbre continuum. A timbre can be defined as an addition 
of basic elements, pure frequencies, sometimes white noise bands; a harmony is created by 
adding timbres together, which is to say the addition of additions of basic sonic components. In 
other words, there is theoretically no difference between the two concepts; it is all a question of 
perception, of habits of perception” (2005, 138). Alternative perceptual modes are encouraged 
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by the harmonic and orchestration decisions Murail made. The string harmonics, blending with 
the steady white noise of the maracas, are both pitch and timbre: the harmonics are white noise, 
too, an ambient backdrop into which the flute (the star of the show in this section) emerges and 
recedes. At the same time, the pitches from the flute generate the pitches of the string 
harmonics, and this connection makes it impossible to ignore the permeable boundary between 
timbre and pitch. This is my becoming aware of a habit of perception, as Murail wrote. 
The music of Ethers is a technology of phenomenological awareness in the same way 
that the spectrogram or the other tools of the laboratory co-opted by the spectralists are 
technologies of conceptual awareness. What gives me this awareness, which is so critical to my 
particular experience of this piece, is my own lived and embodied experience. My ability to 
measure the sound of the flute in relation to my own body’s sound-producing capabilities, or to 
my knowledge of musical instruments, or to my experience being in a space all depend on the 
nature, structure, and history of my body. These kinds of observations about music can feel 
deflating to analysts accustomed to marking cadence types or formal regions, since it’s 
subjective, qualitative, and inherently unverifiable. But a great deal of music has proven 
resistant to the kinds of analytic claims that have traditionally been the aim of music theory; this 
music calls out for a new approach. In what follows I will review sources whose work provides 
psychological, philosophical, and evolutionary support for the idea that listeners can deploy 
their bodily knowledge to empathize with imagined objects, and to use that faculty to imagine 
experiences that stretch the bounds of that very same body. The second half of my claim—that 
technologies of music production constitute an apparatus that produces and modulates these 
experiences—is the subject of chapter 4. 
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Embodiment is a malleable term, and the body itself—easily taken as an unexamined 
and universal given—is not so clearly demarcated a concept as might be assumed. Becker (2004) 
outlines three ways of thinking about embodied experience: first, the body is the physical 
structure where emotion and cognition happen (a viewpoint Becker associates with mainstream 
music cognition); second is the notion of the body as the site of our phenomenal experiences, 
our inner selves; third is the body “as involved with other bodies in the phenomenal world, that 
is, as being-in-the-world” (8). Embodied cognition describes a wide set of views which hold that 
the nature and construction of a person’s physical self, a person’s developmental maturation 
from infancy to adulthood, and a person’s sensorimotor experience of moving with a body, all 
play a causal or even constitutive role in their understanding of the world. This view is in 
contrast with standard theories of cognition (often called cognitivist), which share what Shapiro 
(2011) calls an “ontological commitment” to the idea that “cognition involves algorithmic 
processes upon symbolic representations” (2). One paradigmatic example of traditional 
cognitive science would be Chomskian linguistics, with its rule-based approach to language 
acquisition and manipulation. This view of cognition has been traced back to the dualism 
Descartes drew between res cogitans and res extensa, in which the immaterial mind was the seat 
of thought and the physical body little more than a vessel for the mind. This view permeates 
much foundational work on human cognition, which was indebted to an information-
processing view of the mind in which a perceptual modality like vision, for instance, was 
conceptualized in computational terms: inputs are received from the eyes, the mind assembles 
them into representations, and then decides what conclusions to draw or behaviors to output.  6
 There are innumerable authors who have discussed both the pitfalls of mid-twentieth century cognitive 6
science and its links to Cartesian dualism; see for instance Shapiro (2011), Cusick (1994), and Pickering 
(2010).
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As Shapiro writes, “the guiding idea is that vision is a computational task, involving the 
collection and algorithmic processing of information” (25). Instead, embodied cognition holds 
that mind and body are inseparable, growing together from birth in accordance with the 
environment in which a subject is embedded. Returning to the example of vision, information is 
not received but rather sought out through movement and action. We direct our perceptual 
attention toward exploring certain invariant features of our environment. This view of 
perception was pioneered by James Gibson, founder of ecological psychology. “Each perceptual 
system,” he wrote, “orients itself in appropriate ways for the pickup of environmental 
information, and depends on the general orienting system of the whole body” (Gibson 1966, 58; 
quoted in Shapiro 2011, 35-36).
But it must be emphasized that embodied cognition is a comparatively new framework 
and there is no one unifying theory of embodiment and cognition. Shapiro identifies three 
themes as suffusing various work on embodied cognition, and these themes are not necessarily 
incompatible with one another. They are:
1) Conceptualization; where the properties of an organism’s body serve as a boundary limit 
for the kinds of concepts an organism can acquire;
2) Replacement; where traditional representational processes (algorithms performed on 
symbols) supposed to be central to cognition are replaced by an organism’s body in 
interaction with its environment. Important here, Shapiro observes, is the concomitant claim 
that cognition can take place “in systems that do not include representational states, and can 
be explained without appeal to computational processes or representational states” (2011, 
4);
3) Constitution; cognitive processing as we know it is constituted by the body and the world.
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In Action in Perception, Alva Noë (2004) advances an action-oriented ontology for 
considering perception. He argues that sense perception and motor processes work in tandem 
to ground perceptual and conceptual knowledge of the world around us. Walking towards a 
tree makes the tree grow in our visual field; moving near a stereo makes the sound grow louder; 
and the fact that over time we know these to be causally related forms the foundation of our 
perception and our formation of concepts. In Noë's account, which he calls the enactive 
approach, perception is constituted by the sensory knowledge possessed by the perceiver — 
Shapiro’s third theme. Movement, as in the examples just cited, gives rise to changes in 
stimulation. But Noë argues that stimulation alone is not sufficient for perceptual awareness. 
“For perceptual sensation to constitute experience—that is, for it to have genuine 
representational content—the perceiver must possess and make use of sensorimotor 
knowledge” (Noë 2004, 17). 
One of Noë’s examples is Merleau-Ponty’s famous formulation of a blind man sensing 
with his cane. There is no feeling in the cane, and yet the man is certainly perceiving with it, 
judging objects in the world as he moves through it. The blind man with the cane is enacting 
perceptual content because he is using sensorimotor knowledge to engage with the world. In 
enactivist terms, a blind man who has walked around a scene with aid of his cane has possibly 
perceived more about it than a sighted and inert observer who has explored it with fixed vision 
alone. Where so much of modern culture and modern science is visualist in nature—often 
relying on visual translations of data from other modalities like smell or hearing, and in general 
equating “seeing” with “believing”—one consequence of the turn to embodiment is to 
interrogate the extent to which Western epistemology is fundamentally sight-oriented, and what 
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might be left out in that sensory bias. Music theory as a discipline relies on translating aural 
phenomena into visual form, be it text or music notation. 
Music is a paradigmatic example of an active, kinesthetic art form: we tap, nod, or dance 
to music; we see music performed in all of its skillful physical complexity; we use our bodies 
and instrumental artifacts to produce sounds, and we bring that knowledge to bear in 
imagining how someone else might have made a sound. Performing music need not be the only 
realm of creation: the seemingly passive activity of sitting and listening is itself an active and 
creative activity, implicating a range of faculties from sensorimotor knowledge to mental 
imagery. Creation is fundamentally social, implicating performers, composers, dancers, and 
listeners in a shared (and thus historically and culturally situated) expressive moment. As my 
account of my hearing of Murail’s Ethers demonstrated, one way that music is rendered 
meaningful is by grounding our perceptual observations about performance in our embodied 
ecological knowledge. A familiar way that sounds are produced is through expressive physical 
gestures: clapping hands together, shouting, striking an object. First-person knowledge of how 
these gestures are performed allows for decoding information about their possible intention: 
there is value in understanding that a loud, aggressive sound required great exertion to make 
and likely signals some manner of threat. Robert Hatten defines a gesture as “any energetic 
shaping through time that may be interpreted as significant” (2006, 1, my emphasis). Leman 
and Godøy (2010) define a gesture as “a movement of part of the body, for example a hand or 
the head, to express an idea or meaning” (3). The two definitions are complementary: Hatten’s 
gesture implicates an interpreter, whereas Leman and Godøy suggest authorial expression. 
A listener interpreting a musical gesture first and foremost compares it to a physical 
gesture deemed analogous, be it the gesture that elicited the sound or one that reminds of the 
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sound or both. For instance, grief is often manifest in musical gestures with falling pitches, 
which might suggest a kind of weightiness, or which could nearly imitate a wailing sound.  A 7
surprising musical event might be accompanied by opening the eyes wide and raising the 
eyebrows, facial gestures generally accompanying surprise.  Naomi Cumming likewise argues 8
for the importance of physical gestures in musical meaning formation. She writes that “paying 
attention to a performer’s physical activity is important also in counteracting the sense of sound 
as disembodied, a sense that can come from listening to ‘piped’ music without a knowledge of 
its physical source, or to CDs whose technically altered perfection has removed the sounds of a 
performer’s breath or of the obtrusive scraping of a bow on the strings” (2000, 21). 
It is critically important that Cumming implicates an object—the bow on strings—in her 
account. It’s not simply that we gesture, but that we regularly gesture purposefully with 
instruments. Knowledge of instrumental gesture becomes linked to our sense of a gesture’s 
effort or intensity. If I didn’t know about a hammer or hammering, I would see nails driven into 
a board as the result of immense strength. If I didn’t know about a fretted guitar, I might be 
amazed at the ability to play angular melodies with accurate intonation. Gary Tomlinson’s 
sweeping account of music’s evolutionary origins, A Million Years of Music (2015), begins by 
declaring musical activity’s inseparability from tools and from social communication: he writes 
that “musicking was always technological” and “musicking was always social” (48). The notion 
of musicking, coupled with Tomlinson’s long view on the development of music and the 
development of early humans, gives us a framework for considering how tool use has been 
imbricated with human thought and expression and thus in the making of music. Tomlinson 
 “When I am laid in earth,” Dido’s lament from Henry Purcell’s opera Dido and Aeneas, is an oft-cited 7
example of this correlation. 
 For discussion see Huron (2006), especially chapter 2.8
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demonstrates that Acheulean tools produced in the Lower Paleolithic era “functioned as 
material extensions of the body that altered the selective landscape and its pressures. As the 
toolmakers were advantageously selected, so were the capacities that enabled their industries: 
self-initiated motor sequences, mimesis of others, rehearsal loops” (2015, 82). A feedback loop 
emerges between material objects and functional physical gestures within the taskscape, and 
because of its mimetic dimension—I observe you cracking a crab shell with a rock to obtain 
meat, and I perform the same task in hope of the same result—this feedback loop is 
fundamentally social. Furthermore, this feedback loop led to the production of referential 
gestures and sounds. “The imitation and conventionalization of action gestures and iconic 
pantomines,” writes Tomlinson, “resulted in meaningful gestures” (109). Our capacity for both 
expressing and understanding the expressions of others begins in this Acheulean taskscape, 
amidst the earliest stone tools and the earliest human formations.
All of this is important because whatever music expresses, it does so with a combination 
of tools and gestures whose protolinguistic significance is easier to grasp when set at a remove 
from both its very recent musical manifestations as well as the concomitant development of 
language. Music has important divergences from language, particularly because language fixes 
semantic meanings and music generally doesn’t; and yet comparisons between music and 
language are an enduring part of music scholarship.  Many of the gestures and vocal utterances 9
of early hominins were communicative but lacked the combinatorial elements of language: “a 
laugh or a sigh cannot be broken down into smaller, discrete parts that might be recomposed 
into other signals” (Tomlinson 2015, 110). But we can express gradations of these core 
utterances: big and little laughs, whose gesturing may be grander or smaller depending on what 
 For more discussion of music’s relation to language’s semantic content see Agawu 2009, especially pages 9
20-29.
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general idea is to be expressed. These core aspects of human sociality that Tomlinson traces—
gesturing, tool use, referential social communication, and most importantly mimesis—provide 
necessary evolutionary background to an embodied account of music making. They are 
especially relevant in contemporary “abstract” music, which has often sought to strip away 
accumulated musical meanings to arrive at something composers might have deemed as 
originary or else to envision trajectories of musical organization other than those received from 
tonal music. 
Arnie Cox has formulated what he calls his “mimetic hypothesis” for musical 
experience, which is predicated on the principle that “part of how we comprehend music is by 
imitating, covertly or overtly, the observed sound-producing actions of performers” (2016, 12) 
and that this faculty is simply a subset of how we comprehend the human behavior of others in 
general. Cox distinguishes between mimetic motor action (MMA), which is overt mimetic 
behavior (as when a piano teacher demonstrates to a student how to finger a certain passage at 
the keyboard), and mimetic motor imagery (MMI), which is covert mimesis rooted in mental 
imagery, as when I see someone jump across a small stream and imagine what it would be like 
to do the same (Cox 2016, 12).  Both of the examples I listed are goal-directed actions, which 10
Cox says more strongly activate MMI and MMA; and both of them implicate motor imagery, 
which is one component of musical imagery (13). In the case of watching a performance, we 
might understand the piece by imagining ourselves performing the observed sound-producing 
actions (which Cox calls intra-modal mimetic motor imagery); and/or we imagine analogous 
sound-producing actions (singing a melody that we hear on violin, for instance, which Cox calls 
 An example of motor imagery without mimesis would be if I saw a stream and imagined jumping 10
across it.
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cross-modal mimetic motor imagery); and/or we imagine other analogous exertions (like 
dancing to the music, which, for Cox, is also cross-modal mimetic motor imagery).
For example, as a percussionist I know that there are a number of very fast patterns that 
are nevertheless quite easy to perform because they’re produced by bouncing a drumstick a 
certain way. They sound effortful to lay listeners because there are a lot of attacks, and most 
listeners imagine each individual attack being the result of an excitation. Lots of attacks must 
mean lots of effort. A trained percussionist would instead hear something like a double-stroke 
roll and experience it differently: as less effortful, and perhaps even comfortable and relaxing. 
Both listeners are responding mimetically; but one is misidentifying effort and construing a 
musical experience accordingly. That might be what I as the performer want them to experience
—it’s nice to do something effortless that impresses a crowd—and so even though they’ve 
misread the difficulty of the gesture they may still be receiving its intended meaning. 
So far these examples have dealt with observed performance, which is generally absent 
or impossible in the largely acousmatic world of electronic music. Cox (2016) extends his 
mimetic hypothesis to claims that are especially important some electronic and electroacoustic 
music that I want to consider. First, mimetic behavior can be conscious or unconscious—we can 
hear a pianist and imagine manipulating piano keys without attending to that imaginative act 
(13). Second, mimetic motor action and imagery can be intramodal (the example of matching a 
pianist’s finger movements with our own), cross-modal (hearing a melody played on a piano 
and imagining how we would sing it), or amodal (imagining certain muscle exertions that 
would underlie limb movements) (13). Cox considers an array of empirical evidence in support 
of these claims but I want to highlight two studies in particular. Haueisen and Knösche (2001) 
compared motor activiation in pianists and non-pianists when presented with recordings of 
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piano pieces. Pianists demonstrated a significant increase of involuntary motor activity in the 
contralateral motor cortex compared with non-pianists; their sensorimotor knowledge of the 
production of piano sounds was activated by the auditory stimulus. If we are accustomed to 
performing an action on or with an object (musical or otherwise) and hearing a particular sound 
result, we are in general very good at reverse-engineering this process when given a sound: we 
imagine what we or someone else would have done to produce this sound in this way. This is a 
fundamental component of the history of musicking that Tomlinson describes: that music 
developed alongside the faculty for empathetic mind-reading (inferring what might be driving 
an organism to do something) and that this faculty can implicate tools and objects. Humans 
needed not only to be able to use a stone hammer, but to watch someone else use a stone 
hammer and mimic their actions. This is intramodal mimetic motor imagery: an auditory 
stimulus elicited a response in a listener with a particular skill set that was different from the 
response elicited in a listener without those skills. 
Margulis et al. (2009) examined the effect of a listener’s biography—“an individual’s 
long term experience with a particular type of auditory input” (267)—on their perception of 
music. They found that when listeners heard music played on their instrument of expertise, 
they had dramatically increased sensitivity to nuances of timbre, syntax, and sound-motor 
interactions. The experiment’s subjects, all of whom were either highly trained violinists or 
flutists, were presented with two similar pieces: J. S. Bach’s Partita in A Minor for solo flute and 
Partita in D minor for solo violin. fMRI analysis revealed that skilled performers experienced 
greater activation of parts of the brain devoted to parsing auditory information, like the left 
medial frontal gyrus, when presented with their own instrument’s excerpt. This is not the only 
study to suggest that learning an instrument forges new audio/visuomotor associations. 
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Proverbio et al. (2015) found a correlation between the number of years of formal training on an 
instrument and the ability to detect an incongruence between pitches performed on an 
instrument and pitches heard; more advanced musicians were better able to tell that the audio 
and video were mismatched, suggesting a correlation between perceptual sensitivity and 
instrumental knowledge. 
Margulis et al. (2009) note that “activation in the inferior frontal region can be attributed 
to the involvement of the mirror neuron network” (274). Mirror neurons have been directly 
observed in some primate species; they are neurons that fire both when an animal performs a 
task and when the animal observes the task performed by another animal.  I do not wish to 11
overstate the explanatory value of mirror neurons, and Hickok (2014) provides a thorough 
critique of some studies which have placed too much explanatory value on mirror neurons. 
Cox, too, sounds a note of caution: in listening to a flute performance, it is not clear which 
aspects of performance an auditor might mirror, be they finger movement or breathing or 
mouth and tongue movements, etc.  Nevertheless, I do think that they suggest that some sort 12
of physical mimetic relationship between artifacts, learning, and cognition inheres in our 
experience of music. Intramodal MMI responds to auditory cues with which a listener is 
especially familiar: the timbre of a particular instrument implicates an object (flute, violin, etc.) 
with which we might have skilled sensorimotor knowledge.
It may seem as though this theory of mind-reading (of mental simulation) is contrary to 
the action-oriented and anti-cognitivist approach evoked by philosophers of embodied 
cognition. I would point to the distinction made by Currie (2011) between two views of 
 Mirror neurons were first documented in Di Pelligrino et al. 1992.11
 See Cox 2016, 23 for discussion.12
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simulation. The first he terms the philosophical and developmental psychological 
understanding, in which simulation “names a theory about how it is we come to understand 
people’s reasons, the idea being that we imagine ourselves in their position and then reproduce 
the reasoning which led to their own decision or conclusion” (2011, 85). This would be a kind of 
cognitivist approach to simulation and it is not the one that finds its roots in Tomlinson’s 
account. A second kind of simulation Currie defines as “a theory about ways in which certain 
aspects of human performance are implemented in systems that operate within the person, are 
not directly under personal control, and the workings of which may be inaccessible to 
consciousness, though they may give rise to conscious experiences” (85). Currie cites judgments 
about the production of simulated movements, as when a test subject rotates their hands as part 
of the process of figuring out how they might grip an object depicted on a screen. When I see a 
violinist perform and imagine performing the same gestures, it’s not that I am reproducing a 
“reasoning” because the reasoning behind a musical gesture is usually diffuse and highly 
subjective. (Consider my example of the percussionist performing an easy but fast drum roll.) 
It is important to emphasize that experiential contexts will likely elicit different forms of 
mimetic behavior: at a live concert, where I am watching (for example) a cellist perform, the 
strongest pull will be toward imagining actions performed by the cellist. In an acousmatic 
context, as when listening to a recording, there will be more potential for cross-modal MMI 
given the absence of a visual reference. Experimental evidence for cross-modal MMI is not 
abundant, but Cox points to one study on timbre imagery as evidence of the specific cross-
modal phenomenon of subvocalization. Halpern et al. (2004) asked participants to judge the 
similarity and difference in the timbre of different instruments heard in recordings, and then to 
perform the same assessment based only on the name and image of that instrument—that is, by 
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imagining the sound. Cox writes that “one premise of the study was that timbre imagery likely 
does not involve subvocalization” (31). However, fMRI scans found activation of the 
supplementary motor area of the brain, which Cox says is consistent with a theory “that 
understood recall as a combination of rehearing and reenacting” (29). Cox speculates that we 
subvocalize not just for pitch but for timbre. “Despite the limitations of the human voice, we do 
intentionally and overtly imitate timbres, to some degree of fidelity, as children and as adults…
What matters is the attempt to emulate the sounds, to feel something of what it would be like to 
make such sounds, and to thereby feel something of what it would be like to be an entity 
capable of making such sounds” (32). 
In acousmatic music, it is absolutely conceivable that mimetic motor imagery would, for 
some listeners, be activated by a clear electronic gesture more than, say, a fast sul ponticello 
arpeggio from a violist. Indeed, the seemingly paradoxical role of the human-like machine and 
inhuman performer is one expressive resource that electronic musicians have mined. We don’t 
just interrogate other humans mimetically; Cox writes “when we take an aesthetic interest (a 
disinterested interest, as it were) in some entity, in effect part of what we are doing is wondering 
what it is like, or would be like, to do what that entity is doing and to be that entity…in 
principle the hypothesis extends to inanimate entities like rivers, trees, mountains, sculptures, 
and architecture” (2011, 4). 
Another way to think about this is that we can adopt first- and second-person 
subjectivities in perceiving the world (including music). As Cox (2012) writes, performance is 
corporeally a first-person activity (I am performing) and listening a second-person activity (you 
are performing). But “a listener’s subjectivity combines something of all three of these positions, 
roughly simultaneously, in a continuously changing blend” (2012, 2). For example, enjoying the 
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sound of a metal singer screaming could originate in a masochistic desire to be screamed at in 
an aesthetic context (second person: you are screaming at me), or in a desire to be able to scream 
at someone (adopting a first-person subject position through mimesis: you are screaming but I 
am imagining what it would be like to scream like you). Music gives us a safe environment in 
which to act out either or both of these desires, which may be taboo in our daily life.
3.3 Acousmatic representations
It’s a truism to state that different media represent phenomena differently (often with 
varying degrees of verisimilitude): a film of a man walking represents his gait better than a 
painting would, even if the act of walking is still conveyed by the fixity of the painting. To a 
particular viewer, the feeling of awe in the Grand Canyon might best be conveyed through 
painting even though in reality our aural and proprioceptive experience of being in the canyon 
(which are absent from painting) contribute to the sense of awe the landscape inspires. In 
writing about the sublime, Edmund Burke argued that poetry was a superlative medium for 
conveying that which might otherwise be considered “unrepresentable,” citing passages from 
Milton about the figure of death and of Satan as two examples and deriding painting for being 
mere mimetic representation (Burke 2015, 129-130, 138). Total accuracy should, by definition, 
not be something we look for in representations in any medium: a representation is a step 
removed from that which it represents. As Jen Webb writes, representation is an epistemological 
process: “it is productive of what we know, and how we know it: that is to say, it is constitutive 
— it makes us” (2009, 5). In sum, representation is mediation between our conscious selves and 
the world around us.
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Music can be understood as a representation of action: it conveys information about how 
an action might have been performed, mediated by the various tools of musical creation. 
Listeners extract information from music to govern a variety of aesthetic and gestural responses. 
With repeated exposure these actions become laden with meaning and accrue into concepts, 
tropes, or symbols (tonality being one such symbolic system). By representing music as action, 
our body and its physical capacities acts as a fundamental mediator of musical sound.  I see an 13
analogy between the materials of music and visual art: timbre, gesture, and acoustic space are 
like color, line, and depth of field. Those basic elements can congeal into something that we 
represent as a tree, or they can remain abstract, or they can straddle various experiential 
thresholds between abstraction and verisimilitude. Style and medium necessarily impact our 
representational experience in art: Titian’s trees are not like Wolf Kahn’s but in both cases the 
majority of observers assign them the category of “tree” and then make subjective judgments as 
to the character of the tree based on their color, shape, and other medium-specific attributes. In 
abstract painting, we have shapes (lines, squares) that a viewer struggles to place in categories 
about real-world objects or scenes (taking a square to be a theoretic concept abstracted from 
aspects of the real, physical world). And in some art (such as Duchamp’s Nude Descending a 
Staircase) we begin to straddle the line between objects whose conceptual roots are clear (as in 
Titian’s trees) and objects that are abstract (Mondrian’s lines, Rothko’s rectangles.) Synthesis, as 
in the “instrumental synthesis” of Grisey’s composition Partiels (1975) analyzed in chapter 2, 
exists in limbo between the suggestion of a concrete category (in the Grisey example, a 
trombone sound, or a dominant 7th or 9th chord) and an “abstract” one (a strange and novel 
composite timbre, an unfamiliar chord, an impossible composite gesture). Murail’s flute in the 
 Authors who have made similar arguments include Leman (2007, 2016) and Godøy (2003).13
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opening of Ethers uses novel playing techniques (gesture—in this case, singing and playing) to 
occlude the traditional timbre of the flute such that it occupies a greater frequency space due to 
the combination tones. 
Are these moments of abstraction—moments when we know we’re listening to a 
computer algorithm generate music, or are unable to hear human presence in music, or struggle 
to bring a particular concept or skillful knowledge to bear on a percept—necessarily inhuman? 
Disembodied? The embodied framework that I have pointed to so far leads me to answer “no.” 
This has been the subject of work by Peters (2012b), who writes, “What we hear becomes 
expressive presence only via our bodily experience in listening…Electronic music becomes an 
interrogation of human presence or absence by the very difficulty that composing this presence 
in fact entails.” (18-19). A listener imbues sounds with agency and with intentionality through 
mimetic comprehension of the sound. 
Listeners might wish to escape the mimetic foundations of human experience that 
Tomlinson and Cox outline; for example, Roger Scruton has expressed a Romantic view of 
musical experience, writing that “music is heard as though breathed into the ear of the listener 
from another and higher sphere…Music fulfills itself as an art by reaching into this realm of 
pure abstraction and reconstituting there the movements of the human soul” (Scruton 1998 489, 
quoted in Bicknell 2002). In other words, music ought to transcend its fleshy provenance in 
order to reach a higher plane of experience: we escape res extensa for res cogitans, to invoke 
Descartes again. And what better way to enact this experience than to use a computer and do 
away with the fleshy sound-makers altogether? But such an account is problematic for a variety 
of reasons: it risks obscuring the human and material and social relationships that gave rise to 
music and continue to be a critical part of its meaning; and it obscures aspects of embodied 
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cognition which increasingly appear essential and inescapable to our experience of music. I 
would suggest that such “transcendental” listening is in fact learned, and culturally specific. 
Building on Peters’ idea of interrogating bodily presence in electronic music, I claim that digital 
technologies may in fact render the plastic and embodied nature of perception more obvious or 
apparent because of their virtual nature, and that this is part of their aesthetic appeal. Or, as 
Joanna Demers has written, “All electronic music is a meditation on the act of listening to 
sounds both old and new” (2010, 22).
Finally, I want to consider what it means for the preceding description of music as an 
active, gestural, and embodied practice to be treated as normative or totalizing. We might think 
about how certain musical practices have deviated from these norms, or augmented them, or 
subverted them, or hacked them; and how these practices might come to be normative 
themselves within the bounds of a particular culture. At what point is this account erasing the 
real dimension that social constructions of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and class 
have in music perception and creation? Innumerable authors have critiqued the study of 
cognition for applying a veneer of universalism that in fact simply covers the centering of a 
particular kind of (usually white and male and Western) experience. Becker (2008) cites one 
critic, Elizabeth Tolbert, who writes: “Can one determine anything about musical meaning by 
reducing musical experience to an explanation of perceptual and cognitive processes? From the 
point of view of most ethnomusicologists, the nature of musical meaning is considered to be 
inapproachable by empirical studies, especially in light of ethnomusicological work that 
demonstrates the close relationship of musical meaning to its cultural and historical 
contexts” (Tolbert 1992, 7 quoted in Becker 2008, 3). But, as Becker eloquently discusses, culture 
has a material impact on the mind—consider the study by Margulis (2009) discussed earlier, 
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about the plastic nature of the brain and the way that training impacts perception. “What 
neuroscience can do is help understand some of the underlying mechanisms of the central 
nervous system that contribute to, or that make possible…the transcendental pleasure we may 
experience when entranced by music” (Becker 2008, 10). Becker’s account reframes cognition 
away from its Chomskian roots as a theory of information reception and toward a murkier 
study of human-environment interaction. The concept of embodiment—that the mind and the 
body are inseparable—is at the center of this effort. Its explanatory value is not toward a 
universal theory of mind or of information, but rather in bolstering a holistic and relational 
picture of a human subject embedded within a specific ecological, physical, and cultural milieu. 
And so it is not that the embodied cognition work just discussed is a normative account 
of music, but rather that it is usefully underdetermined. I want to take great pains to avoid 
conflating embodiment and aesthetic value, or to merely invert the maligned Cartesian dualism 
that placed the mind on a pedestal with one that grants the body supremacy. Returning to 
Georgina Born’s account of musical modernism in and around IRCAM, she contrasts the 
“cerebral, complex” nature of modernism with the “physical, performative, simple” world of 
postmodernism (Born 1995, 63). Modernism’s abstraction from the body (which Born accepts as 
a given, but which I question) is in contrast to the more embodied postmodern music, and the 
latter is aesthetically more desirable than the former. What such an account lacks is a relational 
or positional stance. One virtue of embodied cognition is that it provides ample room for 
scholars to ask: “For whom?” Which communities regard a particular music as complex, and 
why might they think that? For example, Heidemann (2016) proposes a system for describing 
vocal timbre that is rooted in embodied cognition and that places listener subjectivity and singer 
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identity at the forefront of analysis: what does it feel like when I imagine singing like the 
performer I’m hearing?
A second virtue of embodied cognition, one that is especially relevant to music theory, is 
that it draws attention to the plastic nature of the mind and to the capacity for cultivating 
unusual or peak experiences. One of the functions of music analysis is to direct attention: 
imparting concepts to apply to percepts, asking questions that prompt new angles on familiar 
aural experiences, and so on. Where much work in music cognition attends to the quotidian 
experiences that non-professional musicians have with music, the merging of music theory and 
embodied cognition allows for the consideration of heightened musical experiences that may be 
fleeting or ephemeral rather than durable aspects of everyday experience.
3.4. The problem of timbre and Chion’s three modes of listening
Musical traits like gesture, material, and space are transmitted to listeners principally 
through timbre, and so an account of how composers construct and manipulate perceptions of 
those three features must necessarily also be an account of timbral manipulation. Western 
popular and art music in the latter part of the twentieth century has been preoccupied with 
explorations of musical timbre, and the music of the French spectral school has in particular 
been focused on timbre. But defining timbre is problematic. The Encyclopedia of Perception begins 
its entry on timbre by defining timbre by what it is not: “Timbre is that characteristic of sound 
that distinguishes between the perception of two sounds with identical loudness, duration, and 
pitch” (Terasawa 2010). Leonard Meyer considered timbre a secondary parameter in music: 
timbre “cannot be segmented into perceptually proportional relationships” like pitch and 
rhythm, so it is “the presence of syntactic constraints that distinguishes primary from secondary 
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parameters” (1989, 14). There is some irony here, in that perceptually speaking timbre is 
foundational in a way that pitch isn’t: humans are very good at hearing differences in timbre 
and our perception of timbre is more refined than our perception of discrete pitches.  And, as 14
Fales (2002) observes, Meyer’s view evinces a kind of timbral deafness, “a perceptual proclivity 
on the part of western listeners, including ethnomusicologists, to focus on melody in music 
where the dominant parameter is timbre” (56). Still, Meyer is correct that timbre does not parse 
into discrete categories with any ease and thus taxonomies of sounding timbres are difficult. 
Timbre is multidimensional; it is a complex combination of individual elements. Timbre, 
space, and material are inextricably linked — hearing timbre is hearing a sound source and 
locating it in an space, even if that sound source is imagined or misapplied. This source/sound 
discrepancy can occur in the absence of visual information; or it can occur when our eyes and 
ears seem to disagree, as when a pianist plays a prepared piano or an oboist performs 
multiphonics. Timbre can be described in terms of the material one perceives as being at its 
sound source: this could take the form of an instrumental description — saying that violin 
harmonics sound flute-like, for instance, though this claim also assumes a familiarity with 
normative sounds produced on both of those instruments (of hearing the flute through the 
physical structure of the violin). Timbre is also described in terms of raw materials (like wooden 
or metallic) or of vocal qualities (nasal, hoarse, pinched) or in emotional terms (lovely, 
irritating); furthermore, timbre and space are connected, as when a reverberant timbre suggests 
a large space.
Analysts have struggled to account for timbre by virtue of its multidimensional nature. 
There are interesting methodological divisions which relate to older debates about acoustics and 
 See Moore, Glasberg, and Proctor 1992 and Pitt 1994.14
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psychoacoustics: whether to measure timbre in terms of its physical properties or its perceived 
attributes, and what the relationships between the two can fairly be said to be. Sethares (2004) 
asserts that “physical attributes of a signal such as frequency and amplitude must be kept 
distinct from perceptual correlates such as pitch and loudness” (12). All physical objects 
resonate with characteristic frequencies which diverge in both frequency and amplitude from 
the harmonic series (in which overtones are integer multiples of a fundamental frequency).  
These divergences are the physical, acoustical features that contribute to the characteristic 
sound of those objects. Western musical instruments have been designed with a particular set of 
scales and intervals in mind and have emphasized timbres which hew relatively closely to the 
overtone series and thus render intervallic relationships between fundamental frequencies more 
clearly (Sethares 2005, 3). 
But as Fales (2004) observes, there can be significant discrepancies between physical 
characteristics of a sound and the features a listener perceives. The human auditory system 
“perceives sources according to its own expectations, sources that are consistent with similar 
sources identified in the past, or that have characteristics typical to an environment, though 
digital analysis might show them to be completely anomalous by any measurable 
standard” (58). The explanatory value of physical measurements of sound must be tempered in 
light of these perceptual features. Lay listeners, Fales explains, can “more easily describe the 
production of the sound than the perceived features of the sound that allow them knowledge of 
its production” (59). Gaver (1993a and 1993b) cites an array of evidence showing that listeners 
are skilled at hearing the material of a struck bar and the hardness of the mallet used to strike it, 
or hearing the shape of hands as they clap: this is information conveyed by the sound’s timbre. 
Adaptive advantages of our refined ear for timbre are easy to imagine: for instance, judging the 
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size and location of potential predators — ideally before they become visible. Our timbral 
sensitivity is also part of our capacity to distinguish different speakers, and to separate speech 
sounds in a crowded room. 
Wallmark (2014) offers a definition of timbre that is rooted in embodied experience: 
“Timbre is the sonic result of material engagement, imbued with the audible traces of bodies in 
motion” (8). Like Cox (2016) and Heidemann (2016), Wallmark roots his argument in theories of 
mimetic engagement, especially concerning the voice. He argues that we relate noisy timbres to 
the human voice and specifically to the imagined feeling of exerting with our voice: of clenching 
our throat, tensing our muscles, expending energy. I would add that timbral understanding 
can’t only be rooted in our capacities of (vocal) exertion, but needs to implicate space and 
material as well. If I scream and it’s heard by someone else at great distance, this gives 
information to them about my scream—for I must have put a lot of exertion into it for it to be 
heard—but also about the sounding space. If I hear the sound of a rock thrown against the 
ground, I learn about its size and infer information about the size and strength of whatever 
threw it. This is important because these physical phenomena rooted in human exertion in a 
physical world are, in a sense, “hacked” by acousmatic music and by the imagery that listeners 
can conjure in an acousmatic listening context.
The invocation of imagery in acousmatic listening is not uncontroversial, and points to 
enduring aesthetic questions in the creation of acousmatic music. Chion (1994) outlines three 
modes of hearing, indebted to the writings of Pierre Schaeffer: causal, semantic, and reduced.  15
Semantic listening refers to the way we listen to speech for semantic meaning. Patel (2007) offers 
 Schaeffer’s four modes of listening—écouter (intentional listening), ouïr (physiological perception of 15
sound), entendre (attention to spectromorphological features of sound, the heart of Schaeffer’s notion of 
reduced listening) and comprendre (engaging with sound’s external or semiotic referentiality)—are the 
subject of several extensive critical treatments, especially Demers (2010) and Kane (2015). 
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a range of evidence for this mode of listening. One study presented speech-like sounds made of 
sine waves to listeners before and after priming them to hear the sounds as speech.  16
Participants first reported hearing the sine waves as amorphous nonsense but after being 
primed to hear them as speech experienced a radical shift in perception of the stimulus. Causal 
listening refers explicitly to much of what this chapter has discussed: listening to a sound to 
determine its location, material, and so on. While walking down the street, I might hear a 
scream and turn my head to see if it’s a person in distress. In music, causal listening might 
include picking out different instruments of the orchestra, or waiting for the entrance of a 
singer. 
Chion (2011) critiques the very concept of timbre for being rooted in causation, which 
electronic music has complicated. “With the fixing of sounds by recording, their manipulation, 
sampling, synthesis,” Chion writes, “this initial causation and the role that it plays in the 
determination of sound have completely changed in nature” (240). Chion argues that his third 
mode of listening, Schaeffer’s reduced listening, is in part a response to the changes technology 
has wrought on causal listening. Reduced listening, Chion writes, is a “mode of listening that 
deliberately and artificially abstracts from causes — and I would add from effects — and from 
meaning in order to attend to sound considered for itself and not only with regard to its sensible 
aspects of pitch and rhythm also of grain, matter, shape, mass, and volume” (2016, 267). For 
Schaeffer, reduced listening stems directly from the capacity to record and replay sound. The 
sounds of the wheels of a train, like the ones used in Schaeffer’s early musique concrète 
composition Etude aux chemins de fer (1948), become rhythmic on repetition: as Kane (2015) 
writes, “repetition musicalizes the sound fragment by removing the dramatic and anecdotal 
 Remez et al. 1981, quoted in Patel (2007, 76)16
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traces of its original causal content” (16).  Chion’s definition of reduced listening is broad 17
enough to apply to all sounds: it is a positional stance adopted by a listener as much as it is a 
fact of technological reproduction. But it’s also a compositional attitude, and an orientation that 
composers can seek to cultivate or suggest in a particular piece. It can also exist on a continuum: 
one of the joys of listening to Schaeffer’s Etude aux chemins de fer is the experience of willfully 
aspect-shifting, of hearing a sound as a train and hearing the sound of a train as being rhythmic, 
for instance. Kane’s definition of acousmatic listening calls it “a shared, intersubjective practice 
of attending to musical and non-musical sounds, a way of listening to the soundscape that is 
cultivated when the source of sounds is beyond the horizon of visibility, uncertain, 
underdetermined, bracketed, or willfully and imaginatively suspended” (2015, 7).
I can listen to Ethers in ways that accentuate or attenuate each of these modes. I could 
imagine making the flute’s combination tone sonority with my voice. To me, this sound feels 
sickly, like a pneumonic groan: airy and pinched and hoarse. Because I do not play the flute I 
have no sense of how easy or hard it is to sing and play at the same time. Were I to try to listen 
to the sound stripped of its causal properties, I find that it’s easier for me to hear the transition 
from the four pitches sounded by the flute into their doublings in the strings, like the complex 
flute sonority has turned to dust and risen into the airier string timbres. 
Many practitioners and theorists of acousmatic and electronic music have commented 
on Schaeffer’s four modes of listening or on Chion’s extension of Schaeffer. Denis Smalley (1996) 
evidences some of the contradictions and omissions that emerge from Schaeffer’s thinking. 
 Diana Deutsch’s well-known speech-to-song illusion, in which the spoken sentence fragment “…17
sometimes behave so strangely” seems to become pitched and musical on incessant repetition is one 
example of this same phenomenon. Margulis (2014) says of this and similar experiments: “What’s 
remarkable in this example is that in shifting this way, we have the sensation that we’re approaching the 
stimulus not in a slightly different manner, but rather as if it were a completely different stimulus 
altogether—as if speech had magically been transformed into music” (18). 
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Smalley discusses Schaeffer’s third mode of hearing, entendre, which deals with 
spectromorphological features of sound like brightness, loudness, and so forth. (Schaeffer 
describes it as “I hear, as a function of what interests me, from what I already know and what I 
seek to understand” (quoted in Demers 2010, 27).) Smalley writes that this mode “is a selective 
process where some sounds are preferred at the expense of others. These preferences are based 
on certain spectromorphological criteria which appear to the listener to be more attractive, 
interesting or significant than others” (1996, 79). He goes on: “If we then ignore the context of 
events and consider only the sound, for example its dynamic shape, the intonation of 
acceleration, the changes in the timbre and grain of the sound, then our listening focus and 
attention intentionally shift to a selective perusal (and enjoyment) of attributes in mode 
three” (1996, 79). Smalley, echoing Schaeffer, emphasizes that we can shift between these modes 
or inhabit multiple modes at the same time. But I feel that Smalley leaves his invocation of 
listener preference and interest while practicing reduced listening under-considered. Sound 
comes to be objectified in this account, as if significations could be stripped away like coats of 
paint to reveal some objective truth beneath. What, in a world of listening that is supposedly 
free from extraneous causal representations or significations, would dictate listener preference? 
What would govern enjoyment? Schaeffer’s description of entendre as coming “from what I 
already know” seems suggestive of both the problem and the solution: even when stripped of 
residual significations listeners are left with some degree of causality inherent in a timbral signal 
because timbre is itself an information-bearing percept. Even artificial, chimerical, or otherwise 
impossible synthesized timbres are captive to the bounds of embodied human perception. 
Godøy (2006) links Schaeffer’s notions of reduced listening to underlying perceptual schemata 
relating to gesture, and suggests that even in reduced listening Schaeffer does not intend for the 
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schemata to be ignored (2006, 152). Godøy terms the interrelation of gesture and sound a 
“gestural-sonorous object” and argues that “there is a gesture component embedded in 
Schaeffer’s conceptual apparatus which is on a more general and basic level than that of 
everyday causal listening, i.e. not on a level that the principle of reduced listening is supposed 
to lead us away from” (2006, 154). Godøy writes: 
The gestural categories have a certain degree of abstraction in the sense that they are 
transferable from one setting to another, both with regard to effectors (i.e. hand, fist, 
finger) and instrument (drum, string, metal sheet, computer), hence in fact be what we 
could call reduced gestures’…or in more general terms become image schemata 
(Johnson 1987) which we use in our perception of known as well as unknown, 
previously heard as well as unheard (155).
Though the cause may not be precisely known, is the implication that a listener would imagine 
a gesture in the abstract without subbing in these effectors and instruments? Can someone 
imagine a fist traveling through the air toward a drum, and then remove the fist and the drum 
from their mental image? I return to Cox’s account of cross-modal mimetic motor imagery: 
absent the mental imagery (or perhaps more broadly the sense) of a fist hitting a drum, listeners 
appeal to other modalities to make sense of what they hear. This could be with their voice, or by 
making recourse to knowledge of another instrument. This raises a different problem: could an 
electronic apparatus itself come to be instrumental? Is there a “feeling” associated with 
truncating the attack off of a waveform in ProTools, which someone skilled in that activity may 
come to associate with attack-less sounds? I would suggest that, for this hypothetical listener, 
the sound would be perceived on multiple levels: knowledge of its mode of production would 
work in tandem with that listener’s personal embodied sense of somatic effort and exertion 
(vocal, muscular, gestural, etc.).
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3.5 Chapter summation
Listening entails mimetic consideration of sound causality, and this consideration can be 
overt or covert. In acousmatic musical contexts, listeners toggle constantly between different 
modes of listening. These include first person (I am performing) and second person (you are 
performing) subject positions; and they also include Schaeffer and Chion’s modes of listening: 
semantic, causal, and reduced. Timbral features of music index sound causality (material, 
gesture, acoustic space). Reduced listening can never fully overcome the fingerprints of bodily 
causality because our bodily knowledge is brought to bear even on seemingly abstract traits of a 
sound like “brightness.” 
In the next chapter, I will suggest that the tools of the recording studio participate in 
listeners’ mimetic experience of musical sound and can even augment that experience. 
Technologies of sound synthesis entail constructing new timbres, and this can result in chimeric 
or impossible timbres. The mimetic and imaginative capacities considered in this chapter are the 
necessary foundation on which extraordinary extensions of feeling can be produced.
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Chapter 4: Constructing Sonic Worlds
4.1 Introduction
Iverson (2015) analyzes Björk’s song “There’s more to life than this,” discussing the 
sound world that the song both represents and creates: the sounds of people talking in a club 
and glasses clinking together stand as diegetic sounds and represent an aural image of the club 
space: of walking through a club, hearing Björk sing, hearing dance beats and synth bass lines 
ebb and recede based on the impression of moving closer to or farther from a loudspeaker. 
There is an intermingling of subject positions, with Björk at times seeming as if she is 
addressing us as the listener and leading us through the space, while other times she becomes 
the lead singer, seemingly standing on stage performing. Iverson concludes: “What is 
remarkable about the track is the way it creates the impression of space. Listeners are 
immediately invited into an environment, and not just a musical one” (156). This invitation into 
a space implies a listening body, Iverson says, one with experience deciphering sounds in a 
space — a causal approach to listening that recalls the ecological psychology research described 
in the previous chapter. 
Listening to music live immerses us in a particular environment: for example, of the 
concert hall, seated with a stage in front of us populated by performers. The technology of the 
recording studio is no different in its creation of an immersive environment, but it is not bound 
by the same physical laws. The sound of a violin could rush from the back of the soundscape to 
the front; a voice could sing quietly but sound louder than a fortissimo drum beat. These effects 
are illusions insofar as they trick listeners into hearing and believing an arrangement of real 
objects and real performers that would nevertheless be impossible in physical reality. They are 
also augmentations or enhancements: a multi-tracked guitar (that is, overlaying multiple 
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recordings of a single guitar passage) can create a thicker, richer sound: its source is still 
recognizably a guitar, but it is an idealized and fictional composite of multiple guitars, amps, 
microphones, and processing techniques.  And lastly, these effects entail empathy: both in the 1
first-person mimetic sense of what it would be like for me to perform a heard action in a heard 
space, and in the second-person imagined exertions of an imagined performer and imagined 
instruments.
Using the recording studio to create a sense of real space and movement, as in Björk’s 
song, is today fairly common. But this was not always so, and while there are a wide range of 
attitudes toward the studio (such as “minimalist” approaches that appeal to ideas of fidelity and 
verisimilitude that, I would argue, are just as constructed as any other approach to sound 
recording ), the development of attitudes of recording rooted in illusions, augmentations, and 2
other surreal auditory phenomena is worth examining. I am particularly interested in how the 
technological workings of digital synthesis suggested these kinds of illusions to composers. 
Digital sound production is uncoupled from the physical actions that produced it (even if 
interfaces strive to recreate this coupling, as with a MIDI keyboard). With a traditional acoustic 
instrumental performance technique like a bow being dragged across a string, the sound 
correlates closely with the action that produced it. Identifying sound causes holds true for many 
non-traditional instrumental techniques as well, like knocking on the body of a violin. But the 
relationship between actions and sounding results in digital synthesis can range from tenuous 
(i.e., lightly depressing a key on a Moog synth could yield a massive and thick-sounding square 
 Such enhancements are not restricted to the recording studio. The use of three strings per pitch in the 1
middle register of the grand piano is a similar effect as multitracking a guitar: the timbre of the 
instrument becomes thicker and mellower, not to mention louder.
 Sterne (2003) provides an excellent history of ideas of verisimilitude in recording, especially chapter 5.2
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wave) to unrecognizable (i.e., pressing a computer space bar to commence an algorithm that 
sends off frantic-sounding bleeps and bloops, or triggering complex instrumental samples with 
the push of one button). The sounds themselves can also vary widely in terms of timbral 
content, presenting conceptual problems for composers finding it necessary to rein in the 
possible options.
Studying particular moments in the history of the development of electronic sound 
synthesis may yield insights into the conceptual touchstones composers and engineers used to 
organize their work. These insights, in turn, might bear out on the works they produced, which 
can be treated as contemporary accounts of the perceptual experimentations of its creators. I 
will focus on the writings of two composers, Hugues Dufourt and Jean-Claude Risset, before 
turning to some of the music of Kaija Saariaho. Dufourt and Risset both felt that digital 
synthesis software and studio manipulations could create surreal listening environments. 
Furthermore, they expressed perceptual concerns about existing methods of synthesis: that the 
prophesied world of unlimited sound was in fact not coming to fruition. Risset felt that analog 
synthesis techniques yielded relatively flat sounds and did a poor job of imitating real 
instruments. In trying to “solve” the problem of synthetic sounds, Risset turned (as with many 
other composers) to psychoacoustic concerns. But where Murail and Grisey’s writings about 
psychoacoustics tended to focus on parametric aspects of sound like harmonic and inharmonic 
partials, Risset made explicit appeals to ecological psychology and to the ways in which 
embodied and embedded perceptual tendencies guide listeners when confronted with new and 
strange sound worlds.
Dufourt is a founding member of the spectral school of composition and was a founding 
member of the French new music ensemble l’Itineraire, alongside Tristan Murail, Gérard Grisey, 
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Michaël Lévinas, and Roger Tessier. Risset is not generally considered a spectral composer, 
though conceptually he is very closely aligned to them. l’Itineraire performed works by Risset, 
including premiering his 1981 electroacoustic work Aventure de lignes. Risset wrote of the 
ensemble: “l’Itineraire was the first group that took into account the ‘electric revolution,’ as 
Hugues Dufourt calls it, and that wanted to implant it in the mainstream of instrumental music, 
and to avoid having electroacoustics remain a separate branch” (2014, 37).  Saariaho began 3
working at IRCAM in 1982 and is generally considered part of the second wave of French 
spectral music, following the composers affiliated with l’Itineraire. Her music adeptly 
intermingles acoustic and electronic elements and, like l’Itineraire, she aimed for the creation of a 
unified sound world rather than leaving electronics as a distinct element. 
Risset and Dufourt outline aesthetic prerogatives in spectral music that were generally 
not discussed by Murail and Grisey and so, given the outsize influence of those two composers 
in anglophone discussions of spectral music, are not generally part of the narrative about 
spectral music. This is not to suggest that the prerogatives Dufourt and Risset discuss are not 
present in their works, or that I am “reading against” the writings of these figures. I am less 
trying to offer a counter-narrative than I am trying to show that a set of conceptual orientations 
surrounding acousmatic music—about referentiality, causation, and abstraction, all of which I 
conceive as both compositional and listening strategies—also apply to electroacoustic music in 
general and the work of some spectral composers in particular. And these discourses can be in 
service of analytic strategies: of explaining certain compositional choices, and of giving listeners 
deeper and broader pathways through a work. 
 l’Itineraire apparaît comme le premier groupe qui ait pris en compte la "révolution électrique,” comme 3
la’ppelle Hugues Dufourt, et qui ait voulu l'implanter dans le grand courant de la musique instrumentale, 
en évitant que l'électroacoustique ne reste une branche séparée. 
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4.2 Hearing and constructing virtual worlds
Risset wrote at length about the potential for technologies of sound synthesis to build 
illusory, virtual sound objects and sound worlds. He points to several early examples, such as 
John Chowning’s work producing the illusion of fast-moving sound sources from stationary 
loudspeakers, and Risset’s own work with Shepard on the Shepard-Risset glissando, an MC 
Escher-esque illusion in which a tone seems to rise indefinitely without ever moving, like a 
barbershop pole (Risset 2014, 42). Risset’s long career in the world of computer audio and 
synthesis began in part with some frustration about the state of early synthetic sounds. 
“Electronic music [prior to 1967] had failed to imitate musical instruments, and it was not as 
simple as one thought to achieve acceptable imitations with the computer” (2014, 42). The 
reason for this has to do with different methods of synthesizing sounds. Early digital synthesis 
algorithms tended to be subtractive (Keislar 2009, 20). Subtractive synthesis starts with a 
complex wave form and filters out certain frequencies. Additive synthesis, by contrast, 
constructs complex spectra by stacking individual sine waves of varying amplitudes, which 
gives a more realistic sound but is much more processor-intensive and so was unpopular during 
the early days of computer music. In 1973 Chowning discovered frequency modulation (FM) 
synthesis, in which a small number of wave oscillators are modulated to yield complex 
aggregate sounds (Keislar 2009). FM was processor-efficient and produced more musically 
satisfying (if still relatively static) tones; it is perhaps best associated with the Yamaha DX7 
synthesizer.  4
Risset describes an aesthetic problem with additive, subtractive, and FM synthesis: “the 
ear is good at detecting the origins of sounds generated in a mechanical world, but it is far from 
 Lavengood (2017) presents an in-depth discussion of the DX7 as it relates to the analysis of timbre.4
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being as discriminative with most synthetic sounds. Hence it is of interest to generate sounds by 
modeling physical vibrations, since such sounds are well differentiated by the ear” (Risset 2004 
43). This can be as simple as studying (for instance, via spectrograms) real world sounds and 
carving out waveforms that resemble them, and Risset has worked with these methods. There 
can still be problems: for instance, the waveform of a trumpet playing softly and loudly will 
need to be quite different in order to reflect the timbral changes of that instrument at different 
amplitudes. But Risset is also making reference to another synthesis algorithm: physical 
modeling synthesis. Physical modeling represents a major conceptual shift in sound synthesis, 
with far-reaching implications for the idea of music as constructing a virtual (that is, non-
physical) world. Physical models stipulate and modulate parameters related to real objects and 
modes of playing: plucked strings, bowed strings, struck objects, etc. Where subtractive and 
additive synthesis focus on sculpting the waveform itself, physical modeling establishes a set of 
rules and parameters for sound impulses rather than attending to the resulting waveforms. 
“Such modeling,” Risset writes, “can replace not the subject, but the surrounding world, as 
observed by the subject through the windows of the various senses” (2004, 202). 
Risset was a keen reader of the ecological psychologist James J. Gibson, whose work 
informed Risset’s own thoughts about how to use digital technology to construct sound. 
“Attempting in 1972 to compile a general article on musical acoustics, I came across an article by 
psychologist James Gibson that criticized the excessive recourse made to perceptual parameters 
such as height and intensity,” Risset writes. “Are these parameters really attributes of 
perception? Or simply the sensible counterpart of the physical parameters - frequency, 
amplitude - which are obvious in the representation of acoustic waves? According to Gibson, 
the study of these parameters is not significant: it would be more interesting to study how 
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hearing distinguishes events in the real world” (2004, 116).  Risset turned to ecological 5
psychology as a way around an aesthetic problem presented by the methods of digital 
synthesis: the tools available to him generated sounds that his ear found (intuitively, he might 
say) lacking, or bland. Familiar means of producing sound were absent from the sound source, 
but Risset’s ear longed for them still. “Gibson points out that large families of musical 
instruments correspond to distinct mechanical actions — hitting, scrubbing, blowing — that the 
ear spots very well,” Risset writes (121). The means of generating a sound retain their meaning 
in audition, and thus provided one category for Risset to consider. This perspective was for 
Risset not just ecological but necessarily embodied; he quotes Bergson: “to recognize a common 
object is to know how to use it” (123).  It also implies, in its reference to hitting scrubbing and 6
blowing actions, musical mental imagery (not just mimetic motor imagery, of the kind described 
in chapter 2): the way that the mind conjures images to accompany or fill in for perceptual gaps. 
It is this faculty for mental imagery that leads to the surreal experiences conjured by certain 
synthesis tools. And, as Cox (2016) argues, “musical imagery is partly motor imagery” (41): if 
musical imagery is imagined music, and music is (at least originally) the result of sounding 
actions, our capacity for musical imagery relies on a capacity for motor imagery. 
Risset wants to be able to make sounds that the ear can easily parse: to have tools in his 
composition toolkit that can build naturalistic sounds. At the same time, he is focusing on 
modes of production more than particular instruments: his aim is not to build the sound of a 
 Tentant en 1972 de compiler un article général sur l'acoustique musicale, je rencontrai un article du 5
psychologue James Gibson qui critiquait le recours abusif à des paramètres perceptifs tels que hauteur et 
intensité. Ces paramètres sont-ils vraiment des attributs de la perception? Ou simplement la contrepartie 
sensible des paramètres physiques -- fréquence, amplitude -- qui sautent aux yeux dans la représentation 
des ondes acoustiques? Selon Gibson, l'étude de ces paramètres n'est guère significative: il serait plus 
intéressant d'étudier comment l'audition distingue les événements du monde réel.
 Reconnaître un object usuel consiste surtout à savoir s'en servir.6
!100
clarinet so much as to build a sound that suggests blowing into a tube. I see this as an important 
distinction, simultaneously a desire to offer the listener familiar footholds while harkening to a 
modernist impulse (described in chapter 2) to push expressive resources precisely by stripping 
away accrued meanings — which certainly included familiar musical instruments. In this way 
Risset’s consideration of source/cause mechanisms in synthesis is of a piece with the spectralist 
interest in preserving consonance and dissonance while redefining them in terms of acoustic 
features rather than tonal function. 
In his 2010 essay “The Principles of Music and the Rationalization of Theory” Dufourt 
makes a useful analogy: “Just as chemistry became a science of non-existent bodies, as Auguste 
Laurent said in 1854, electroacoustics has now become a science and a technique of non-existent 
sounds” (28). In La Musique Sur Ordinateur he initially sets out to discuss how computer music 
has refigured the relationship between music and the sciences: “The creation of music on the 
computer,” he writes, “provides a field of proofs for the theoretical advances in artificial 
intelligence, particularly in relation to the representation of knowledge or relationships, the 
modeling of human reasoning, or the determination of behavioral strategies” (2014, 256).  7
Dufourt’s invocation of science is not of the sort associated with Milton Babbitt, who felt 
that art music ought to aspire to the same set of discursive and methodological tools as 
empirical science and ought to be conferred cultural prestige and institutional support as a 
result.  Dufourt, rather, seems interested in the ways in which music and science are different 8
modes of experimental inquiry into human experience. I mean experimental in the sense 
 La création musicale sur ordinateur fournit un champ d’épreuves aux avancées théoriques de 7
l’intelligence artificielle, notamment en ce qui concerne la représentation des connaissances ou des 
relations, la modélisation du raisonnement human ou la détermination des stratégies de comportement.
 For discussion see Brody (1993).8
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associated with John Cage and discussed in Piekut (2011): of the testing of a hypothesis the 
outcome of which is unknown. This is also a context in which the tools of science—the tools of 
the laboratory—have an epistemic function, of the sort considered in studies by Latour and 
Woolgar (1979) and Steege (2003). Though there are significant differences between the high-art 
modernism of spectralism in the ‘70s and ‘80s and the (mostly American) experimental contexts 
Piekut considers, some kindred lines of thought remain. “Like any avant-garde,” Piekut writes, 
“experimentalism performs not simply a return to daily life but an intensification of it…It is the 
everyday world around us, as well as the possibility that this world might be otherwise” (2). 
Attention to the quotidian can look like Cage’s attention to silence, but it can also be a renewed 
focus on material, on the mechanisms of gesture, and on the residue that these leave on the 
sounds listeners parse.
In another essay, “Computer music: A semantics without a subject?” (La musique sur 
ordinateur: un sémantique sans sujet? Dufourt 2014), Dufourt’s opening considerations of 
experiment and experience lead him to consider questions of aesthetics in computer music, 
which in turn lead him to questions of perception. He writes: “The implicit aesthetics of 
computer music is part of this intellectual tradition for which perception is a particular form of 
knowing [intellection]. In this perspective, aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic emotion are 
possible only because the intellect and perception obey the same basic rules” (2014, 259).  9
Especially in light of the claims Dufourt goes on to endorse, I read this passage as pushing 
against the typical separation of perception from cognition: perception is a form of cognition, not 
prior to it or subservient to it. And the basic rules that cognition and perception obey Dufourt 
 “L’esthétique implicite de la musique sur ordinateur s’inscrit dans cette tradition intellectualiste pour 9
laquelle la perception est une forme particulière d’intellection. Dans cette perspective, l’appréciation 
esthétique, l’émotion esthétique ne sont possibles que parce que l’intellect et la perception obéissent aux 
mêmes règles fondamentales.” 
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explains in his next sentence: “According to the psychologist of perception James J. Gibson, the 
sensory equipment is perfectly adapted to the information available to each individual under 
natural conditions. The neural mechanisms are adequate for understanding and representing 
events in a three-dimensional world.” The rules obeyed are rooted in the relationship between 
an organism and its environment, and that statement requires some further background on 
Gibson’s work.
Heft (2013) traces a set of conflicting intellectual heritages on the field of psychology. 
One school of research in psychology can be said to be focused on the individual (and, 
implicitly, an enlightenment, humanistic sense of the individual), bracketing off the unitary self 
from its environment. Gibson, Heft argues, saw his ecological approach to perception as a 
response to and a refutation of this traditional cognitivist view of perception, in which aspects 
of our environment are represented in the Cartesian theater of the mind via our senses. Rather 
than considering the bounded individual, Gibson takes the individuals’ relationship to the 
world as his subject of inquiry. His approach has strong intellectual precedents in the work of 
William James and other pragmatist thinkers. Gibson drew a distinction between a physicalist 
understanding of the world as it exists independent of a perceiver, and what he called the 
econiche, which is specified in relation to an animal. What animals perceive in their econiche are 
not objects but affordances, which are relational features between an organism and an 
environment. A chair affords sitting for a human, perching for a bird; a doorknob affords 
grasping and twisting for a human hand, but it may be essentially invisible to a dog; those 
action potentials are the true object of perception, and they have a gestural, embodied, and 
corporeal essence. Gibson writes, “An affordance…is equally a fact of the environment and a 
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fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, 
to the environment and the observer” (quoted in Heft 2013, 164). 
Gibson’s work was principally focused on visual affordances, but they can be 
communicated aurally, too: size and sound are communicated aurally, as when an organism 
determines that a sound they heard is threatening—consider the call of a hawk, which means 
something very different for a mouse as it does for a birdwatcher. Music, as a special class of 
sounds, has been said to have its own affordances: these include movement (Windsor and de 
Bezenac 2012 and Kozak 2015), affect regulation (DeNora 2000), and affective synchrony 
(Krueger 2014). Kozak invokes the work of Merleau-Ponty to extend the idea that music affords 
movement toward an account of imagined movements, because listeners possess a motor-
intentional stance toward musical sounds. “Not only does each listener constitute ‘objects’ of 
experience anew, but these very objects show up as Gestalts with different kinds of depth, 
depending on the bodily capabilities of the gesturer” (2015, 3.15). Crucially for music analysis, 
Kozak argues that listener’s motor-intentionality “turns sounds into musical objects, rather than 
those objects being given in advance” (3.16). In chapter 3 I considered how composers working 
with tools of electronic music are closer in subject position to a listener than to a performer even 
if they’re nominally performing a sound. I believe that Dufourt and Risset’s discussion of 
Gibson and ecological perception indicates as much, and it suggests that the boundary between 
creator and receiver (or poiesis and esthesis), which is always porous, is even moreso in the 
world of electronic sound. Dufourt and Risset are deploying their own motor-intentionality and 
their own embodied knowledge on the sounds they’re making. The drive to create more flexible 
digital sounds is not necessarily coming from a desire for realism but from a more basic desire 
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for sounds with timbral features that denote corporeal, causal, and material cues familiar from 
lived experience.
In an essay from 1988 Risset writes: ”Is not the prospect of being able to confront our 
perceptual mechanisms with a simulated world with different physical laws fascinating?…
Purely illusory, anchored not in the sonorous body but in the body of the listener, in the flesh of 
the perceptive organization, it can be more pregnant than the real world, insofar as it makes full 
use of our perceptual, sensitive and cerebral operations at the same time, likely to involve our 
most current preoccupations as well as archaic, originary mechanisms” (quoted in Dufourt 2014, 
264). In music listening, be it acoustic or electronic, listeners are capable of fabricating and being 
immersed in a virtual environment, one in which musical sounds convey information about 
size, shape, material, intensity, affect, and space. The capacity for this imaginative immersion 
plays on evolutionary, ethological, and developmental capacities specific to an organism. In the 
world of digital music, these sounds and spaces can be stretched to take on impossible physical 
characters: a soft, quiet, violin-like sound with reverb applied so that it sounds like it’s filling up 
a giant room; a breathy voice that resonates like a gong; the sound of bowing a 40-foot-long iron 
cable. Listeners are confronted with categories of sound that they cannot recognize, or that they 
attribute to constructed and possibly impossible causal phenomena and experience as aural 
illusions.
In Risset’s music, such illusions are quite strong. In his 1985 tape piece “Sud,” field 
recordings of sounds associated with the sea and with the forest intermingle with synthesized 
sounds that often resemble the sounds heard in the field recording.  To my hearing, the piece 10
opens with bird calls, and a gradual entry of the sound of lapping waves. The waves are tinged 
 A recording is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fhj2O4jToKI10
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with the sound of digital clipping, such that the tail end of their sound takes on a brightness 
that sounds artificial. (Waves, interestingly, are among the best natural sources of “white noise,” 
a characteristically digital sound with equal intensity across the auditory frequency range.) 
Small chirps enter around 1:00, suggesting insects in a field. The insect noises subtly morph into 
percussive, fast, and staccato synthesized tones beginning at 1:50. I am aware that they are 
synthesized but I’m also primed, by their proximity to real-world sounds, to evaluate them in 
terms of insects. Eventually I start to hear the sounds in terms of other objects—particularly, key 
clicks on a saxophone or clarinet—and experience the freneticism of the insects calming down 
as it becomes the rapping of fingers against keys. I am in this moment performing an aspect-
shift between two ways of conceiving of the same object: in terms of gestures suggested by its 
sonic features and in terms of its real-world significance, or in terms of the Schaefferian écouter 
and entendre. 
Aspect-shifting of the kind associated with Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” has often been 
associated with optical illusions like the duck-rabbit (figure 1) or the Rubin vase (figure 2), in 
which the same image can foster two competing interpretations. This has been extended into 
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Figure 4.1: the duck-rabbit Figure 4.2: the Rubin vase
musical experience in recent work by Guck (2017). Guck contrasts the pairing of perception 
(hearing) and impression (hearing-as); perceiving-as (instead of merely perceiving) is 
perception “about which one is aware that one is making a choice about how one sees what one 
sees among possibilities” (245). Smalley (2007) observes that “when we recognize that a sound 
has been created by human gesture we can identify in detail the type of physical energy and 
touch that instigated and propagated the sound, and in acousmatic music we connect 
spontaneously with any vestiges of gesture we may detect, even when the sound (either the 
source, or the aspects of the cause) is not ‘real’ or does not seem entirely plausible” (39). These 
associations can constitute a path through a musical work; I find that clear formal boundaries in 
Risset’s Sud exist between the sections that are obviously field recordings and the ones that are 
obviously synthetic, and that the blurring of those aural entities at times constitutes a blurring 
of formal boundaries. 
But the duck/rabbit is a binary illusion: either you see a duck, or you see a rabbit. By 
contrast, listening to acousmatic music effects a perceptual continuum between poles of 
(relative) referentiality and abstraction. Field (2000) discusses strategies composers have used to 
exploit our auditory listening strategies in the reasonably controlled environment of a through-
composed work. “The representation of reality is now a compositional parameter that can be 
found at the heart of many contemporary electroacoustic approaches, be they acousmatic, 
soundscape/ecological, or even musique concrète” (37, emphasis in original). Field describes a range 
of listening environments from “hyper-real environments where it is not possible for the listener to 
tell the difference between a recording of reality and a simulation of reality” (37) and “virtual 
(environments that appear overtly simulated in some way)” (37). Field argues that the clearer 
the causal source of a sound, the more likely a listener is to determine it as “real.” And, 
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following Wishart (1986), Field outlines a continuum of aural reality: hyper-real, real, virtual, 
and non-real (45). “Hyper-reality” refers to music that sounds “more real than real” (45): where 
digital simulation is undeniably present but in service of heightening what Field calls “the 
gestures and signs of reality” (45). “Real” refers to an environment that has not been simulated 
but simply represented from recordings without interference. I would argue that this notion of 
the “real” occludes the constructedness of recording — from choice of microphone, to the 
position of the recorder in relation to the subject, to the space in which it is recorded. I suspect 
Field would agree, as he hastens to add that “this definition simply enables a distinction to be 
made between simulated virtual or hyper-real environments where the composer has changed a 
representation of reality and those that have not been manipulated” (46). Sounds in non-real 
environments “have no discernible connection with the real world” (47).
Field does not state clearly whether a category like “virtual” applies only to the 
referentiality of an object (for example, a synthetic gong sound) or if it applies to traits like 
musical gesture (for example, a note sung for longer than any human could breathe). I want to 
deploy the embodiment framework described in chapter 3 to describe issues of expressivity in 
these various degrees of “real” aural environments. Even Field’s “non-real” environments can 
be measured by recourse to real expressive phenomena, and indeed I believe this is one source 
of their expressivity and meaning. A piece like Ligeti’s Artikulation (1958), which would seem a 
paragon of the non-real given its plainly synthetic timbres and gestural content, nevertheless is 
understandable in terms of timbral roughness, gestural activity, and imaginative speculation 
about causation. In the opening ten seconds of Artikulation I find that I listen for causation by 
default: I hear the sound of an intake of breath, possible voices murmuring in the distance, 
water droplets in a large space, and reverberant footfalls. This rather literal hearing places me in 
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an environment (which I imagine is large, because of the reverb, and dank, because of the water 
droplet sounds) and has me regarding the sounds as “other” — not made by me. If I try to 
engage with the opening breath-inhalation noise by imagining myself make it, I find that the 
gesture feels tense, as though I’m poised for action. Were I to try to listen adopting a more 
performative, first-person stance, I might consider how I would make the raindrop and footfall 
sounds with my mouth, or with a percussion object: in both cases, it feels relatively relaxed 
compared to the tension I feel listening to the sounds as environmental noises. Were I to try and 
listen without regard to causality, I might think of the sounds as being relatively clean: I do not 
hear them as particularly complex or noisy in terms of timbre. But this attribute of cleanness 
reveals the problems with reduced listening discussed in chapter 3, because the observation still 
hinges on a relational measurement: in this case, what I hear as cleanness maps to my vocal 
production of similar sounds, which I would do with minimal distortion via constricting my 
vocal cords. 
No single hearing of this opening is correct: all are plausible, all could be made 
intersubjectively meaningful through description, and all make recourse to my feeling moving 
body. Following Cox (2016), assuming that a listener has consented to engage with this music, 
they will deploy whatever mimetic motor imagery is available in light of their background in 
service of parsing the aural information they receive. And the account of timbre in Wallmark 
(2015) suggests that even abstract timbral elements can be related to concrete vocal phenomena: 
the timbral roughness and low overall pitch register of a sound being relatable to a high-
exertion growl, and broadcasting similar information: of tension, or of threat. I will turn now to 
the opening of Saariaho’s Verblendungen (1984), which nicely intersects with Risset + Dufourt’s 
consideration of ecological perception, as well as Field’s discussion of real and hyperreal 
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sounds. The piece is, like many spectral pieces, built around a slow and inexorable progression 
between poles: in this case, noise and pure sound. 
4.3. Artificial objects in Kaija Saariaho’s Verblendungen (1984)
Kaija Saariaho’s Verblendungen (1984) is one of her earliest works and her first to combine 
a live orchestra with electronics recorded to tape. In her program note she writes that “in spite 
of their different, sometimes opposite materials, the orchestra and the tape should build a 
common, inseparable sound world.” In the piece, the orchestra and the tape move in opposite 
directions across a pure sound <—> noise continuum. The tape starts as a noisy hissing mass 
and moving toward stable, readily identifiable pitched material, while the orchestra begins with 
clear pitches and moves toward noisier playing techniques. The piece begins with a bang — a 
loud, forceful orchestral tutti on a dense chord, competing (and at times drowned out by) a loud 
hissing tape part. The tape sounds somewhere between white noise and the escaping of steam, 
or perhaps the sound of brushes dragged on a snare drum; at times it also sounds like the 
distortion that results from analog tape clipping. There are two competing global parameters 
Saariaho is balancing: she envisions a pure tone—noise continuum and wants for the orchestra 
to traverse from tone to noise across the duration of the piece while the tape component 
traverses from noise to tone. The global form of the piece is broadly modeled on an image of 
two paintbrush strokes (figure 3), which were suggestive to Saariaho of a spectrogram, with 
darkness referring to amplitude and the lines of the brush bristles representing various 
harmonic spectra (Saariaho 1987). Like the image, her piece begins with strong dynamics and a 
thick texture before receding — and then it does this again to effect the second brush stroke. 
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At the beginning of the piece the orchestra sounds a thick and dissonant chord, a 
sonority dominated by ic 1, often expressed as minor 2nds. Saariaho’s reduction of the opening 
pitch progression (from Saariaho 1987) is shown in figure 4. As the reduction makes clear, the 
opening is characterized by relatively parsimonious voice-leading: in general, only one or two 
pitches move or are added/subtracted between chord onsets, and they typically do so by one or 
two semitones at most. The low E0 is less present in the orchestrational texture than it appears 
from the reduction, and the section doesn’t feel as though there’s a pedal tone throughout in 
part because of the prominence of brass in the middle register. Durations in seconds are listed 
above each sonority, showing the unpredictable and aperiodic nature of these chord onsets. Of 
interest is that Saariaho conceives of these chords as being as far on the “pure tone” continuum 
as possible: the orchestra is only going to get noisier from here in terms of timbre, though the 
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Figure 4.3: Paintbrush gesture that forms the structuring formal metaphor 
for Verblendungen, from Saariaho (1987)
pitch content of the piece gradually thins out and becomes relatively static and consonant. Thus, 
noisiness of tone and harmonic dissonance are decoupled. 
The tape component, startling and inescapable at the outset of the piece, begins to recede 
into the background after about four minutes. When it gradually reappears, it bears much closer 
resemblance to its source material, the two violin strokes, and is far less noisy. After seven and a 
half minutes, the piece begins the “second brush stroke,” or second major dynamic peak, using 
only the tape component. The single violin sample has been transposed to effect an entire string 
orchestra, but it has an unearthly sheen, and the timbral world signifies (at least to this listener) 
the retro atmosphere of 1980s movie soundtracks. I imagine that some of the otherworldliness of 
the strings in this section comes from the speeding up and slowing down of her starting sample 
to produce different pitches.  This, in turn, speeds up the sound of the bow stroke (effecting the 11
attack onset). Given the electroacoustic context, in which the predominant sound thus far has 
 Saariaho has not to my knowledge commented in detail about her working method for creating this 11
section of Verblendungen, although since I am only recounting my hearing it is not necessary that I 
correctly glean the manipulations used.
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Figure 4.4: Opening pitch progression in Verblendungen from Saariaho (1987)
been acoustic string instruments, the synthetic strings at first sound “othered,” or enter the so-
called uncanny valley: by failing to be perfectly accurate they are rendered all the more 
inaccurate. But they also sound bright and glassy, and thinner; my imagined sense of both the 
playing method and string material is altered. Or, given their synthetic sound, I imagine the 
pitches performed by one person at a keyboard rather than by an ensemble of individuals. In 
sum, Verblendungen as experienced on recording complicates my sense of object/material 
perception, and invites me to introspect on that complication. My experience of the piece is 
impacted by aspects of the sound that are rooted in technological features—in the speeding up 
of a sample to change its pitch, and the concomitant change in timbral attack characteristics that 
this technique causes—but which are also rooted in my motor imagery and in my experience 
with various instruments. These technological and perceptual features intersect as part of my 
affective response to the piece. 
Stepping back even further, I find that there is joy to be had in not knowing what 
produced a sound, because it effects my predictions of what might come next. If I’ve been 
hearing something that I thought was a violin harmonic only to learn that it’s a cymbal, I have 
had a musical expectation subverted (which could be positively or negatively valenced) but it’s 
possible that I’ve also, for a brief moment, imagined an object doing something impossible. That 
imaginative experience is coupled with a sense of exertion—a feeling of wondering, 
mimetically, how I would make the sounds I’m hearing—and when the interpretation of the 
sounds on which those feelings of exertion are built changes, rather than shattering my sense of 
immersion I am instead left feeling like I’ve undergone a non-real gestural transformation (if I 
am imagining sounds from a largely first-person perspective) or that someone or something else 
has undergone that transformation (if I’m imagining from a largely second-person perspective). 
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Saariaho was working at IRCAM during this time, though the tape component of 
Verblendungen was primarily made at the GRM. Barrière (1991) writes: “From her collaboration 
with (Stephen) McAdams between 1983 and 1985 emerged an innovative conception of timbre 
as a form-bearing musical element…Together they strove to combine psychoacoustic concepts, 
such as auditory image, with compositional ideas aided by computer music tools that were then 
becoming available” (96). In her program note for the piece, Saariaho writes: “The tape part has 
been worked out with GRM’s digital tools for manipulating and transforming concrete sound 
material. The basic material for the tape consists of two violin sounds, a sforzando stroke and a 
pizzicato. From these two sounds I have built a quasi-string orchestra with a very wide pitch 
range” (Saariaho 1984). She sketched curves outlining the prominence of different parameters 
(figure 5), including the relative prevalence of the orchestra and the tape part, the use of 
polyphony, the rate of harmonic progression, and dynamics. Moisala (2009) describes Saariaho’s 
interest in dazzling bright lights as a metaphor for the piece (the title of which can be translated 
as “Dazzlings”). Moisala (2009) writes: “Verblendungen has its roots in Saariaho’s childhood 
experience of feeling the warmth of sunlight on her skin; “When I listen to music and when I 
imagine my music, there are also coloristic aspects [involved]—I am not looking for these 
relationships between images and sounds but they exist in me.” (56). 
In Verblendungen, as in Risset’s Sud, I am struck not just by the electronic sounds 
themselves but by the way in which they intermingle with the putatively “natural” acoustic 
instruments (or, in Sud, field recordings). As the orchestra pulses and shimmers in the opening 
of Saariaho’s piece, the pre-recorded tape gradually sounds less like a distinct instrument and 
instead colors the orchestral sonorities. They are orchestrated into the texture just as much as 
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the brass section or the woodwind section, with an ear toward their effect on the sum total 
sound.
4.4. The Volition of Sounds
It is a truism for composers to observe, often with some frustration, the seemingly 
limitless world of sound presented by electronic music. Risset’s critique of subtractive synthesis 
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Figure 4.5: Parameter curve sketches of Verblendungen, from Saariaho (1987)
is in part a response to this; there is a way in which the material of the sound can be ascribed 
volition, a path of least resistance that may be seen as working against the preferences of the 
human auditory system. Missives by composers on this subject are abundant; Babbitt wrote that 
“it is not a matter of merely simulating a specific, conventional instrumental timbre, but of 
endowing any electronically synthesized timbre with the same high degree of dimensionality 
possessed by, say, a string timbre, if only to eliminate the genuine ‘steady-state’ of electronic 
sound, and the resultant sense of ‘sameness’ and fatigue” (Babbitt 1964, 262, also quoted in De 
Souza 2018). Or consider Boulez’s observations in his essay “Technology and the composer”:
Oscillators, amplifiers, and computers were not invented in order to create music…So 
rich in possibilities are [electronic music tools] that sometimes mental categories have 
yet to be created in order to use them. To musicians accustomed to a precise 
demarcation, to a controlled hierarchy and to the codes of a convention consolidated 
over the centuries, the new material has proposed a mass of unclassified solutions, and 
offered us every kind of structure without any perspective (1978, 60). 
The new sonic “material” that electronics have provided was a salutary development as 
long as composers find meaningful ways to structure these sounds. For Boulez, the question of 
referentiality might seem at odds with his Adornian aesthetic of autonomy and an imperative 
toward the “progress” represented by these novel musical materials. But later in the essay he 
seems to write approvingly, if also warily, of the recourse to the familiar: “The quite natural 
temptation is to approach this new field with our tried and tested methods and to apply the 
grid of familiar categories to an unexplored domain” (61). Boulez continues by suggesting that 
in making recourse to familiar concepts as a way of structuring new sounds, the concepts are 
likely in turn to morph in response to the material in ways that could not be foreseen. 
The existing categories could, it is true, be helpful at first in mapping out virgin territory 
and enabling us, by reconstitution and synthesis, better to know the natural world 
which we think we know so well and which, the nearer we get to it, seems to elude the 
precision of our investigation. It is not only the question ‘what is a sound made of?’ that 
we have to answer, but the much harder one of ‘how do we perceive this sound in 
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relation to its constituent elements?’ So by juxtaposing what is known with what is not 
known, and what is possible with what will be possible, we shall establish a geography 
of the sound universe. (Boulez 1978: 61-62)
Boulez’ unfortunate colonial metaphors here point (among other things) to a belief that 
there may be finite limits (and discoverable ones) in our world of sounds. What precisely that 
might mean is hard to discern, and it also seems contradicted by more nuanced observations he 
makes later in the essay about the symbiotic relationship between sonic material and method. 
Boulez continues: “The reasoned extension of the material will inspire new modes of thought: 
between thought and material a very complex game of mirrors is set up, by which images are 
relayed continuously from one to the other…We might compare this with architecture, where 
structural limitations have been radically changed by the use of new materials such as concrete, 
glass, and steel” (62). The sonic material, Boulez argues, has an agency of its own, and the 
agency of the composer is in dialogue (if not outright tension) with material constantly. And the 
source of this tension, Boulez and Risset both argue, is psychoacoustics: not just perceptibility 
but comprehensibility. Goldman (2010) has outlined how Boulez and the spectral composers 
shared a number of aesthetic objectives. Their interest in psychoacoustics, and specifically as a 
response to the tendencies (or volition) of their electronic tools, is an important unifying point. 
Techniques associated with spectral music like instrumental synthesis—the imitation of additive 
synthesis using the rich timbral resources of acoustic instruments—are in some respects a 
response to the aesthetic impasse Risset observes.
Boulez’ comment about new architectural materials suggests a link to Siegfried 
Giedion’s historical account of the impact of iron and ferroconcrete on architecture in France. 
Giedion invokes the notion of airspace: “through the condensation of [iron] to a few points, 
there appears an unknown transparency, a suspended relation to other objects, a creation of the 
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airspace…This sensation of being enveloped by a floating airspace while walking through tall 
structures [like the Eiffel Tower] advanced the concept of flight before it had been 
realized” (1995, 102). The feeling of walking into a new architectural space enabled by the 
structural possibilities of iron and concrete, while commonplace today, must have elicited at the 
turn of the twentieth century (and may still elicit today) feelings of awe, wonder, immensity — 
aesthetic emotions like the ones experienced when listening to new musical sounds that connote 
particular experiences. In the case of Giedion, the technology (iron) is new; the design of the 
structure is new; and our bodily response to the environment is new. We may feel that entering 
a large building and entering a large cave have similar feelings of airspace, but the knowledge 
that one is man-made and one is natural might lead to different evaluations of the experience. 
We have all felt awe or wonder before, but there is a more specific feeling of awe that being in a 
large building can create, and this is because such a technological feat is outside the domain of 
everyday experience and so is outside the common domain of embodied experience, and yet 
can still be subsumed within our embodied perception. We can become inured to their aesthetic 
force with repeated exposure—or we can come to appreciate them more—but the potential for 
these experiences is technologically dependent.
Rehding (2016) has explored the epistemological significance of instruments for the field 
of music theory: how the monochord, for example, participates in and conditions knowledge of 
pitch ratios. De Souza (2018) has extended this argument to the synthesizer, which he argues 
has epistemic significance for understanding musical timbre and its relationship to materiality 
and performativity. “Perceptual limits,” De Souza writes, “are revealed by the synthesizer’s 
apparent limitlessness” (18). Babbitt echoes this in his essay on the RCA synthesizer: “the 
composer who approaches responsibly the composition of music for electronic media must find 
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himself engaged in what can be termed in all justice and accuracy, ‘basic research.’…The 
constant self-question of the composer of the past: ‘Does what I have written exceed the 
capacities of the performer?’ is now replaced by: ‘Does what I have produced exceed the 
perceptual capacities of the trained listener?’” (1964, 263) Electronic tools for synthesis, 
including the computer, gave epistemological knowledge not just of timbre but of particular 
modes of listening: ecological modes of the kind outlined by Gibson and Gaver, “reduced” 
modes outlined by Schaeffer and Chion, and not only the spectrum between them but the ways 
in which these two modes (often set at odds) may in fact overlap. And the pieces composed 
with these tools come to perform this epistemic function by proxy, as in a piece like Grisey’s 
Partiels (discussed in chapter 2), which didactically makes the listener aware of the fuzzy 
relationship between timbre and harmony. 
The broader intellectual context for these observations today is the field of media theory, 
which deals with the ways in which materials mediate or otherwise condition thought and 
experience. “Media determine our situation” (Kittler 1999, 1) and “The medium is the 
message” (McLuhan 1964, 7) are two well-known media-theoretic declarations, though they 
also represent stronger positions on the issue of technological determinism than other authors 
might suggest. Hansen (2006) describes media theory as concerned with “an ineliminable 
oscillation between the materiality and the phenomenality of media” (297), which I would 
suggest expands older questions of poiesis and esthesis — creation and reception — to 
encompass the agency of non-human actors whose role had hitherto been considered neutral or 
passive. Hansen stresses the role that embodiment, and our embodied perceptual systems, play 
in our media ecosystem. “The medium, and mediation as such, necessarily involves the 
operation of the living, the operation of human embodiment…Humans have always evolved in 
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recursive correlation with the evolution of technics” (300). Tomlinson (2015), discussed in 
chapter 3, is a complementary account of this same observation: that “musicking was always 
technological” and that our mimetic relationship to objects constituted one node in an 
evolutionary feedback loop between objects, physical gestures, mimesis, and the taskscape. 
There is a chronological media hierarchy in musical creation. Across the lifecycle of a 
hypothetical piece of composed music, the pen and paper used in composition is a layer of 
mediation, the software used to engrave that composition is a second layer, the instrument(s) 
used is a layer, be they acoustic or electronic, the recording devices used (if any) are a layer, and 
so forth. These layers are generally applied, like coats of paint, in a particular order, but there is 
a way in which they also feed back onto each other. For example, a particular passage scored for 
a violin might be re-written once the mixing phase has begun, perhaps in order to accommodate 
a certain kind of filtering or compression applied to the total mix. Certain instruments do better 
being processed in real-time than others (for example, a snare drum turns out to be a relatively 
limited instrument for processing) and this can effect scoring choices either at the outset or once 
the trouble is encountered. Learning that a snare drum is hard to process electronically in turn 
reveals aspects of the physical quality of the sound of a snare drum — that its sharpness and 
rapid decay give relatively little material to play with. This is an epistemic function performed 
by the technology of the recording studio. How these layers of mediation “act” upon a musical 
composition is to some extent premised on what they afford by design, and to which composer/
compositional agenda.
The idea that technology sometimes performs an epistemological revealing helps 
navigate around rhetoric of newness: how new is new media? Is the technological assemblage 
of the recording studio revolutionary or evolutionary? Are the virtual worlds Risset and 
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Dufourt discuss so dependent on technologies of audio inscription and synthesis and analysis, 
or are they simply an intensification, another step in a process of perceptual play and illusion 
that has been present in all of the arts? After all, our sensory apparatus isn’t changing, exactly, 
but rather our attention and sensory knowledge are being redirected or attenuated constantly in 
a process that is both technological and cultural. Hansen (2004) invokes the work of Henri 
Bergson to consider technology’s impact on perception. Of particular use for Hansen is the way 
in which affect and memory render perception impure: “the world is composed of an aggregate 
of images, and perception demarcates the selection of a subset of this aggregate by a ‘center of 
indetermination’” (Hansen 2004, 3). For Bergson and for Hansen perception is also inherently 
bodily (this being the source of its “impurity”): “Bergson places his emphasis on the body as a 
source of action; it is the action of the body that subtracts the relevant image from the universal 
flux of images” (Hansen 2004, 3-4). It follows from this that the body has a creative agency, and 
that our bodies and our motion through our environment literally creates our perception. 
Different media platforms have different capabilities, different things that they afford, 
different actions and thoughts which they constrain. Already here there is a way in which 
environmental perception involves the consideration of technical objects (doors, chairs), a line of 
thinking that continues through to digital technology. Hansen explains: “The capacity of the 
‘embodied mind’ to adapt quickly to new virtual realities demonstrates the plasticity of the 
nervous system and the operative role of bodily motility in the production of perception” (39). 
One implication of this idea, which is one of Hansen’s central arguments, is that digital 
technologies may in fact render the plastic and embodied nature of perception more obvious or 
apparent because of their virtual nature. Musical compositions that employ digital technology 
may cast certain embodied experiential dependencies that hold across all musical practices into 
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greater relief: if I find that listening to the electronic sounds in Saariaho’s Verblendungen is given 
affective meaning by imagining them produced by bowed strings, I might be led to consider 
how source/cause imaginings translate affective content in more familiar musical contexts.
Hansen coins the term “affectivity” to describe “the capacity of the body to experience 
itself as ‘more than itself’ and thus to deploy its sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, 
the experimental, the new” (2004, 7). While I find the word “affectivity” unhelpfully vague, the 
notion that our bodies can feel “more than” themselves is strongly suggestive. When Risset 
writes “the challenge for the artist is not merely to create an illusion of our world, which is the 
usual goal of virtual reality, but rather to create appealing new virtual worlds” (2004, 203), this 
creative act is as much an act of listening as of composition. It invokes the listener’s 
sensorimotor skills, imagination, and sense of what it would be like to do something. The drive to 
activate the imagination more strongly, rather than to risk breaking the mimetic invitation of the 
music with too many incomprehensible sounds, led composers like Risset and Saariaho to 
search for new tools to better achieve these appealing new worlds. One such tool was the 
CHANT physical modeling synthesis software, which emerges from the perceptual impasses 
described in this section. The workings of that software, and its use in a composition by Grisey, 
are the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Grisey and/at the Limits of the Voice
5.1 Introduction
When Gérard Grisey set out, beginning in 1981 at IRCAM, to write a piece employing 
the capabilities of the CHANT vocal synthesis software, he began with a relatively simple idea: 
he envisioned a large complex of vocal polyphonies, enveloped by an uninterrupted vocal tone 
acting as a pedal point or fundamental pitch (Grisey 1984).  Even though this sketch of an idea 1
would three years later become just one part of the 37-minute electroacoustic piece Les Chants de 
l’Amour, it immediately connects to several of the larger themes of the piece. There is the 
characteristically spectral idea of a fundamental tone and polyphonic activity above it, perhaps 
suggestive of the harmonic series. There also is the notion of a binary—the fundamental voice 
and the polyphonic voices on top—and gradations between it. Binaries and gradations tend to 
be central in early exemplars of spectral music: harmonicity and inharmonicity, stasis and 
motion, tone and noise. Much in that same spirit, Les Chants de l’Amour is in part a piece about 
the binary pairing of the human and digital choirs: their opposition, their blending, their 
interactions. Grisey’s fantasy of an uninterrupted vocal tone is fundamental to the themes of the 
piece: Grisey was not envisioning the kind of “choral breathing” familiar from centuries of vocal 
performance, but rather the idea of one entity singing a note without interruption for vast 
lengths of time — for inhuman lengths of time.
To achieve this effect, Grisey had to consider the voice at a granular, microscopic level, a 
level of awareness that the CHANT software’s team of creators were likewise attuned to. I find 
 “The first sketch of Les Chants de l’Amour, actually the formal setting, dates from the summer of 1981. I 1
then conceived the idea of great vocal polyphonies enveloped and supported by a powerful 
fundamental.” (Grisey, 1984)
“La première esquisse des Chants de l'Amour, en réalité la mise en place formelle, date de l'été 1981. Je 
conçus alors l'idée de grandes polyphonies vocales enveloppées et soutenues par un fondamental 
puissant.”
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it a useful point of entry into the piece to imagine the sorts of questions Grisey likely had to 
consider in order to write the passage he described: How to make something sound like a 
human voice, and even sound like it’s breathing, without having it stop producing noise? How 
to encourage listeners to imagine this sound as a voice, or as a human voice? Grisey’s 
motivation to write a piece heavily featuring synthesized voice and saturating it with references 
to love, an emotion deeply associated with human (or at least organic) life, merits similar 
scrutiny.
This chapter will analyze the genesis, narrative, and compositional organization of Les 
Chants de l’Amour and search for points of overlap between those elements and my embodied 
listening experience. I consider the piece an ideal case study of the aspects of acousmatic 
listening discussed in this dissertation. The synthesized voice undergoes rapid transformations, 
is at times quite distinct timbrally from the human choir and at other times blends in. The two 
imitate each other: for instance, when the human singers perform the machine-like sounds of a 
vinyl LP slowing down and thus decreasing in pitch; or when the tape voice performs in a 
smooth bel canto. These are strategies of compositional organization (they allow for sections to 
feel distinct); and they are strategies for structuring a narrative for the piece (albeit a 
fragmentary one). But they are also strategies for inviting me as a listener to engage and 
empathize with the musical actors in the piece. Following Cox (2016), my mimetic engagement 
with sound might be always present but it can be stronger or weaker depending on what kinds 
of cues I’m responding to, and how readily I am able to map those cues onto my motor imagery. 
My analysis will focus on the moments in Les Chants de l’Amour that most strongly activate my 
first-person mimetic engagement, and which lead me to imagine doing things that are well 
outside the normal means by which I express myself or exert myself. 
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The narrative elements of Les Chants de l’Amour engage with both familiar and novel 
ideas about non-human expression and agency which were made realizable through then-
cutting-edge advances in computing technology and vocal synthesis software. At the same time, 
Grisey’s compositional choices are both informed and constrained by the capabilities of the 
software he used to realize his synthetic voice. In this sense, both the piece and the 
compositional process illustrate aspects of technology’s impact on creative decisions and 
perceptual experience, and elevate those aspects to the level of conscious awareness by 
dramatizing or aestheticizing them in a work of art. This manner of not only exploring but 
revealing facets of perception through music is a marker of the spectralist’s particular cultural 
and historical moment — sitting at the nexus of technological advances in digital computing 
technology, reactions against (and continuations of) high modernism, and developments and 
refinements in psychology. Grisey’s piece stages the porous relationship between human and 
machine at the level of programmatic narrative—which is certainly not unique to this piece and 
taps into older narrative tropes —but also evidences it on a technical level, particularly 2
regarding Grisey’s uses of the CHANT synthesis software.
Jérôme Baillet notes that Les Chants de l’Amour is “an isolated attempt in the evolution of 
Grisey” (24), with his next composition incorporating voice (L’icône paradoxale) being composed 
ten years later and reflecting several significant changes in aesthetic. There is little secondary 
literature in English on Les Chants de l’Amour, and it is not performed often. It is a sprawling 37-
minute work for voice and tape, and the tape component requires that the conductor be 
 Consider Philip K. Dick’s 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? which became the Blade Runner 2
(1982) film. Even earlier examples exist: Carlo Collodi’s 1883 story of Pinocchio, the toy that desires to 
become human; or the large literature on the fascination with automatons in the 19th century (for 
instance, E.T.A. Hoffman’s 1816 story Der Sandmann). Riskin (2016) places such stories in a larger 
narrative of science’s refusal to attribute agency to nature or to non-human objects. 
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synchronized with a click track, which presents challenges for crafting an expressive 
performance. Barrière (2015) described the scope of the work as “a mistake,” suggesting that the 
piece would have been more effective in miniature. Grisey has written at length about the piece, 
including in a 1500-word program note and an accompanying published presentation from the 
1985 International Computer Music Conference. Because of the referential nature of writing for 
voice, its use as a model for the CHANT synthesis software Grisey used, as well as the variously 
abstract and figurative compositional maneuvers Grisey deploys in the piece, Les Chants de 
l’Amour provides an excellent vehicle for considering conceptual touchstones in spectralism that 
are more oblique in other works and which are not a part of the overarching narrative about 
their music. Spectralism’s objects are never simply timbre but the sensations and images those 
timbres might conjure in a given a listener. Grisey’s belabored emphasis on perception and on 
listening was not simply about didactic compositional processes and psychoacoustic 
phenomena but about the stretching of the listening subject. Grisey spoke in a program note for 
his 1988/1989 work Le Temps et l’Écume of the time of whales and the time of insects: of the way 
that different perceptions of time scales could provide an organizing metaphor for time in 
Grisey’s work.
A number of the compositional techniques in Les Chants de l’Amour reveal the influence 
of total serialism on spectral thinking. This piece presents a tension between a set of aesthetic 
values rooted in perceptible processes, and a desire to use a compact idea or seed to yield an 
entire composition. That desire connects spectral music to an older set of aesthetic values about 
musical composition, typically associated with nineteenth-century Austro-German music in the 
wake of critics like E.T.A. Hoffman and Heinrich Schenker: that a composition should be 
traceable to an initial kernel of an idea, the working out of which ultimately comprises the 
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piece. Watkins (1988) has observed this tendency in the music of American minimalists like 
Steve Reich: “[minimalism’s] devotion to the idea of process from germinal sources suggested a 
link with classical repertoires whose formal foundation resided in the potential for working out 
musical ideas of an organic nature” (275). Spectralism’s connection to minimalism is thus not 
simply a shared interest in audible and gradually unfolding processes, but in a shared 
commitment to a defining aesthetic value in the tradition of classical music (especially in the 
Austro-German tradition): of the working-out of a concise initial idea. This affinity may have 
been apparent to those working at IRCAM: Les Chants de l’Amour was premiered alongside a 
new work by Reich, Mein Name Ist, which played with similar conceptual touchstones (of vocal 
sounds transitioning between sense and nonsense, referentiality and abstraction) as Grisey’s 
piece. 
5.2. CHANT
In an important respect, the genesis of Les Chants de l’Amour begins in 1979 with the 
development of the CHANT software at IRCAM. Initially written by Xavier Rodet, Yves Potard, 
and Conrad Cummings, the software was also developed by John Chowning and John Gordon 
at Stanford and was refined extensively by Jean-Baptiste Barrière. CHANT was a physical 
modeling synthesis software, which the programmers call synthesis-by-rule. It was initially 
coded in the SAIL language and was then rewritten in C and in FORTRAN (Rodet, Potard, 
Barrière 1984). As its name suggests, it began as a tool for the synthesis of vocal sounds, but it 
proved a far more flexible program and was used to synthesize all manner of familiar and novel 
timbres. Analog synthesis and manipulation of vocal signals had been around since at least the 
1930s, and speech synthesis can be traced much farther back: Schroeder (1993) details a speech 
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machine invented by the Hungarian nobleman Wolfgang Ritter von Kempelen in 1791, which 
produced vowel sounds and was modeled on the shape of the vocal tract — including “a 
hinged tongue and movable lips” (232). In 1929, Homer Dudley began developing what would 
become the Voder (“voice decoder)”, a device that synthesized the human voice as a means of 
saving bandwidth while transmitting the voice over radio (Schroeder 1993, 234). Robert Moog’s 
vocoder was developed beginning in 1968.
But CHANT’s developers—Xavier Rodet, Yves Potard, and Jean-Baptiste Barrière—felt 
that digital technology had reached a level of sophistication that analog could not match (Rodet, 
Potard, Barrière 1984, 15). The complexity of the human voice was precisely what made it an 
appropriate subject: “because of its extreme richness…the voice inspires a more general and 
fertile approach than the study of any other instrument” (16-17). The first step for synthesis was 
an understanding of the physiological production of vocal sound—as the developers note, 
“synthesis [meant generally] is the proof of both our understanding of sound phenomena, and 
of the music itself” (1984, 15). The physiological production of a vocal sound can be 
summarized as follows: lungs exhale a stream of air that travels into the vocal tract, through the 
larynx, and into the mouth and nasal cavity. Along the way, that airstream is disturbed: by the 
vocal chords, which modulate the stream of air; and by the narrowing of the mouth via the lips, 
tongue palate, and glottis. The vocal tract acts as a set of resonators, filtering frequencies to 
various extents to form vowel sounds. Consonants are simply the introduction of noise 
elements (using the teeth and tongue) into this steady stream of air. This description of vocal 
function is highly suggestive of signal processing in general: a fundamental tone and its filtering 
at various stages. 
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CHANT could theoretically have used any number of sounding objects as a model. Why 
did the software developers choose to focus on the voice? I believe there was something 
peculiarly attractive about the voice given the aesthetic aims of late modernist music in and 
around IRCAM in the 1970s and 1980s. Because of its intimacy, its familiarity, its multiplicity of 
significations, its Barthesian “grain,” working with the voice (and with synthetic vocal sounds) 
presented challenges and opportunities for composers desperate to explore new expressive 
terrain. Barrière writes: 
What justifies recourse to vocal material in this context is the need to create afresh a mimetic 
process…The choice of vocal material becomes an important one, because of a parallel 
resolve to move towards even more abstraction, by making play of a paradoxical perception 
which hovers between a “disembodied” sound synthesis and an abstract presence which is 
never grasped, always assumed, endlessly sought, ever non-existent. There is a “voice” but 
no singer. There is only a corpus of material which is terribly abstract, but which retains an 
inevitable physical link with every listener (1984, 182).
I read Barrière as appealing to the same mechanisms of listening as Cox (2016): that 
vocality has a privileged place in encouraging and even producing empathy in a listener, and 
that this production of empathy allows composers to push farther into abstract domains of 
pitch, gesture, timbre, and narrative. 
CHANT’s developers also had concerns about the user-friendliness of their software. 
“Analog devices have often been simpler to use than many programs,” they write, and there 
was a drive to make something that was both user-friendly and provided instant or near-instant 
feedback: something with real-time music-making capabilities (1984, 15). Barrière describes an 
aesthetic and conceptual “war” at IRCAM in the early 1980s about real-time music making with 
computers. “You could work in real time but sacrifice sound quality, or have a high level of 
control and better sound quality. And real time won” (Barrière 2015). Because CHANT’s 
variables dealt with physical aspects of sound production—with the excitation of a source and 
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with the ways in which that source resonates—it opened the door for somewhat more intuitive 
uses. Creating a bel canto singing voice that sings the note A4 for three seconds would, using 
the tools of additive or subtractive synthesis, be immensely laborious, both conceptually 
abstract and necessitating a great deal of trial and error. 
While still complicated by 2018’s standards, in 1980 physical modelling tools like 
CHANT were much faster in part because of the way in which their capabilities were laid out 
for users. As discussed in Rodet, Potard, & Barrière (1984), the parameters that users could 
control in CHANT included:
• Frequency of a fundamental pitch
• Random variations of that fundamental pitch
• Vibrato
• Random variations of that vibrato
• Spectrum: formants and amplitudes
• Slope of the spectrum
• Amplitude envelope of the formants
These parameters roughly divide into controls dealing with the attack of a sound (its 
pitch, and its amplitude envelope) and the resonance of the sound (vibrato, formants). That 
division meshes well with extant aspects of the spectral aesthetic. In both Grisey’s Partiels 
(discussed in chapter 2) and Murail’s Ethers (discussed in chapter 3), a sound’s attack and 
resonance are decoupled, allowing for an impressionistic coloring, shading, and stretching of 
the resonance of the low E of a trombone (in Partiels) or the combination tones produced by 
singing and playing a flute simultaneously (in Ethers). 
5.3. Pre-compositional genesis and structure of Les Chants de l’Amour
It may seem unnecessary, in a project about listening, to consider pre-compositional 
design at all. But I am not entirely split from one traditional aim of music theory, which is to 
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develop an ability to hear a piece’s “structure.” There are two reasons for this. First, there are 
elements of the piece’s design which point to spots in the piece that are especially mimetic, for 
instance in Grisey’s use of different types of compositional rhetoric for transitions (by excess, by 
silence, etc). But more broadly, I believe the pre-compositional plan of the piece shows that 
Grisey is imaginatively empathizing with the synthesized voice. This belief is not offered as a 
statement of provable fact; rather, I find when listening that I can’t help but wonder about 
Grisey’s own thoughts while experimenting with the CHANT software. This act of placing 
myself in Grisey’s subject position, fictional though it may be, has become integral to my 
experience of the synthetic voice part in Les Chants de l’Amour and in its cultivation of 
imaginative listening experiences. And it intersects meaningfully with pre-compositional 
concerns, especially concerning Grisey’s schematic 
 Grisey (1985) states that during the summer of 1981 he was briefly neighbor to the 
Dagar brothers, who were Indian carnatic singers. He cites that experience as an important 
influence on his compositional thinking in Les Chants de l’Amour, alongside music by Ockeghem, 
Dufay, and the Lituri Forest Pygmees. He regularly met with Rodet in the fall of 1981, and made 
a few trips to IRCAM, where he acquainted himself with the workings of the CHANT software 
(Grisey 1981).
The piece is divided into 28 sections (plus an introduction), each based on one phoneme 
found in a recording, made at IRCAM, of the sentence “I love you” (figure 1). Grisey scrutinized 
the recording using spectral analysis to glean the content of its formants, the prominent 
overtones which render recognizable the various vowel sounds in speech (as well as all manner 
of other sounds). Grisey is using sound as a model, with an emphasis on the microscopic level: 
the molecular components of the voice. Another of Grisey’s predilections, the stretched or 
!131
“inhumane” time that Baillet referenced, is present in the stretching of “I love you” to 37 
minutes in length. Grisey’s interest in tripartite divisions of musical material (prevalent through 
the six-movement Les Espaces Acoustique cycle) is a hallmark of Les chants de l’Amour, and one 
reason why Grisey picked “I love you” as the germinal phrase for the piece may be its three 
word structure. (Figure 1 reveals that its phoneme content partitions fairly evenly into thirds.)
The extreme stretching of “I love you” could be read as a winking and sly maneuver, 
since it strips that expression of meaning and renders it impossible to discern except in its 
vestigial traces. Several sections of the piece are texted, typically containing one-word fragments 
like “love” or the names of famous lovers (for instance, “Romeo” and “Juliet”). Additionally, in 
several moments Grisey shades the phonemes such that they have a clear connotation, for 
instance with erotic panting or frightened declamations. The very act of writing a high-
modernist love song could be seen as subversive, a recourse to a mundane and low-brow topic. 
Yet Grisey seems to have viewed it as in line with musical modernism’s push against the 
boundaries of representation, and the ineffability of love seems to be what attracted Grisey to 
the subject. In the program note he writes: “In a recent interview, I was asked this question: 
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I - - - - -  Love - - You 
↓       ↓           ↓  
ɑ ɑ a æ E e I i y Y ø ǝ ʌ ɔ ʌ æ E e I y Y ø ǝ ʌ ɔ o U u
Figure 5.1: Grisey’s list of the 28 phonemes of “I Love You”
"Why love songs? I could not answer because if the love song, like the love poem, is a difficult 
genre, it is even more difficult to talk about it” (Grisey 1984).  3
Grisey’s sketches for Les Chants de l’Amour suggest that Grisey was looking to write a 
piece for choir that explored tropes familiar both to modernist works of that era and to spectral 
music: continuums between nonsense and sense, phonemes and complete text, and timbre and 
harmony. Figure 5.2 reproduces a scratch sheet of thematic material in the piece. Not all of the 
ideas on this scratch sheet are borne out in the final piece, but Grisey’s efforts at grappling with 
how to handle semantic and referential content in tandem with spectral aesthetic hallmarks is 
evident. He sees continuums between nonsense and sense, with the former being characterized 
by atomic elements of speech like vowels and consonants and the latter being characterized by 
text. 
The formant frequencies of “I love you” are used to govern much of the pitch material in 
the piece. Grisey et al (1985) reproduces the global pitch and formal chart of the piece, here 
printed as figure 3. The top line lists each of the 28 phonemes of “I love you” using the 
international phonetic alphabet; below that are two frequencies, which are the frequencies of the 
two loudest formants for each phoneme. Grisey then mapped these frequencies onto pitches, 
transposing them down an octave (that is, dividing the frequency in half). Presumably this was 
to bring the pitches into a more reasonable register for performance. Next, Grisey rounded those 
frequencies to the nearest partial of a low fundamental (indicated at bottom as H, or 
hyperfundamental). For instance, the first D and A of the phoneme “a” represent the 6th and 9th 
partials of the low hyperfundamental G (97.99 hertz). Shifts between hyperfundamentals are 
 Lors d'un entretien récent, on m'a posé cette question : « Pourquoi des chants d'amour ? » Je n'ai pas su 3





1) Voyelles = choeur
2) consonant/bruit = bande
Dissocier - bruits (plosives, sibilants) etc., tape
  - voyelles
↓
Associer - Texte = choeur
Apparition du sens vers la fin. (un au debut)
Trouver une phrase unique (richesse du matériau phonétique du sens.)
Non-Sens (dissociative) —> Sens (associative)
Consonances (Bruits) —> 
Voyelle (formants) —> morphemes —> phonèmes —> mots —> sens
signifié = signifiant? 
Evolution harmonique et mélodique provient des formants du chacune des voyelles utilisées
La forme est donc la projection touts le durée (l’étirement voir computer) de formants contenus dans un 
mot ou une phrase 
“Piece for Choir”
1) Vowels = choir
2) Consants/noises = tape
Dissociation - noises (plosives, sibilinats) etc., tape
- vowels
↓
Association - text = choir
Appearance of meaning toward the end. (One at the beginning). 
Find a unique phrase (richnesse in phonetic material and meaning)
Nonsense (dissociative) —> meaning (associative)
Consonants (noises) —>
Vowells (formants) —> morphemes —> phonemes —> words —> meaning
signified = signifier?
Harmonic and melodic evolution comes from the formants of each of the vowels used
The form is the projection of all the durations (stretching out, see computer) of the formants 
contained in one word or one phrase
Figure 5.2: Excerpts from a pre-compositional sketch of thematic material in Les Chants de 
l’Amour held in the Paul Sacher archive; English translation is mine and is not in original 
sketch
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Figure 5.3: Map of formal sections of piece and formant frequencies, from Grisey et al (1985)
meant to be moments of heightened drama in the piece, which Grisey calls “transitions by 
excess” which “causes the current process to deviate from its path for a short moment” (1985, 
218). 
Grisey’s rhetorical resources in each section are relatively tightly constrained by a 
scheme he outlines in figure 5.4. Grisey calls these “extremely simple” (1985, 219) and observes 
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Figure 5.4: Types of writing in Les Chants de l’Amour (from Grisey 1985)
that though they applied equally to the synthesized voice and the human choir, in practice they 
were interpreted differently. (For example, writing type “D” focused more on the blocks of 
homophony and names of famous lovers for the human choir, but in filter-based melodies with 
a steady pitch in the voice.) Grisey tracked these in a massive chart that I’ve reproduced in 
figures 5.5 and 5.6. Many parts of the chart were left blank and the most complete and 
consistent entries deal with the writing style scheme and the transitions between each section. 
Grisey divides each of the 28 formal sections into three sub-sections, which he describes as 
being like the phases of breathing: inhalation, exhalation, rest. In the piece’s program note he 
also describes these by analogy to the waveform of a sound, with section one’s dynamic climb 
being like “attack transients,” section two being like the “sound body,” and section three being 
like the “transient extinction.” Grisey also makes clear that “I / Love / You” correlates to 
sections 1, 2, and 3. In Grisey’s charts (figures 5 and 6), writing styles with a tick mark (‘) are 
close to the subsequent style: so, writing style A’ would be a mixture of A and B; A’’’ would be 
very close to B with a bit of A mixed in; and so forth. As Grisey’s formal chart makes clear, the 
large transitions between each hyperfundamental are always a transition by excess: dramatic 
moments in which things seem to spiral out of proportion. Furthermore, each of the three 
subsections of a phoneme has a markedly different writing style to create variation across each 
of the 28 sections. 
The tape voice in Les Chants de l’Amour is cobbled together from a mixture of sound 
synthesized using CHANT and recordings of spoken voices that Grisey processed and filtered 
using CHANT. The relationship between the tape voice and human choir provides the central 
drama in the piece. Of this relationship, Grisey wrote: “The [tape] voice, in turn divine, 





Phoneme Section and 
global 
fundamental
Système Repartition Noume Spectre Consonnes Durées Dynamique
ɑ S1 (H1) A’ 1 v + tape 
à 1 voix
16” pp
ɑ S2 A’’ 1 v 15” pp
a S3 A’’’ 1—> 2 v 13” p
æ S4 B 1—> 3v (1 
rev)
10” mp
E S5 B’ 1—>4v 9” mf
e S6 B’’ 1—> 5v 8” f
I S7 B’’’ 1—> 6v 7” ff
i S8 (H2) C tape à 2 
v ; solo 
tape
6” fff




Y S10 C’’ 1—> 6v ; 5; 
1
8.5” f
ø S11 C’'' 1—>5v; 4; 1 10" mf
ǝ S12 C’’'' 1—>4v; 2; 
1; 1
11.5” mp
ʌ S13 D (C’’’’’) 1—>3v; 1; 2 13" p
ɔ S14 (H3) D’ solo tape; 
tape à 3 
voix
i - - - - - - - ɔ  
inhumain - - 
humain
20” mp
ʌ S15 D’' olo tape euridice 16" mp















I S19 (H4) E’ solo tape 9” fff
y S20 E’' 1v tape 10" ff
Y S21 E’'' 1v 12” f
ø S22 E’''' 1v 13.2” mf
ǝ S23 (H5) F 15” mp
ʌ S24 F’ 17” mf
ɔ S25 F’’ 21” f
o S26 (H6) F’'' text Cortazar 
Rayuela
25.5” p
U S27 G tape respiration —> 
ronflement
28.716” pp
u S28 (H7) G’ + E’ tape grande polyphonie 
parlée / somme 
des durées
27.76” ff
Figure 5.5: Grisey’s sketch for each section of Les Chants de l’Amour, part I
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Table 1
II dyn ↘︎ III statique
Phoneme Section (& 
global 
fundamental)
Système Répartition Neume 
Spectre
Consonnes Durées Système Répartition Neume 
Spectre
Consonnes Durées Transition 
type
ɑ S1 (H1) F’ 2 m 27” E 14” silence
ɑ S2 F’' 2, 2/3;    
-5, 4
m, n, 27" E’ 12” silence
a S3 F’'' 2, 3;        
-4, 3
m, n, ß 23” E’' 11” tuilage
æ S4 G 2, 4 m, n, l, ß 25” F 11" analogie
E S5 G’ 3, 5/6 m, n, l, 
ß, ȡ
37” F’ 14" juxtaposit
ion
e S6 G’’ 4, 7/8 m, n, l, 
ß, ȡ, b, 
d, v
49” F’' 13” rupture
I S7 G’’' 5, 10 m, n, l, 
b, d, ȡ, v
62” F’’' 13”+20" excès




72” G 8.5” contraste




69” G’ 10.5” fusion






60” G’' 4 bruits ≠ Polyphonie 13" silence
ø S11 A’’' m, n, l, 





42” G’'' 5 bruits ≠ Polyphonie 13.5” tuilage




35” G’''' 6 bruits ≠ Polyphonie 13" fusion
ʌ S13 B (A’’’’) lʌv               
tvn, dvn
31” A 7 bruits ≠ Polyphonie 17” excès
ɔ S14 (H3) B' Amore 33” A’ ♀ 
“orpheo!”
11" silence
ʌ S15 B’' Love Dove 
Above
31.5” A’' 10.5" silence










35" A’''' 10.5" tuilage










p t k pr 
te ku ps 
ts kz
52” B’ 6” fusion
y S20 C’' neume 3 49" B’' 8" juxtaposit
ion
Y S21 C’'' neume 4 45” B’'' 9" silence
ø S22 C’’'' neume 6 40” B’''' 35” tr. par 
excès et 
fusion
ǝ S23 (H5) D 2, 5 35" C 10" tr. par 
silence
ʌ S24 D’ 2,4 33” C’ 12" tr. par 
rupture et 
tuilage
ɔ S25 D’’ 2, 3 34” C’' 40.5” tr par 
excès et 
fusion
o S26 (H6) D’’' berceuse 38” C’’' 10" tr. par 
fusion
U S27 E Bribes, 
Rêves, 
Souvenirs
52" (rest)+8” tr. par 
excès et 
fusion
u S28 (H7) E’ + G’ 55.377” 123” total
Figure 5.6: Grisey’s sketch for each section, part II
voices, doubles and multiplies itself into a crowd. It learns to breathe, to sing, to move, to 
stammer, and finally to speak 22 languages.”  Grisey’s interest was not in the imitation of the 4
human voice as much as the “deviations of these voices.” He continues: 
We discover several fields of perceptions and emotional reactions related to the avatars 
of the human voice: 
- Sung voice, well imitated, almost too pure, flawless. "What a voice!"
- Mysterious territories of the human voice put in unheard situations. "What happened 
to this voice?"
- Disquieting areas of the “organic” voice. Something or someone lives and breathes to 
produce that sound. "What is this monster?” 
- Reassuring areas of instrumental or electronic sound. "Ah! It's only a machine…"5
Such tropes bring Grisey into dialogue with other twentieth century artists who have 
engaged with the figure of the cyborg in music. Auner (2003) refers to musical representations 
of machines-as-human as “ventriloquism,” which he argues “can be linked to broader cultural 
changes associated with the digital technologies that are transforming our sense of reality, 
subjectivity, and the human” (101). He quotes Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto: “Late 
twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural 
and artificial, mind and body self-developing and externally designed, and many other 
distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines” (quoted in Auner 2003, 101). Auner, 
like Cox (2016), privileges the voice as a site of humanity and of expression, and suggests that 
the juxtaposition of the human voice with synthetic voice (and the potential subversion of the 
 Cette voix, tour à tour divine, monstrueuse, menaçante, séductrice, miroir et projection de tous les 4
fantasmes des voix humaines, se dédouble et se multiplie jusqu'à la foule. Elle apprend à respirer, à 
chanter, à émouvoir, à balbutier, enfin à parler 22 langues.
 Nous y découvrons plusieurs champs de perceptions et de réactions émotives liées aux avatars de la 5
voix humaine : - voix chantée, bien imitée presque trop pure, sans défaut. « Quelle voix ! », - territoires 
mystérieux de la voix humaine mise dans des situations inouïes. « Qu'est-il arrivé à cette voix ? », - zones 
inquiétantes de la voix « biologique ». Quelque chose ou quelqu'un vit et respire pour produire ce son. « 
Quel est ce monstre ? », - zones rassurantes du son instrumental ou électronique. « Ah ! Il ne s'agit que 
d'une machine... »
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human voice’s putative expressivity and the synthetic voice’s putative dispassion) is a site of 
expressive potential in recent music.
I find that the use of thematic material related to love in the piece’s narrative fosters my 
empathetic listening. To my ears, the CHANT-synthesized voice rarely sounds human in Les 
Chants de l’Amour: it either sounds deliberately synthetic, or falls into the so-called uncanny 
valley of near- (and thus plainly non-) human. Establishing a narrative framework (however 
loose) around love is a way of composing what Cox (2016) calls a mimetic invitation: an 
invitation for me as a listener to empathize with the machine and thus to consider what it 
would be like to express what it expresses. This in turn enables a perceptual broadening, an 
implicit imagined sense of what it would be like (or feel like) to sing or do something 
impossible. Rather, I am trying to imagine a particular listening mindset that would reflect 
certain aesthetic goals surrounding the use of synthesis to plumb the experientially new. 
However, while I’m not arguing that this experiential broadening does happen, I am suggesting 
that such an experience is possible for a listener to have. Examples from film scholarship may 
help illustrate.
Richmond (2016) scrutinizes the digital cinema techniques in Avatar and How To Train 
Your Dragon, which “both elicit from viewers a giddy, as-if sensation of flying through space: the 
illusion of bodily movement” (254). These illusions rely on immersion; or as Richmond puts it, 
they “modulate the embodied perception of their viewers to elicit an immersive sense of a 
world onscreen” (255). In such cinematic experiences, the camera plummets and I, immersed 
and empathetically engaged in an intersubjective relationship with the perspective of the 
camera, plummet too: my abdomen tenses and I lean in my seat. (Recall the example in my first 
chapter, of my experience watching a movie in a large iMax theater.) My perspective shifts from 
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third person (it is flying) to first person (I am flying). Richmond stresses that verisimilitude is 
not a requirement for this kind of immersion: “their sensation impact stems rather from 
perceptual effects like the illusion of bodily movement through immersive cinematic space…
rather than from verisimilitude, resemblance, or iconicity, categories of likeness that stem from 
understanding cinematic worlds as grounded in representation” (256-257). Richmond draws 
from the work of Vivian Sobchack, who describes a viewer’s encounter with the cinema as 
being not one of biological vs mechanical physicality but as no different from the relationship 
“between any singular embodied consciousness perceived as ‘mine’ and those ‘others’ that are 
understood only by virtue of my own experience of myself in the eyes of others and through my 
own intentional activity of inference” (Sobchack 1992 329, quoted in Richmond 264). Viewers do 
not empathize with the camera as camera, argues Sobchack, but rather “the viewer and the 
camera share the same interest in the world. They do not share the same place in the world, nor 
the same body” (ibid. 329/265, emphasis in original). This distinction has the effect not of saying 
that we, the human viewer, empathize with an inanimate object, so much as it says that we 
endow the inanimate object with intentionality, with agency, and empathize with that 
intentionality.
The same is true in listening to music, though I would argue that because film is more 
readily multisensory it provides a better illustration of these effects. What is an analogue for the 
experience of flight in music? Any time a listener has the experience of feeling what it would be 
like to do something that exceeds their actual bodily knowledge. Returning to the work of Cox 
(2016) discussed in chapter 2, this experience could be intra-modal: As a percussionist, I can 
hear a virtuosic pattern executed cleanly and enjoy the imaginative feeling of having played it, 
or of having the skill required to perform it — this despite quite possibly lacking that finesse. Or 
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it could be cross-modal: through subvocalization I could imagine the great strain and exertion 
of singing in the register of a piccolo flute (since I lack embodied knowledge of how to play the 
flute) even though this strain may be absent entirely from the performer. This approach forms 
the core of the approach to vocal timbre analysis in Heidemann (2016): the imagined strain and 
exertion one feels in trying to sing like Aretha Franklin is part of how we both decode and 
ascribe the affective and expressive intent of her singing. In Richmond’s analyses of Avatar and 
How To Train Your Dragon, a consideration of the expressive resources of the films (the corporeal 
and empathetic illusions of flight) was inseparable from both the technical apparatus that 
created it (the darkened cinema with its giant screen, cloistered off from the outside world; the 
techniques of digital imagery and sound design) and from the embodied and ecologically-
grounded perceptual apparatus that made it legible. By extension, a music analyst interested in 
explicating the expressive moments in Les Chants de l’Amour would profit from considering the 
nature of the synthesis software used and the ways it might activate certain faculties of listening 
in a suitably empathetic viewer.  I turn now to several moments in Les Chants de l’Amour that 
stage the human/machine tropes that Grisey describes in his program note. 
5.4 Analytic scenes
Grisey’s sometimes-glib attitude toward intelligibility is well encapsulated by the 
opening of the piece: 10 of the singers loudly declaim the sentence “Songs of love for all loving 
lovers of all the world” in 10 different languages, leaving about one second between each 
syllable. (See example 1.) The result is a powerful and jarring barking sound with barely-
recognizable fragments of text peeking through. Grisey’s affinity for sounds that lie at the 
precipice of separation and fusion is also present: several of the singers trail off after declaiming 
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their word, extending consonances in a downward glissando. Gradually, pitches of the 
harmonic series of the note G (the hyperfundamental of this section) are arpeggiated in upward 
gestures, first by the bass voices and gradually moving through to the soprani. The plainly 
stated arpeggiations of the harmonic series has the feeling of emergence and even of nascence, 
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Example 5.1: measures 1-3 of Les Chants de l’Amour
ushering in the introduction of the tape voice at rehearsal 1 (recording 1:05). The tape voice’s 
first utterance is in some respects remarkably similar to the vocal declamations: a loud, barking 
attack with a long tail. The noisy and weighty attack is surprising, a timbral world clearly 
distinct from that of the choir. The noise quickly fades and a droning G1 emerges. After a short 
pause, one of the basses sings an ascending D2-A2 perfect fifth above the tape’s G1 fundamental 
provided by the tape voice (figure 8). They enter into a pulsing duet, the “ma-ma” of the bass 
singer and the inchoate “ah-ah” murmurings of the tape voice making the earlier connotations 
of nascence even more explicit. 
My experience in listening to this passage is that the voice’s initial entrance is barely 
recognizable as a voice; it sounds like a low, droning synth pad. At rehearsal 2, when the voice 
starts to imitate the bass singer, I start to ascribe vocality to it, and the rhythmic repetition of the 
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Example 5.2: Rehearsal 2 from Les Chants de l’Amour
pulsing gesture encourages this response. The use of phonemes for text registers as child-like, 
and the timbre of the bass voice is very clean and soft. When I adopt a second-person listening 
stance, it sounds as if the tape voice has crashed to Earth and begun to learn how to speak by 
imitating the human choir. By 2:20 I find myself tracking the pulsing “ao” sounds of the tape 
voice, tensing slightly in my chest to match the way I would perform the tape part with my own 
voice.
At 26:00, the soprani and contralti sing a Bb4-E5 tritone in even quarter notes while the 
tape part holds the same pitches two octaves higher. The tape part sounds like violin harmonics, 
much too high to resemble vocality in my hearing. A bass singer enters with a low Ab, gravelly 
and guttural and slow, and the tape begins a gradual glissando down above that droning bass 
and drops in and out. At 26:37 a remarkable shift occurs: the tape becomes much more strongly 
vocal, uttering “eee ahhh” vowel sounds in a pulsing rhythm reminiscent of the quarter notes of 
the soprani and contralti at the start of this section. The tape voice sounds strained and pinched, 
like it’s running out of breath. I hear other voices too, or sometimes I hear the voice split into 
multiple voices. At 27:45 the same basic tape part repeats but trails off into the distance via the 
addition of reverb. I experience this as a strain, because I had been mimetically engaging with 
the tape voice’s pulses, in a first-person subject position. As the tape voice recedes via reverb 
and is colored by a filter, I find myself quieting down while also changing pitch repeatedly, a 
contradictory easing (by growing quieter) and elevating (by singing higher pitches) of tension.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: For a Posthumanist Embodied Cognition
This dissertation has suggested that listeners evaluate sound by drawing from our lived, 
bodily experience. A cello played fortissimo, sul ponticello, and overbowed would sound 
discomfiting and angry to a listener has a sense of the exertion, effort, and tension—and the 
affects, such as agitated or angry, they signify to that listener—that they would feel if they were 
to make that sound. Because I do not think it is possible to completely transcend or escape the 
residue of our sensorimotor imagery, our lived and embodied experience always leaves its 
fingerprints on our evaluation of musical sound even if we acknowledge that we perceive 
sound in an aesthetic context different from in an everyday ecological one. A perceiver’s 
deployment of embodied sensorimotor knowledge, encompassing the imagination of causal 
features of sounds, is hacked by electronic tools of sound creation and reproduction. In 
manipulating or outright creating instrumental timbre, performers and composers of electronic 
sound invite listeners to ascribe intentionality and agency to chimeric and impossible sounds. 
These impossible attributes are indexed in the timbre of sounds.
There arises a problem in this account of embodiment, which is made more pronounced 
in the course of considering the role played by the software and hardware in electronic and 
electroacoustic music. Without some nuancing, this descriptive/analytic approach risks 
reinscribing notions of the bounded individual that originate in Enlightenment humanism and 
radiate out across most of Western thought from the last 400 years. Braidotti (2013) critiques this 
received humanist tradition for its universalism, its reliance on binary oppositions like self and 
other, and its inextricable link with imperialism. “Subjectivity is equated with consciousness, 
universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical behavior,” she writes. “In so far as difference 
spells inferiority, it acquires both essentialist and lethal connotations for people who get 
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branded as ‘others’” (15). Does an account of embodiment simply reinscribe man—presumably 
white, able-bodied, centered and thus invisible to himself—as the literal measure of all things? 
Does embodied cognition merely move from a search for universals in music as an object—of 
quantifiable intervals between note X and Y generalized with formula J—to a search for 
universals in the perceiving subject? 
My hope is that the patchwork of authors I’ve invoked in this dissertation suggest a way 
around this dilemma, toward an embrace of the contingency of perception and an embrace of 
the value of deploying ones’ lived experience to convey an aesthetic experience 
intersubjectively. In shifting the focus from music as an object to music as a process—to 
musicking—we shift the emphasis to a musicking subject or subjects and to the social world in 
which they are embedded. I have centered my listening experience as a trained composer, 
performer, and music theorist, and at times extrapolated from my experience. But this is not in 
service of saying that one should or must hear in the way that I do; rather, it’s to suggest that 
someone could, and that hearing in this manner might produce certain experiences which are 
not typical for that listener.
Braidotti crafts a theory that is alternately anti- and post-humanist, replacing the unitary, 
bounded, and universal human subject with “a more complex and relational subject framed by 
embodiment, sexuality, affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities” (2013, 26). This 
posthumanism is one that sees non-human actors enfranchised with agency in our daily lives, in 
our thoughts and deeds. Artistic practice can make this relationship especially clear. Consider 
Boulez’s comments on analog synthesis in chapter 4 or Grisey’s use of the CHANT software in 
chapter 5: to say that the software enabled or constrained Grisey’s compositional maneuvers is 
another way of saying that it exerted an agency. There are things that users are inclined to do 
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with their tools, which is related to but distinct from the things they enable users to do. The 
residue of these bidirectional interactions and negotiations with tools endures in the 
imaginative act of listening. When I hear a synthesizer play an upward glissando, I might 
conceptualize it in relation to the feeling of performing a cello glissando. I might also (or might 
then) compare the synth-glissando-as-cello-glissando to a glissando with my voice, but this 
does not mean that I’ve peeled back layers of mediation like an onion to arrive at the essence of 
my understanding of the sound. The objects I consider become co-constitutive of my sum total 
experience of the sound, a negotiation between vocal exertion, gestural exertion with an object, 
and whatever other experiences I might consciously or unconsciously bring to bear on the 
percept.
I return to Hayles’ claim that “we have always been posthuman” (1999, 291),  insofar as 
human thought has always been entangled in a relational stance with objects, social forces, and 
corporeality. How we discursively construct ourselves in relation to our tools has implications 
for music analysts looking to make a particular musical experience legible to another listener, or 
to explain and decode a composer’s motivations for writing a particular passage. “As long as 
the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous self with unambiguous boundaries,” Hayles 
writes, “the human-computer interface can only be parsed as a division between the solidity of 
real life on one side and the illusion of virtual reality on the other…By contrast, when the 
human is seen as part of a distributed system, the full expression of human capability can be 
seen precisely to depend on the splice rather than being imperiled by it” (290). 
My claim that artists can use technology to construct or make possible a feeling that is 
outside of a listener’s body’s sense of itself—such as flying at the movies, or whispering but 
filling up a cavernous space—relies on the same distributed subjectivity and cognitive scaffolds 
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as all other manner of experience even if it feels qualitatively at a remove from it. It also relies 
on a capacity for imagination and for empathy (including empathizing with actors traditionally 
thought to be inanimate or inhuman). In pushing these experiences to their extremes, 
composers like Grisey, Murail, Saariaho, and Risset reveal for some listeners the co-constitutive 
relationship of body, tool, and world through the very act of straining it.   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